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Over the last two decades, US corporate governance has witnessed a significant 
increase in the incidence and influence of shareholder activism. Shareholder activism, 
however, has been found to be inconsistent with US corporate governance which is 
framed within director primacy theory. In this theory, the board is able to carry out a 
unique combination of managerial and monitoring roles effectively, and shareholders 
are only capital providers to companies. Shareholder activism is normatively found 
inimical to effective and efficient decision-making, i.e. the board’s authority, and to 
the long-term interests of public companies. The increasing willingness of institutional 
shareholders to participate into the decision-making processes of their portfolio 
companies is at odds with US corporate governance. Therefore, the aim of this thesis 
is to examine whether director primacy theory should be softened to accommodate 
greater shareholder activism in US corporate governance. 
 This thesis presents an analysis of the legal rules that reflect director primacy 
theory. In this respect, US shareholders have traditionally had limited participatory 
power. The way in which the courts perceived the board’s authority also stymied 
shareholder participation. This thesis considers not only legal and regulatory 
developments in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, but also the governance 
developments through by-law amendments which could potentially make an overall 
change in the balance of power between shareholders and the board. Shareholders are 
slowly moving to the centre of corporate governance in the US. 
  History has shown that the board of directors often failed to prevent manager-
induced corporate governance failures. This thesis argues that shareholder activism is 
necessary for improving the web of monitoring mechanisms and for a well-functioning 
director primacy model. Shareholder activism forces the board to more critical about 
management, which is a prerequisite for the director primacy model. Therefore, this 
thesis argues that shareholder activism should therefore be accommodated into US 
corporate governance. The proposed approach addresses accountability problems 
more effectively than the current director primacy model while recognising the board 
authority and enhances decision-making processes of public companies. In this regard, 
it makes  several recommendations to soften the current director primacy model: 
establishing a level playing for private ordering, adopting the proxy access default 
regime, the majority voting rule, the universal proxy rules, and enhancing the 
disclosure requirements of shareholders. 
 The present research also demonstrates that contemporary shareholder 
activism involves many complexities. It contains different types of shareholder 
activism, which differ by objectives, tools, and motives. It could be used for purely 
financial purposes or non-financial purposes or both. Furthermore, the concept of 
stewardship has been developed to address public interest concerns, namely short-
termism in the market and pressures by activist funds through shareholder activism. 
In this way, this thesis develops a complete positive theory about shareholder activism 
rather than focussing on a specific type of activism. This complete analytical 
framework constitutes more reliable basis to draw normative conclusions rather than 





Shareholder activism has become very topical in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. Institutional shareholders, in particular activist funds, are criticised for forcing 
companies to pay out their profits immediately and for pursuing short-term interests 
at the expense of the long-term interests of companies and other stakeholders, such as 
employees or creditors. The board and management, therefore, are compelled to 
transfer wealth from the company to shareholders. Institutional shareholders are 
regarded as ‘short-term’ predators who only focus on increasing share prices before 
its long-term impact on the company is felt. In this respect, shareholder activism has 
negative implications on the economy, society and even the environment by 
preventing the board and management from exercising their authority independently. 
It has often been argued that the board and management should be insulated from 
shareholder activism. 
 This thesis demonstrates that we should not think that self-interested and short-
term institutional shareholders are the only institutional shareholders in the market. 
Not all institutional shareholders are short-term investors. On the contrary, mainstream 
institutional shareholders are primarily long-term investors. They had been 
traditionally passive investors. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, they began 
investment policies that sought to build long-term investments in their portfolio 
companies and take into consideration non-financial concerns. Activist funds are 
different from mainstream institutional shareholders. They are relatively short-term 
investors that seek to obtain abnormal returns. They aim to make controversial changes 
such as the sale of a department of the target company, spinoff of a subsidiary 
company or reduce R&D spending at the target companies. Despite this negative 
image, activist funds play a key role in corporate governance. They raise legitimate 
question in the boardroom and between shareholders and serve an important 
monitoring role over underperforming boards and management teams.  
 This thesis, therefore, argues that shareholder activism broadly benefits 
shareholders, companies and capital markets. So, company law should encourage 
shareholders to be active while preserving sufficient independence for the board and 
management. In this way, shareholders could contribute new ideas as well as financial 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background to this Research 
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine the question of whether director primacy 
theory should be softened to accommodate greater shareholder activism in US 
corporate governance. In doing so, this study builds a theoretical framework for the 
evolving role of shareholders in the US to analyse how the role of shareholders has 
been incorporated into practice in the US and to examine whether it should be further 
accommodated into US corporate governance. Under US corporate governance, 
directors are vested with authority to manage the company. The board of directors is 
generally protected from shareholder interference; therefore, US corporate governance 
is described as one that adopts the director primacy theory as the best means to ensure 
shareholder wealth. However, there have been significant market and policy 
developments that incentivise and encourage shareholders to participate in the 
management of companies. This causes tension between directors and shareholders in 
the US. This thesis, therefore, investigates whether shareholders should be further 
accommodated into US corporate governance by considering the potential benefits 
and side effects of shareholder activism.   
 In its simplest definition, corporate governance is a ‘system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’.1 It contains a combination of legal rules and 
principles which have been developed over time and are based on the distinctive 
features of each nation’s legal and financial tradition.2 If one needed to categorise 
corporate governance systems, it could be done under two major types: the ‘outsider’ 
(Anglo-American)  and the ‘insider’ (continental European) models.3 The primary 
differences between these dichotomous corporate governance models are the share 
                                                 
1 Adrian Cadbury et al., Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance (Gee, 
1992), para 2.5.  
2 Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach (2007, Abingdon: 
Routledge), 170. 
3 See, Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th edition, OUP, 2013) Chapter 10; Ruth Aguilera and 
Gregory Jackson, ‘The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and 




ownership structure of public companies and their predominant objectives of public 
companies.4 With regard to the share ownership of companies, in outsider corporate 
governance models, shares of large companies are usually held by widely dispersed 
shareholders and this contrasts with companies in continental Europe and the insider 
model where large companies tend to have a controlling shareholder.5 The ownership 
of shares is, therefore, separated from the control in outsider corporate governance 
models. As regards the objectives of public corporations, in outsider corporate 
governance models the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth prevails as the 
fundamental objective of public corporations, while in insider corporate governance 
models, corporations tend to embrace the interests of different stakeholders such as 
employees, creditors, and suppliers.6   
 The similar ownership pattern and objectives of public companies gave rise to 
the implicit assumption that there is a unified and stable Anglo-American corporate 
governance model. This assumption is rightfully challenged in the literature on the 
grounds of its failure to take into account the allocation of powers between 
shareholders and directors.7 In this respect, a further distinction is made between 
director primacy and shareholder primacy, depending on whether directors or 
shareholders should have ultimate control over corporate affairs.8 US corporate 
                                                 
4 Ruth Aguilera and Gregory Jackson, ‘The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: 
Dimensions and Determinants’ (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 447; John Armour, Simon 
Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate 
Governance’ (2003) 41(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations 531, 533; Ruth Aguilera, ‘Corporate 
Governance and Director Accountability: an Institutional Comparative Perspective’ (2005) 16 British 
Journal of Management 39. 
5 Cynthia Williamson and John Conley, ‘An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American 
Shareholder Value Construct’, (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 493, 498; Ruth Aguilera 
and Gregory Jackson, ‘The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and 
Determinants’ (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 447, 448-450; Ruth Aguilera et al, ‘Putting 
the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2007) 32(3) The Academy of Management Review 836, 
845. 
6 see, Andrew Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United 
Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 577; Aguilera 
(n 5), 836-863.  
7 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate’ (2002) 16 The 
Transnational Lawyer 45.  
8 Stephen Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance: In Theory and Practice (OUP 2008); Stephen 
Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 Northwestern 




governance is better described by the notion of director primacy, while the UK follows 
the shareholder primacy model.9  
 The core tenet of US corporate governance is its trust in directors and the 
limited role for shareholders. ‘Shareholders exercise virtually no control over either 
day-to-day operations or long-term policy’.10 The board of directors is vested with 
managerial power to make the vast majority of corporate decisions. As Bainbridge 
argues, ‘corporation law virtually carves the separation of ownership and control into 
stone’.11 Likewise, Delaware’s traditional approach to companies has been described 
by the leading judges of the Delaware Court as follows:  
‘The notion that stockholders should have the power to disrupt the functioning 
of the republic whenever they see fit is viewed as fundamentally inconsistent 
with the Delaware model of the corporation … [T]he election of directors is the 
one area in which stockholders may act affirmatively … [T]he normative appeal 
of this analogy to republican democracy is limited, however, by the realities of 
the corporate election process. One fundamental reality is that the annual 
election process is tilted heavily towards management and does not operate in a 
way that encourages genuine choice or debate.’12 
Shareholder participatory rights are considered so weak that ‘they scarcely qualify as 
part of corporate governance’.13  
 Legal constraints that prevent shareholders from exercising control and 
influence over the board and management are supplemented by economic factors. 
Shareholder activism is generally assumed to be prohibitively expensive for 
shareholders because any benefit flowing from activism will be equally shared 
amongst shareholders, while the cost is borne by the activist shareholder. In other 
words, shareholders are generally assumed to be ‘rationally pathetic’ or ‘rationally 
                                                 
9 Christopher Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations 
of Shareholder Power (CUP 2013); John Armour and Joseph McCahery, ‘Introduction’ in John Armour 
and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities 
Regulation in Europe and the US (Hart Publishing 2006) 13; Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth 
(Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012) 56; Sofie Cools, ‘The Real Difference between the US and 
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers’ (2005) 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 697 . 
10 Bainbridge (n 7) 46. 
11 Stephen Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (n 8) 4. 
12 William Allen, Jack Jacobs and Leo Strine, ‘The Great Takeover Debate : A Meditation on Bridging 
the Conceptual Divide’ (2002) 69 The University of Chicago Law Review 1067, 1094. 




passive’ because of collective action and free-rider problems.14 The limited 
shareholder influence over corporate decision-making is often thought to be the way 
it ought to be,15 given the economic efficiency of a centralised decision-making body 
that has power to act by fiat.16  
 As with all powers, directors and managers could exercise power inefficiently 
or to advance their own private interests. The separation of ownership and control 
gives rise to significant agency and accountability problems in public companies.17 
Under agency cost theory, directors and managers are the agents of shareholders 
(principals) and manage companies on behalf of shareholders. As a result, ensuring 
the accountability of directors18 and addressing the agency problems became the 
primary concerns of company law.19  
 In ensuring accountability in companies, director primacy relies heavily on the 
market for corporate control. Under the market for corporate control, it is usually 
assumed that dissatisfied shareholders exercise monitoring function by selling shares, 
thereby leading to a decrease in the share price of the company and making hostile 
takeovers possible.20 It is argued that the market for corporate control encourages 
managers to act ‘as if they have the shareholders’ interests at heart’.21 Exit, i.e. the 
‘Wall Street Walk’, is regarded as a more effective way to express dissatisfaction with 
the management and to address accountability concerns within the corporation. The 
                                                 
14 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 
Publishers 2009); Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Harvard University Press 1991) 65-8. 
15 Jennifer Hill, ‘Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder’ (2000) 48 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 39, 57. 
16 Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance: In Theory and Practice (n 8)  38-53. 
17 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
18 Iris Chiu, The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism (Hart 2010) 22. 
19 Klaus Hopt, ‘Comparative Company Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006), 1180-86; Gordon Smith, ‘Corporate 
Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from Kmart’ (1996) 74 North Carolina Law 
Review 1059, 1054; John Armour, Henry, Henry Hansmann, and Reiner Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems 
and Legal Strategies’ in Reiner Kraakman et al., (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative 
and Functional Approach (OUP 2017) 29.     
20 See, Henry Butler, ‘The Contractual Theory of the Corporation’ (1989) 11 George Mason University 
Law Review 99, 111; There are also other types of the discipline of the market. See Chapter 2. 




market for corporate control has also found its place in court decisions: ‘[t]he redress 
for failures that arise from faithful management must come from the markets …’22 In 
addition, director primacy theory relies on the dynamics of the boardroom, the 
corporate hierarchy in monitoring managers and directors themselves, independent 
directors, and remuneration contracts.23  
 History, however, has shown a great number of corporate governance scandals 
caused by the failure of these accountability mechanisms. A lack of efficient control 
mechanisms could incentivise shirking, extracting value from companies or to taking 
excessive risks for lavish salaries. In the Enron, WorldCom and Tyco fiascos, auditors 
failed to detect the irregularities in financial statements of companies because of the 
compensation structures of audit firms.24 In addition to the failure of the auditors, the 
Enron board, regarded as one of the best boards of a publicly held company, failed to 
monitor fraudulent transactions of managers leading to the company’s collapse due to 
its overreliance on the management.25 In the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the board of 
Citigroup faced serious allegations that directors failed to oversee the transactions of 
management despite the existence of ‘red flags’ that signalled potential problems in 
the way in which the company was managed.26 Similarly, the board of directors at 
Lehman Brothers were dysfunctional and lacked the relevant expertise and knowledge 
to understand and to monitor the transactions undertaken by management.27 The total 
cost of the 2007-2008 financial crisis was around $11.9 trillion.28 These cases are good 
examples of the costs of failure of accountability mechanisms, and also show that 
centralised management by a board does not always result in the most efficient type 
                                                 
22 In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation 907 A.2d 693 (Del.Ch., 2005). 
23 Bainbridge, (n 7) 51.  
24 John Coffee, ‘What Caused Enron – A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s’ (2004) 
89 Cornell Law Review 272.  
25 Bernard Sharfman and Steven Toll, ‘Dysfunctional Deference and Board Composition: Lessons From 
Enron’ (2008) 103 Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 153.  
26 See, In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A. 2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).  
27 Grant Kirkpatrick, ‘The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ (2009) 2009(1) 
Financial Market Trends 21-2. 
28 William Sun, Jim Stewart, and David Pollard (eds) Corporate Governance a nd The Global Financial 




of management. It also demonstrates that the board may fail to carry out its expected 
role under director primacy system of corporate governance.  
 Institutional shareholders were not regarded as having capacity to monitor the 
board and management and to participate in the decision-making processes of public 
companies.  A major impediment to shareholder activism is that it is not an easy option 
for them because of legal and regulatory obstacles and the problem of collective action 
and free-riding. There have been promising developments in the global economy and 
the markets that have reshaped the incentives of shareholders,29 and improved the 
means of communication, technology and trading patterns.30 These developments 
have made activism more likely than ever before. The foremost development was the 
transformation of share ownership of listed companies from individual to institutional 
ownership.31 In particular, private savings for the long term such as pensions played a 
pivotal role in the emergence of the privately-managed investment industry. The assets 
under management of the investment industry reached $36.1 trillion in 2015.32 The 
economic growth of the investment industry is an indication of the socio-economic 
importance of institutional investment in the economy and society. In addition to the 
traditional institutional investors, activist funds have emerged and begun to engage in 
high profile activism.33 The changing tactics of activist funds have mobilised 
traditionally passive institutional shareholders.  
 In the post-financial crisis era, shareholders are perceived as being able to 
exercise monitoring over the management of portfolio companies in a way which 
generates overall social benefit and also addresses accountability concerns in the 
corporate sector. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK issued the 
                                                 
29 Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and 
The Revaluation of Governance Rights’ (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 863. 
30 Brian Cheffins and John Armour, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge 
Funds’ (2011) 37 The Journal of Corporation Law 52, 72. 
31 See Brian Cheffins and Steven Bank, ‘Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?’ (2009) 83 Business History 
Review 443. 
32 The Boston Consulting Group, ‘Global Asset Management’ (2016) 
http://www.agefi.fr/sites/agefi.fr/files/fichiers/2016/07/bcg-doubling-down-on-data-july-2016_tcm80-
2113701.pdf accessed 19 June 2017.    
33 Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence’ 




‘Stewardship Code’ (SC), which requires institutional shareholders to engage with 
their investee companies.34 A stewardship movement has also emerged in the US, 35 
but as a result of bottom-up market forces. In practice, this movement seeks to firm up 
shareholder behaviour to facilitate long-term investment and to control short-termism 
and pressures from activist funds. Active monitoring can be an accountability 
mechanism that protects and promotes shareholders’ own interests, and acts as a proxy 
for protecting and promoting the long-term interests of the company and economy as 
a whole.  
 The final challenge is that even if shareholder activism is possible, it could 
arguably have a negative impact on the decision-making processes of companies, 
cause short-termism at the expense of the long-term interest of companies and other 
stakeholders, and lead to the extraction of private benefits from the company.36 This 
anti-shareholder empowerment rhetoric has dominated the US literature and law-
making process.37 Even in the post-Enron era, lawmakers have sought to enhance 
shareholder protection rather than shareholder participation.38 However, the 2007-
2008 financial crisis has triggered legal and regulatory reforms to empower 
shareholders to ensure the accountability of directors and the financial stability of 
markets.39 
1.2 Objectives of the Research  
Given the recent developments in corporate governance, the possibility of changes in 
the field, and tensions between director primacy and increasing shareholder activism, 
this thesis contributes to the recurring theme of the allocation of power between 
                                                 
34 FRC, The UK Stewardship Code (Revised 2012). The Code aims to ‘promote the long term success 
of companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper. Effective stewardship 
benefits companies, investors and the economy as a whole’. 
35 Investor Stewardship Group, ‘The Stewardship Principles’ 
https://www.isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/.  
36 See Chapter 3; Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (Kindle Ed., Berret-Koehler Publishers 
2012); Martin Lipton and Steven Rosemblum, ‘Election Contests in the Company`s Proxy An Idea 
Whose Time Has not Come’ (2003) 59 The Business Lawyer 67; Stephen Bainbridge,  ‘The Case for 
Limited Voting Rights’ (2006) 53 UCLA Law Review 601.  
37 See Chapter 3 and 5. 
38 The aim of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is ‘to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability 
of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes’. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
39 The Preamble of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
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shareholders and directors in public companies by exploring the theoretical 
foundations, legal changes and future development of shareholder power in the US 
context. The emerging investor paradigm requires us to consider properly the context 
in which the activist funds and the awakening mainstream institutional investors are 
placed. However, it is not clear how this can fit into the US corporate governance 
model which generally does not welcome shareholder participation in the management 
of companies. This study will contain an analysis of the director-orientated rules and 
doctrines accepted by the courts, as well as the legal and regulatory reform suggestions 
in company law in order to speculate on the way forward for the US. Taking into 
account the tension between shareholders, the board and managers, the following 
research question will be examined in detail: 
a- Should the current director primacy theory be softened to accommodate the 
developing role of shareholders in US corporate governance?  
In answering the core research question, there are additional questions that need to be 
answered: 
b- What is the role of shareholders under contractarian and director primacy 
theories? To what extent could directors and managers be held accountable 
within the boundaries of contractarian and director primacy theories?  
c- Is the evolving role of shareholder activism desirable, given the potential 
problems that shareholder activism might cause in corporate governance? 
d- What are the features and types of institutional investors? 
e- To what extent is shareholder activism practicable (i) in US company law and 
(ii) with the context of the judicial interpretation of director primacy in the US? 
f- Are the concepts of authority and accountability compatible? Are there any 
legal reforms which would enhance the functioning of shareholder activism 
while providing sufficient room for directors?   
It adopts both positive and normative approaches. First, it contributes to the knowledge 
of how different types of shareholder activism have taken place in the market, and how 
institutional shareholders interact with other institutions of corporate governance and 
features of the monitoring environment. Second, in normative terms, it seeks to justify 
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and pinpoint, the ways in which shareholder activism can be enhanced as an 
accountability mechanism.  
 These questions will be answered in the context of corporate governance in 
public companies in the US, since shareholder activism in privately-held companies 
would require consideration of other issues,40 and deserve a separate discussion. The 
research will also confine its discussion of shareholder activism to activism among 
institutional shareholders, since they are the major owners of the shares of public 
companies, and individual shareholders are often too dispersed and unmotivated to 
engage in activism. Therefore, the activities of individual shareholders will not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
 US law has been chosen as the focus for this research owing to its unique 
approach to the role of shareholders in corporate governance. It is also valuable in 
company law studies and has a strong influence on other jurisdictions. In the US, there 
are 51 state jurisdictions which can be chosen as a formal domicile for a company.41 
As such, it is impossible to examine all of these jurisdictions in a single thesis. 
Therefore, Delaware was chosen as a proxy since its leading position as the preferred 
state of incorporation is beyond dispute.42 
1.3 Original Contribution to the Field 
In recent years, a considerable corpus of material on shareholder activism or the role 
of shareholders has been published. Yet a lot of diversity exists in the literature as each 
scholar approaches shareholder activism from their own unique perspective. It is 
therefore impossible to provide an all-encompassing literature review. However, it is 
useful to examine how key arguments have been discussed in the literature in order to 
                                                 
40 In the privately-held companies, the separation of ownership and control is almost fictional. In these 
companies, major shareholders are often also directors and managers. Shareholder-managers could 
ignore the interests of companies and other shareholders in performing managerial activities. It is also 
possible that major shareholders could obtain private benefits from companies and other shareholders. 
Hence, the privately-held companies have different internal dynamics and face different corporate 
governance problems than public companies. See, Howard Friedman, Publicly Held Corporations 
(OUP 2011) 3; Mark Roe, ‘The Institutions of Corporate Governance’ in Claude Ménard and Mary 
Shirley (eds), Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Springer 2008) 371.   
41 Marc Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart 2013) 106. 
42 Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, ‘Firm’s Decision Where to Incorporate’ (2003) 46 Journal of Law 
and Economy 383.  
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demonstrate how this thesis develops its own position. This thesis adds value to the 
literature by examining how the emerging shareholder and board relationship in the 
US could affect the current incarnation of the director primacy theory applicable in 
the US. Issues around the allocation of power have been examined from competing 
theories and the discussion primarily revolves around who should have the ultimate 
power in companies. However, their consideration remains limited in the context of 
the market and policy developments regarding institutional shareholders. This thesis, 
therefore, brings new perspectives that challenge inherent assumptions in the 
literature, and also makes a number of timely contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge regarding the role of shareholders in US corporate governance in the post-
crisis era.  
 
 Bainbridge is a pioneer in the legal literature on director primacy theory with 
a large number of publications on the topic.43 Centralised management with authority 
is of survival value to public companies because it lowers costs relating to uncertainty 
and opportunism and delivers the benefits of specialised and informed management. 
Directors have clear decision-making advantages compared to shareholders with 
varying interests and levels of information. The core claim of this theory is that 
companies are managed most efficiently when the authority is centralised as much as 
possible in the hands of a board of directors. The centralised authority provides a level 
of efficiency that could not be achieved by shareholder decision-making in large 
companies. This theory assumes that the board has capacity to carry out a unique 
combination of ‘advice giving, on-going supervision, and crisis management.’44 In 
director primacy theory, shareholder activism is incompatible with the centralised 
authority of the board because of the inherent trade-off between authority and 
accountability. Therefore, ‘one must not lightly interfere with management or the 
board’s decision-making authority in the name of accountability’.45 Therefore, 
shareholder participation in decision-making means a reduction in authority for the 
                                                 
43 Bainbridge (n 8); Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2005) 
119 Harvard Law Review 1735; Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers’ (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 769. 
44 Bainbridge (n 8) 161. 




board which is counterproductive.  Since shareholder activism is inefficient, the 
adherents to director primacy do not anticipate demanding a greater participatory 
role.46 The proponents of different versions of director primacy theory argue that 
shareholder activism causes short-termism in corporate governance and forces 
companies to follow risky business strategies at the expense of other stakeholders.47 
Some scholars also place emphasis on self-interested actions of shareholders and intra-
shareholder conflicts which may occur where a group of shareholders follow their own 
interests.48 Thus, shareholder activism is considered a potential threat to the efficient 
functioning of public companies. In addressing accountability problems, this theory 
relies on board dynamics, the market for corporate control and other corporate control 
mechanisms, viz. non-executive directors, remuneration contracts, and auditors 
monitoring directors and managers. However, while this thesis fully acknowledges the 
economic efficiency of the centralised management with authority model, some of its 
arguments are challenged. 
 
 In this regard, this thesis highlights that these corporate control mechanisms 
are subject to inherent limitations as they fail to monitor directors and managers and 
mitigate their inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Moreover, the board often fails to carry 
out this unique role and exercise adequate oversight of management to prevent 
manager-induced failures because of the de facto power of management in the 
decision-making process of large companies. Independent directors of course increase 
the monitoring capacity of the board, but they are not substantively independent of 
management because they are dependent on it for information and resources. The 
board’s capacity to carry out such a unique role is not fully adequate. The failures of 
Enron and Lehman Brothers are typical examples of how the boards could fail to 
monitor management effectively.49 When they fail adequately to exercise their roles, 
                                                 
46 Richard Buxbaum, ‘Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine,’ (1984) 45 Ohio 
State Law Journal 515, 526 (describes the evolution of shareholders to investors in the market); Henry 
Manne, ‘Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics’ (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 259, 
260-1. 
47 see fn. 36.  
48 see Chapter 3. 
49 For instance, the independent board of directors at Lehman Brothers was dysfunctional in the wake 
of the financial crisis. Members of the board satisfied the independence requirements of the New York 




failure could have a massive negative impact on the market. In addition, US company 
law provides strong protection to directors who underperform, pursue controversial 
business strategies or fail to monitor managers; hence, the duty of care is almost 
irrelevant to US public companies. The law does not provide sufficient deterrence for 
inefficient and ineffective directors and managers. In consideration of the importance 
of accountability of directors and managers in the interests of shareholders and 
companies, this thesis illustrates how the web of accountability mechanisms possess 
limited capacity to prevent directors and managers from shirking or engaging in rent-
seeking behaviour. Hence, there is a need for better functioning corporate governance, 
which addresses accountability problems more effectively than the current state of 
model and enhances decision-making processes of public companies.  
 
 In order to address accountability problems in public companies, shareholder 
primacy theory attributes a greater role to shareholders. ‘Shareholder primacy 
contends not only that shareholders are the principals on whose behalf corporate 
governance is organised, but also that shareholders do (and should) exercise ultimate 
control of the corporate enterprise’.50 Since shareholders are residual claimants and 
principals, they are deemed to have the right, interest and incentive to make efficient 
decisions; therefore, they should have ultimate control.51 Shareholder empowerment 
is therefore an important tool to deal with agency problems. Bebchuk played a pivotal 
role in the shareholder empowerment debate and called for greater power for 
shareholders.52 This line of debate relies on the role of shareholder empowerment in 
increasing the efficiency of companies rather than any concern for the intrinsic value 
                                                 
company undertook in the market. See, David Larcker and Brian Tayan, ‘Lehman Brothers: Peeking 
under the Board Facade’ (4 June 2010) Stanford Closer Look Series; see also Bernard Sharfman and 
Steven Toll, ‘Dysfunctional Deference and Board Composition: Lessons From Enron’ (2008) 103 
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 153. 
50 Bainbridge, ‘The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (n 8), 563. 
51 Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 439, 441.  
52 Lucian Bebchuk, ‘The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise’ (2007) 93 Virginia Law Review 675; 
Luician  Bebchuk, ‘Letting Shareholders Set the Rules’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 1784; Lucian 
Bebchuk, ‘The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Longterm Value’ (2013) 113 Columbia Law 
Review 1637; see also, George Dent, ‘The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor 




of shareholder democracy.53 Bebchuk, who is the leading scholar for shareholder 
empowerment, proposed to grant decision-making powers to shareholders to amend 
charters, to change the state of incorporation, and to initiate business decisions of 
substantial importance.54 The proponents of shareholder primacy theory highlight that 
shareholders have insufficient power, and establish a link between shareholder 
empowerment and the financial performance of companies. However, they little about 
how shareholder activism can function to improve corporate performance.55 The 
challenge for the proponents of shareholder empowerment is the measurement of the 
efficiency of empowerment, an area on which much ink has been spilt.56 As will be 
seen throughout the thesis, the empirical evidence is inconclusive and can be 
challenged.57 Therefore, it cannot provide sufficient theoretical and empirical support 
for the role of shareholders in corporate governance. 
 The Desirability of Shareholder Activism from the Perspective of the Exit, 
Voice, and Loyalty framework    
Since the empirical evidence is inconclusive, the desirability of shareholder activism 
cannot be adequately determined on that basis alone. To explore the role of 
shareholder activism fully and how it functions, this thesis engages with Hirschman’s 
influential book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
                                                 
53 Bebchuk, ‘The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise’ (n 52) 678. 
54 See, Lucian Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 
833.   
55 See for a similar criticism, Robert Thompson and Paul Edelman, ‘Corporate Voting’ (2009) 62(1) 
Vanderbilt Law Review 129, 145. 
56 Roberta Romano, ‘Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of 
Corporate Governance’ (2001) 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 174, 176-7; Bernard Black, ‘Shareholder 
Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States’ (1998) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=45100 accessed 10 May 2017; see for a literature 
review of empirical studies on shareholder activism, Stuart Gillan and Laura Starks, ‘The Evolution of 
Shareholder Activism in the United Stated’ (2007) 19(1) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 55, 60-
61 (Gillan and Starks examined 39 empirical studies on shareholder activism, and show that study 
results are mixed); Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire, ‘Principal Cost: A New Theory for Corporate 
Law and Governance’ (2017) 117 Columbia Law Review 767 section IV.A.   
57 See note 56; John Coffee, and Darius Palia, ‘The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Corporate Governance’ (2016) 1 Annals of Corporate Governance 1; see for another 
challenges in the past, Lynn Stout, ‘The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control’ (2007) 93 Virginia 
Law Review 789, 798–99 (finds weak evidence for greater shareholder franchise); see for the relevant 
literature on the lack of any consistent relationship between shareholder empowerment and overall 
financial performance.  Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire, ‘Principal Cost: A New Theory for 




Organisations, and States,58 which considers voice to be a feedback mechanism. In 
principle, shareholder activism functions as a feedback mechanism and alerts the 
management of a particular organisation about the underperformance of the 
organisation, while exit alerts the management through market.59 Shareholder activism 
is an attempt to change the policies of an organisation, through petition or other means 
to management directly in charge or through appeal to a higher authority.60 Therefore, 
voice i.e. shareholder activism is strongly related to political behaviour.61 Voice allows 
shareholders to correct the egregious failures of the board and management before it 
is too late. Shareholder activism direct the board toward a policy with the lowest 
agency cost problems. Each company derives diverse benefits from activism, 
depending on its features. For instance, a company operating in a competitive market 
may benefit from immediate responses from the market. Therefore, short-term 
responses of shareholders could be beneficial for some companies. However, it might 
be destructive for another company. In other words, voice could be excessive for a 
particular organisation as well.62 Overall, shareholder activism functions as a feedback 
mechanism and has a firm-specific nature. 
 A More Complete Framework for Shareholder Activism      
In the post-crisis era, shareholder activism is blamed for injecting short-termism in 
corporate governance and destroying the long-term interests of public companies.63 
However, such criticism fails to reflect contemporary shareholder activism because 
there is no single type of shareholder activism. In order to tackle this problem, this 
thesis considers shareholder activism as a collection of different types of shareholder 
activism, that differ by objectives, methods, and motives.64 In this respect, it provides 
an alternative and better positive theory how shareholder activism functions and 
interact with the board and management. Hence, with the help of this complete 
framework, we can draw coherent and consistent normative conclusions regarding the 
                                                 
58 Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Harvard University Press 1970). 
59 Hirschman (n 58), 30. 
60 Hirschman (n 58), 30. 
61 Hirschman (n 58), 15-6. 
62 Hirschman (n 58), 70. 
63 See note 36. 
64 See Chapter 4. 
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allocation of power between directors and shareholders. This framework avoids us 
from being trapped in the polar characterisation of shareholders by the proponents of 
director primacy and shareholder primacy theories. Shareholder activism could be 
related to financial issues as well as those of non-financial issues such as 
environmental, social and governance nature. The different groups of institutional 
shareholders serve different functions in corporate governance. In this context, activist 
investors reveal the flaws of corporate strategies mostly from the performance of 
financial performance. Some mainstream investors are informed voters and are willing 
to support activist proposals if they believe activist proposals are likely to increase 
shareholder value. On 31 January 2017, major mainstream institutional shareholders 
published the Stewardship Principles and developed a new paradigm.65 These 
investors facilitate direct engagement with the board and are willing to contribute to 
the development of business strategies for long-term value creation rather than 
immediate share price increases. ESG (environmental, social and governance), and 
CSR (corporate social responsibility) issues are important for these investors. These 
mainstream investors show that there could be a middle ground between shareholder 
primacy and board primacy theories because the way in which they exercise 
shareholder activism is more collaborative than is assumed by these theories. This type 
of activism is a new paradigm in the US and could reshape the relationship between 
the board and shareholders.66 There are also other funds which primarily focus on 
social performance, even though this type of activism may not bring about an 
immediate increase in share prices.67 Overall, shareholder activism can enrich the 
board by providing feedback to the board and plays an error correction role by warning 
the board and management about the underperformance of the company.  
                                                 
65 Martin Lipton, ‘The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance’ (HLSFCGF, 3 February 2016) < 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/03/the-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance/ > accessed 
20 February 2016. 
66 See Chapter 3. 
67 See Chapter 3; See for the insignificant impact of governance activism, Roberta Romano, ‘Less Is 
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance’ (2001) 
18 Yale Journal on Regulation 174; see Vincente Cuñat, Mireia Giné, and Maria Guadalupe, ‘The Vote 
is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value’ (2012) 67 Journal of Finance 1943, 




 The Softer Version of Director Primacy Theory is Possible  
Such analytical framework indicates that shareholder activism could function without 
undermining the value of the board authority.68 In contrast to director primacy theory, 
this thesis considers accountability and authority to be mutually consistent. In other 
words, it finds the board authority compatible with shareholder participation, in 
contrast to the traditional director primacy theory. Therefore, it challenges the precept 
of a trade-off between authority and accountability. In this respect, there is no 
arithmetic allocation of power (authority) between the board and shareholders; thus, 
board authority is compatible with strong shareholder participatory rights. Hence, the 
fundamental policy question of corporate governance should be how accountability 
problems could be mitigated while preserving sufficient room for the board and 
management, instead of discussing quanta of power and the holder of ultimate power.69  
 
 Traditional director primacy theory, therefore, could be rendered more flexible 
to accommodate the evolving role of institutional shareholders in corporate 
governance, without undermining board authority. Since traditional director primacy 
theory considers shareholder activism inherently detrimental to the functioning of 
corporations, it argues that company law should attribute very restricted role for 
shareholders and that companies are managed most efficiently when authority is 
centralised in the hands of the board. It relies on that the board has capacity to monitor 
managers and directors and to carry out managerial tasks. However, the board could 
fail to carry out the expected roles because of its overreliance on management, the 
close relationship with management, and the lack of sufficient information and 
knowledge. At this point, it becomes evident how the evolving role of shareholders 
might be useful to US corporate governance: it could enhance the board’s capacity to 
carry out its unique role, reduce agency and accountability problems, and enhance the 
sustainability of companies.70 In this regard, this thesis argues that the current director 
primacy theory should not survive in its extreme form. It should be softened to 
accommodate the evolving role of shareholders in US corporate governance.71   
                                                 
68 See Chapter 3 and 6. 
69 See Chapter 6. 
70 See Chapter 6. 
71 See Chapter 6 
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 This thesis argues that the softer version of director primacy is possible. The 
evolving role of shareholders makes the softer version of director primacy theory 
possible because shareholder activism serves as an error correction role rather than the 
exercise of authority.72 The softer version of director primacy does not deny the value 
of board authority and vests the board of directors with the ultimate power to manage; 
however, shareholders are given a space at the corporate discussion table. This new 
approach provides this space by enhancing shareholder power and increasing the 
effective use of shareholder rights. The shareholder voice will thus be heard in the 
decision-making processes of public companies and cannot be ignored by 
managements and boards. By increasing shareholder voice in the corporate 
governance, this new model enhances the board’s capacity to carry out its unique dual 
role by making the board less dependent on management. Activist shareholders can 
enrich the board with new information and raise legitimate questions about the current 
practices and business strategies of the management. Where the board receives robust 
criticism regarding a management strategy, it will be forced to be more critical and to 
obtain more information about the management strategy, which is a prerequisite for a 
well-functioning director primacy model. The board must also provide an account to 
other shareholders for that particular strategy, lest, activist shareholders could 
convince other shareholders and escalate activism to the extent that they could replace 
the board members. As a result, the board has to have deep knowledge of company 
and be appropriately critical of management to convince other shareholders to support 
it and the existing corporate governance practices. Such informed directors could 
provide more effective monitoring of managerial performance and, where needed, 
provide a managerial role in establishing major corporate governance and business 
planning issues.  
 
In this respect, the board’s capacity to carry out its unique role (managerial and 
monitoring roles) will be higher under the softer version of director primacy theory, 
compared to the traditional director primacy theory. Since the softer version of director 
primacy incorporates the role of shareholders into the functioning of public 
companies, it could address agency and accountability problems more effectively than 
                                                 
72 See Chapter 6. 
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traditional director primacy and has an enhanced decision-making process over 
traditional director primacy. The inclusion of the evolving role of shareholder activism 
in the functioning of public companies reduces the board’s overreliance on 
management, which in turn completes the deficiencies of the board. The softer version 
of director primacy also allows the board to address the opportunism of activist funds 
by fine-tuning shareholder authority with the help of mainstream investors. It also 
acknowledges the value of the board of directors in public companies. Even in the soft 
director primacy model, it will be shown that a power imbalance between shareholders 
and directors persists.  
 This thesis also shows that there have been positive developments in terms of 
shareholder activism in the market. Institutional shareholders are becoming more 
active and making seismic changes in US corporate governance on a company-by-
company basis. The increased shareholder activism also challenges the assumptions 
of contractarian theory i.e. the rational shareholder apathy. Therefore, corporate 
governance should not be built on the assumptions that shareholders are rationally 
passive or are short-term investors, given the evolving role of shareholders in the US. 
In the market, the softer version of director primacy theory is gradually emerging with 
the help of institutional shareholders.73 Institutional shareholders create a difference 
between corporate governance in books and corporate governance in the market.74 
Corporate governance in the market is diverging from the extreme form of director 
primacy and establishes the middle ground between director primacy and shareholder 
primacy theories. However, these developments are still not sufficient to recognise the 
value of shareholder activism. This thesis recommends that the law should follow the 
developments in the market. Hence, it makes several recommendations: creating a 
level playing field for private orderings and adopting the default proxy access rule, 
majority voting rule, and universal proxy cards. 
                                                 
73 See Chapter 3. 




 The Side Effects of Activist Funds Should Be Addressed for a Better 
Functioning Corporate Governance   
In the literature, some scholars consider that activist funds could bridge the gap 
between ownership and control in public companies.75 However, they overlook the 
side effects of activist funds. This research also explores the side effects of shareholder 
activism. Even though this thesis is of the view that the side effects of shareholder 
activism should not be overemphasised, it recognises two possibilities, unlike many 
proponents of shareholder empowerment.76 First, that activist funds might 
occasionally increase their influence to force the board to make particular business 
decisions that advance their own interest rather than the board’s and other 
shareholders’; and second, shareholder activism could be excessive, and thereby 
disruptive for some companies. In this respect, this thesis will investigate and discuss 
legal and regulatory means that seek to minimise these negative aspects of shareholder 
activism. It suggests increasing the disclosures requirement of shareholders to curb the 
side effects of activist funds. 
1.4 Methodology 
This thesis adopts the doctrinal research methodology which relies on primary and 
secondary resources, including law, cases, books, articles, empirical studies, corporate 
governance forums, opinions of institutions, and newspapers. These primary and 
secondary sources focus on shareholder activism in the US and UK. The research 
synthesises different ideas and develops new thoughts on how the evolving role of 
shareholders described above could be accommodated within the framework of 
director primacy model.   
 This thesis primarily focuses on US company law and analyses the cumulative 
impact of US law and regulation on shareholder participation in the management of 
companies. Therefore, it does not adopt a comparative research methodology. Yet 
some aspects of UK law and corporate governance are also considered where relevant. 
                                                 
75 Gilson and Gordon (n 29); Bebchuk (n 54); Yaron Nili, ‘Missing the Forest for the Trees: A New 
Approach to Shareholder Activism’ (2014) 4 Harvard Business Law Review 158; Lucian Bebchuk and 
Robert Jackson ‘The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure’ (2012) 2 Harvard Business Law 
Review 39.  
76 See Chapter 3. 
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The references to UK corporate governance and cases pertaining to UK law are made 
for a number of reasons. First of all, although these countries adopt two different 
approaches in their corporate governance models, public companies in both countries 
share structures that are similar. They also belong to the same legal family. Second, 
the UK is among the most shareholder friendly jurisdictions in the world, with the 
references to UK law allowing us to better understand how US law is director-centric. 
Third, shareholder participation has been uncontroversial in the UK for a long time;77 
therefore, the related literature, corporate governance codes, and reports could provide 
guidance on how board authority could function with strong participatory rights. For 
these reasons, relevant literature on the UK will be taken into consideration.        
 Doctrinal research by itself is not sufficient to examine the role of shareholders 
in corporate governance because the financial incentives of shareholders is one of the 
main drivers behind shareholder activism. Therefore, this thesis uses concepts and 
ideas from a law and economics approach. Within this approach, concepts such as 
efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, and collective action and free-rider problems have 
played a dominant role in assessing the desirability of any legal reform and the roles 
of shareholders and directors. This thesis attempts to evaluate the impact of the 
transformation from individual share ownership to institutional share ownership on 
the cost-benefit analysis of activism. Additionally, factors affecting the business 
model of institutional shareholders are examined to highlight that the cost-benefit 
analysis is by itself insufficient to understand contemporary shareholder activism.  
 The law and economics approach perfectly explains why shareholders prefer 
to exit rather than voice their concerns about management. This line of thought 
considers exit as far more efficient and rational for shareholders. Success and failure 
are evaluated through share prices, and any disciplining of directors and managers 
comes from the market. It is an easy option for shareholders because it does not require 
any further action. However, shareholder activism has a political character and is not 
necessarily related to the financial incentives of institutional shareholders. There are 
many motives behind shareholder activism, which are not limited to the financial 
incentives of shareholders, i.e. the cost-benefit analysis. This thesis brings 
                                                 
77 Moore (n 41) 187. 
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Hirschman’s framework into the corporate governance domain as a complement to the 
legal and economic approach rather than as a replacement. It highlights aspects of 
shareholder activism, in addition to those cost-benefit analyses. In Hirschman’s 
framework, shareholder activism, i.e. voice, is the articulation of critical opinion 
between shareholders and directors. In order to analyse the changing role of 
shareholder activism and its implications for director primacy theory, Hirschman’s 
framework is needed in order to complements to legal and economic approach. It 
provides a more robust theoretical underpinning. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured around the key research questions set out in the previous 
section. In the following section, a brief overview of each chapter is presented.  
 Following this introduction, Chapter 2 lays down the theoretical framework by 
explaining corporate governance. The insider and outsider models are broadly 
introduced with an emphasis on the core feature of the outsider model, namely the 
separation of ownership and control. It explains the inevitable consequences of the 
separation of ownership and control: passive and weak shareholders and 
unaccountable directors. It moves on to analyse the prevailing theory of the firm, 
namely the contractarian theory, and director primacy theory. It examines why 
shareholders are the only constituents given voting rights, and why shareholder 
participation is limited, given the agency costs in the firms. Subsequently, the chapter 
analyses the shareholder primacy theory which argues that shareholders should be the 
ultimate controllers in firms. In the final section of Chapter 2, alternative 
accountability mechanisms are examined, viz. the market for corporate control, 
executive remuneration, independent directors and the external audit in order to 
determine whether there is room for shareholder activism in ensuring accountability 
in firms.   
 Chapter 3 focuses on the nature and types of shareholder activism. It explains 
the differences between offensive and responsible shareholder activism, as well as 
how shareholder activism could be beneficial for shareholders in monitoring and 
disciplining the board and management. It then examines how shareholder activism is 
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perceived as a means of addressing public interest concerns such as short-termism and 
attacks by activist funds, and to ensure long-termism in the market. Shareholder 
activism has a dual role: as a monitoring mechanism that protects and promotes the 
interests of all shareholders, and an accountability mechanism for ensuring the long-
term sustainability of companies and economy through the concept of stewardship. 
The second part of Chapter 3 discusses the potential problems related to increased 
shareholder activism in order to decide whether there is a strong case for shareholder 
disempowerment.  
 Chapter 4 examines the transformation of the share ownership of listed 
companies from individual ownership to institutional ownership. It goes on to analyse 
the impact of increasing institutional ownership on shareholder activism and discusses 
whether free-rider and collective action problems could be overcome, and whether the 
benefits would exceed the costs of activism. It then seeks to answer why institutional 
investors do not exercise the same level and type of shareholder activism and exercise 
different types of activism.   
 Chapter 5 critically discusses the legal and governance practices which 
underlie director primacy theory in the US. This chapter evaluates the practicability of 
the changing role of shareholders in US company law. It firstly examines the structure 
of the board and how it evolved from an advisory to a monitoring board. It places 
emphasis on the information gap created by virtue of this transition, and the de facto 
power of managers arising from the delegation of power from directors to managers. 
It then examines the judicial deference to board authority through the business 
judgment rule. This analysis shows that courts rely on shareholder democracy, that is, 
they rely on shareholders and on the market for corporate control to discipline and 
replace under-performing managers. The second part of this chapter focusses on 
shareholder rights. It highlights the existence of limited participatory rights and the 
fact that the meaningful exercise of these rights can be problematic. Analysing the 
development of shareholder participatory rights reveals the tension between 
shareholders, corporate directors and managers. In its final section, Chapter 5 
discusses whether recent legal and regulatory reform have heralded a paradigm change 
from director primacy to a more shareholder friendly model.  
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 Chapter 6 ties the threads together by focusing on the evolving role of 
shareholders in the context of the recent market and policy developments to establish 
a framework that responds to the evolving role of shareholders, and to consider the 
legal and regulatory implications of this framework. This chapter offers a new 
approach as to whether the US model could incorporate shareholder activism while 
simultaneously preserving sufficient independence for directors. In doing so, it takes 
into account the potential collusion of activist funds without closing their business 
models. It then evaluates the UK model with a focus on the question of whether the 
board’s authority is undermined in a shareholder friendly corporate governance model 
and discusses the role of statutory participatory rights. The final section of this chapter 
offers suggestions about improving the effectiveness of shareholder activism without 
altering underlying principles of US corporate governance. 
 Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by providing the key findings of chapters. This 
chapter addresses the research questions identified in the introduction. Additionally, 
the limitations of this research and the recommendation for future studies are also 
















Chapter 2. Corporate Governance: Framework 
and Control Mechanism 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which directors and managers 
can be held accountable within the boundaries of contractarian and director primacy 
theories, with a particular focus on the role of shareholders. As a foundation of this 
thesis, this chapter introduces the corporate governance theories and examines in-
depth why shareholders are attributed a limited role in corporate governance from the 
perspectives of the contractarian and director primacy theories.  
 This chapter starts by reviewing the genesis and classification of corporate 
governance models. The well-accepted classification schema depends on the 
differences between the outsider and insider corporate governance models.1 While 
shareholders in the insider model are concentrated and often have relationship with 
companies, shareholders in the outsider model are numerous and dispersed which 
results in a separation between ownership and control.2 This separation creates so-
called weak and passive shareholders.  It raises significant accountability concerns in 
the outsider corporate governance model. This chapter moves to analyse key aspects 
of contractarian and director primacy theories3, which conceive limited shareholder 
participation as the way things ought to be.4  Under contraction theory, the firm is seen 
as a nexus of contracts that regulates the inputs offered by various parties to the 
production process in exchange for a corresponding output. All constituencies are 
contractual parties, but shareholders occupy a privileged position because of their 
                                                 
1 See, Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th edition, OUP, 2013) Chapter 10; Ruth Aguilera and 
Gregory Jackson, ‘The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and 
Determinants’ (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 447; Rafael La Porta et al., ‘Corporate 
Ownership Around the World’, (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471. 
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3 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University 
Press 1991) 67. 
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contractual claims, i.e. residual claims, while other stakeholders have fixed claims.5 
In the contractarian theory, shareholders supply vital capital to the firm and delegate 
the managerial functions to managers, and managers provide their specialised 
decision-making skills to the firm. The agency cost theory analyses this relationship 
from a principal-agent perspective and places an emphasis on agency problems.6  
 In this regard, contractarian theory led to the emergence of two competing 
views as to the internal structure of companies and the allocation of power between 
shareholders and directors: director primacy theory and shareholder primacy theory; 
hence, this chapter analyses the theoretical aspects of both of the director and 
shareholder primacy theories. Shareholder primacy theory relies heavily on the 
concept of agency cost problems and argues that shareholders should be the ultimate 
monitor of the company.7 By contrast, director primacy theory features the efficiency 
of centralised decision-making and finds authority and accountability mutually 
incompatible. It argues that shareholder participation is unnecessary and value 
decreasing where there are strong corporate control mechanisms, namely the market 
for corporate control, executive remuneration, audit and the role of non-executive 
directors.8 The last section of this chapter outlines and critically examines the existing 
corporate governance mechanisms and whether they function adequately in ensuring 
managerial accountability in corporate governance. 
2.2 Classifications of Corporate Governance Models Worldwide: 
the Insider and Outsider Corporate Governance Models 
The origins of governance debates go back many centuries, but the term ‘corporate 
governance’ has been in use only since the 1970s.9 Following corporate collapses in 
                                                 
5 Jonathan Macey, ‘Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-shareholder 
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’ (1999) 84 Cornell Law Journal 1266, 1274 
6 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
7 Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 439, 440. 
8 See, Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 
97 Northwestern University Law Review 547. 
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the 1980s, it has gained contemporary meaning in the law and legal practice.10 There 
is still no widely accepted definition of corporate governance, since it encompasses 
many distinctive features of countries such as the legal tradition, the level of economic 
development, culture and society.   
 Different jurisdictions have developed their own understandings of corporate 
governance models. It is not easy to classify countries’ corporate governance systems, 
but probably the most useful classification is the insider model versus outsider 
models.11 This classification draws a correlation between the degree of concentration 
of share ownership in listed companies and corporate governance systems.12 The 
outsider system, in which ownership and control are separated, is only common in 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, whereas the insider model is more common in the rest 
of the world. For the purposes of this thesis, the main focus will be on the Anglo-
American corporate governance models and the insider model will not be explored in 
any great detail. 
 Insider Corporate Governance Models 
Insider corporate governance models, typical of continental Europe, are characterised  
by ‘concentrated ownership or voting power and a multiplicity of inter-firm 
relationships and corporate holdings’.13 In these jurisdictions, the control of quoted 
corporations is generally vested in large block-holders such as controlling families, 
banks, corporate groups and governments.14 Corporate control by these dominant 
shareholders is intensified through the use of pyramids and multiple chains.15 
                                                 
10 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices (2nd Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 11-12. 
11 See note 1.  
12 John Armour, Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of 
UK Corporate Governance’ (2003) 41(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations 531, 533. 
13 Maria Maher and Thomas Andersson, ‘Corporate Governance Effects on Firm Performance and 
Economic Growth’ (OECD 1999), 23. 
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Dimensions and Determinants’, (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 447. 
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Institutional shareholders such as pension funds, mutual funds and other collective 
investment schemes tend to play a limited role than is the case in the outsider model.16 
 The advantage of concentrated ownership or voting power is that shareholders 
with large stakes or voting power can actively monitor management performance and 
overcome problems associated with dispersed ownership. As a result, the ‘separation 
of ownership and control’17 is not an issue, because the problems regarding weak 
management accountability are reduced.18 This is because, with more concentrated 
ownership (or voting power), shareholders receive more benefits from monitoring and 
have enough power to influence the company’s strategies. In addition to increased 
monitoring, investors in the insider corporate governance model usually have long-
term relationships with companies, which has a positive impact on a firm’s 
performance and increases profitability in the long-run.19 
 Outsider Corporate Governance Models 
The outsider models, typical of the United States and the United Kingdom, are 
characterised by relatively dispersed ownership and a highly active capital market. 
These systems aim to foster an effective and equitable distribution of information and 
emphasise the strong protection of shareholders.20 Companies in the US and UK share 
a similar pattern of scattered share ownership, in contrast to companies in mainland 
Europe.21 Since there is no shareholder with a large enough stake to exercise overall 
control, it is often argued that shareholders are generally weak and passive.22 Both 
jurisdictions have well-developed securities markets and employ similar corporate 
governance mechanisms to promote managerial accountability. Given the dispersed 
ownership, regulation in these jurisdictions has been introduced to encourage 
transparency and to facilitate investors’ access to information. The Anglo-American 
                                                 
16 Maher and Andersson (n 13), 24. 
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corporate governance models facilitate the development of financial markets and are 
therefore mostly designed to ‘deal with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment… [and] control 
managers’.23 The outsider systems also have some advantages such as enhanced 
liquidity of stocks and better risk diversification opportunities for investors.  
The purpose of corporations is often regarded as maximising shareholder 
wealth;24 therefore, shareholder wealth maximisation is placed at the heart of 
companies, and the corporations’ interests are defined by the shareholders’ interests.25 
The existence of dispersed ownership in public corporations and the predominance of 
shareholder wealth maximisation as a fundamental corporate objective distinguish the 
Anglo-American systems from other continental European corporate governance 
systems which are more stakeholder-orientated. For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
not necessary to examine in further detail the question of what the purpose of the 
corporation should be. Instead the primary focus will be on the allocation of power 
between shareholders and managers. 
 The one weakness of this classification is that it ignores the differences as to 
how corporate governance models approach to shareholder participation. The US and 
UK are often lumped together, and their differences are usually under-played and 
sometimes outright ignored because of the similar share ownership of public 
companies and their strong endorsement to shareholder primacy norm. However, these 
jurisdictions reveal far greater divergence as to the allocation of power between 
shareholders and directors than the literature usually assumes.26  
 Bainbridge incisively pointed out that the shareholder primacy norm connotes 
two different meanings: 1) the shareholder wealth maximisation norm which requires 
managers to make decisions according to the interests of shareholders, or 2) complete 
                                                 
23 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, (1997) 52 The Journal of 
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shareholder control over the corporation’s affairs.27 However, director primacy theory 
argues that the ultimate corporate control should be vested in the board of directors.28 
Therefore, as opposed to the implied assumption of a stable and unified Anglo-
American corporate governance model, director primacy theory accords with US 
company law, while shareholder primacy describes the UK law.29 The following 
section will examine the emergence of these different theories in allocating power 
between shareholders and directors. 
2.3 Core Feature of the Outsider Corporate Governance Model: The 
Separation of Ownership and Control   
The separation of ownership and control is one of the core and most controversial 
attributes of Anglo-American corporate governance systems.30 The unique share 
ownership structure of corporations was identified in what still may be one of the most 
influential works on corporations, namely The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property by Berle and Means.31 The publication of this book changed the direction of 
the theoretical debate on company law. Shareholders were presented as passive 
investors and dissociated from active management. Since its publication, an important 
view in company law has been that managers in public corporations escape from 
effective shareholder control because corporations are held by a large number of 
shareholders.32 
 This ownership structure leads to the emergence of the image of weak and 
passive shareholders due to free-rider and collective action problems.33 It is usually 
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rational for shareholders to remain passive because ‘when shares are widely traded, 
no one has the right incentive to gather information’34 to engage in decision-making. 
Since shareholders usually own a small fraction of the total shares of a company, they 
will receive a small portion of the total benefit arising from activism. Therefore, 
collective action theory assumes that shareholders are not generally expected to submit 
shareholder proposals or oppose management proposals unless their expected benefit 
outweighs its costs. Furthermore, other shareholders could free ride on the efforts of 
engaging shareholders without bearing the cost of activism.  
Another factor that contributes to shareholder passivity is the availability of an 
easy exit option. Despite the fact that corporate law provides some control rights to 
shareholders,35 it is often assumed that ‘there is no reason why shareholders who 
supply capital to the firm should have any interest or expertise in managing the firm’s 
affairs’ because of the high costs of being informed and the relatively small expected 
benefits.36 It is usually easier and more rational for them to exit or to be passive rather 
than to become involved in decision-making. This is called ‘rational shareholder 
apathy’.37 Shareholder voting is therefore mostly regarded as unimportant.38 
The separation of ownership and control ‘removed many of the checks which 
formerly operated to curb the misuse of wealth and power’.39 Berle and Means’ thesis 
revealed a control gap in public companies which continues to constitute a major 
shortcoming for large companies. It also provided the foundation of the image of weak 
and passive shareholders. As will be seen below, such an understanding has resulted 
in recalibration of the role of shareholders as capital providers, who will rationally 
prefer exit to voice.    
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2.4 Theories Explaining the Internal Structure of Corporate 
Governance 
Given the significance of the separation of ownership and control, corporate 
governance theories have been developed in order to address the problems arising 
from this separation. The existence of the separation has a normative dimension, which 
can suggest changes in company law or the maintenance of the status quo.40 There are 
a number of theories which analyse the different aspects of corporations. These 
approaches could be classified into two broad groups depending on whether they 
perceive company law to be the result of private bargaining in the market or a 
centralised regulatory state imposition.41  It is impossible to examine all theories, so 
this thesis will focus on key aspects of contractarian theory which dominates in the 
US.42 
 Contractarian Approach 
2.4.1.1 Transaction Cost and Team Production Theories 
Until Coase’s influential 1937 article, The Nature of Firm,43 it was assumed that the 
economic system was coordinated by the price mechanism.44 Coase found that there 
are costs to using the price mechanism such as the costs of negotiating, concluding 
and enforcing a contract.45 Once those costs were considered, the most efficient and 
economical way to organise production might be by forming a firm. Therefore, firms 
are an alternative to contracting in the market, with the aim of minimising transaction 
costs. This can be seen as the earliest sign of the contractarian understanding of the 
company. The firm is defined as a ‘system of relationships which comes into existence 
when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur’ and the distinctive 
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Review 407, 419; Moore (n 41) 62. 
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feature of a firm is the existence of an authoritative body directing the allocation of 
resources and production.46  
 Alchian and Demsetz accepted that higher transaction costs in the market make 
organising production within a firm advantageous47 but it was necessary, they argued, 
to explain the conditions under which the cost of production within the firm could be 
lower than the cost of allocation of resources across the market.48 They proposed that 
firms ‘have no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the 
slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people’ because 
the relationship between them is a ‘quid pro quo’ contract.49 In this context, 
shareholders are better described as ‘investors’ who contribute capital in exchange for 
the right to receive the residual profits.50 
 Rather than an authoritarian directive, team production and a centralised body 
within a set of contractual arrangements are identified as the defining features of a 
firm.51 Since the firm is defined by the team production under a centralised body, the 
need for measuring marginal team production and the monitoring of potential shirking 
activities of the team members become major problems for the firm.52  
A policing function, therefore, was needed within the firm if it were to be run 
efficiently. They suggested that a centralised and contractual agent who is the residual 
claimant (i.e. the shareholder) who has the greatest incentive not to shirk would 
monitor the team members.53 They claimed that, in order to reduce shirking and to 
discipline team members, team members would transfer the right to alter individual 
membership and performance as well as the residual claimant’s right to the central 
party common to all contracts; therefore, the monitoring agent would possess the 
bundle of rights. 
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 This analysis is important for Anglo-American corporate governance systems 
because it identifies and addresses the problem of aligning the interests of different 
constituencies in a corporation in order to generate an efficient result. The implications 
of the theory are that firms run by unconstrained managers are not efficient due to the 
divergence of interests, and they should be under the control of shareholders. 
2.4.1.2 Corporations as a Nexus of Contracts 
Jensen and Meckling, following Alchian and Demsetz, developed the corporation as 
a nexus of contracts theory and subsequently agency cost theory by embodying 
managerial incentives.54 Since then, the contractarian approach has dominated legal 
and economic discourses in the US as to the nature of public companies and has 
become the prevailing view in academia.55 In its simplest form, this theory holds that 
the firm is a legal fiction which serves ‘as a nexus for contracting relationships and 
which is also characterised by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets 
and cash flows of the organisation which can generally be sold without permission of 
the other contracting individuals’.56 Therefore, the company consists of implicit and 
explicit bargains between different actors of production such as investors, employees 
and creditors. 
 This theory emphasises the relationship between shareholders and managers, 
and defines it as an agency relationship; that is, ‘a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent.’57 This theory assumes that parties to the corporate contract are rational and 
seeking to maximise their own divergent interests and the managers are no exception 
to this premise. Therefore, the interests of managers and shareholders might diverge 
because both parties would likely wish to maximise their own return. The costs arising 
from managers acting opportunistically, the costs of monitoring them and the costs of 
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aligning the interests of managers and shareholders in order to prevent the managers 
from shirking are called ‘agency costs’.58 These are often specifically referred to as 
‘vertical agency costs’.59 Agency costs are the inevitable consequence where decision-
making is delegated to individuals who do not bear the financial outcomes of their 
decisions. These costs could be tolerable when the gains from specialised management 
are higher than the sum of residual loss to investors and monitoring expenses. The 
primary reason for the monitoring cost is the information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent; the principals do not have the same level of knowledge about 
the company as their agents.60 Monitoring activities and detection of mismanagement 
are generally costly for shareholders; therefore, investors tend to minimise the risk by 
diversifying their investments and have little incentive for ownership at the micro 
level. 
 In the context of the nexus of contracts theory, the firm is a ‘complex set of 
explicit and implicit contracts’61 which sets out the way in which the outputs of 
production are shared among the different constituencies. The responsibilities, duties 
and benefits of each party are defined by the contracts. All constituencies have 
contractual status.62 Shareholders supply capital to the firm and managers contribute 
the specialised decision-making skills to the firm. Easterbrook and Fischel stated that 
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‘it is all a matter of enforcing the contracts, and for any employee or investor other 
than a residual claimant, that means the explicit, negotiated contracts’.63  
 Shareholders are distinguished from other constituencies by virtue of ‘the 
special nature of the claim held by equity investors - a claim to “what is left over” 
rather than to a definable return such as a wage or payment of interest’.64 The theory 
assumes that shareholders enter into a contract with the management ‘for a promise to 
maximise long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximises the value of their 
stock’.65 Accordingly, directors and managers will try to maximise shareholder wealth 
and secure and protect the investment of shareholders in the corporation. The 
responsibilities and duties of the management are therefore limited to protecting and 
enhancing the investment of shareholders. Conversely, non-shareholder constituencies 
have fixed claims by virtue of their contractual relationship.66 This is the justification 
for shareholders enjoying structural exclusivity, which is to say: ‘the entitlement to be 
regarded as the ultimate beneficiary of the accountability norms to which the board – 
and, indirectly management – are ordinarily subject in exercising their executive 
discretion’.67 
 In the context of law and economics discourse, the shareholder franchise is 
justified on the grounds of the shareholders’ status as the residual claimant and as the 
principal in the agent-principal relationship with directors and management.68 Since 
shareholders are the residual claimants, they are often assumed to have the greatest 
incentive to maximise shareholder value, ‘the appropriate incentives… to make 
discretionary decisions’69, and to control the management from shirking. The 
provision of controlling rights to shareholders is justified by reference to the specific 
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characteristic of their contracts and the fact that shareholders are the most vulnerable 
to corporate decisions.  
 The contractarian approach adopts a different view about shareholder 
participation and empowerment. The proponents of contractarian theory are not 
generally worried about the lack of shareholder rights or activism because they often 
rely on the ‘Wall Street Rule’: if shareholders are unhappy with management, they 
will exit the firm rather than bearing the costs of objecting with a view to changing the 
way the company is managed.70 In the contractarian approach, shareholders are also 
not willing to participate in the management of the company. First, shareholders 
contribute capital but not managerial skills, and managers provide entrepreneurial 
skills but not capital.71 Second, unless shareholders own all of the shares in a company, 
no shareholder would have the right incentives or expertise to participate in corporate 
management intelligently.72 Third, ‘if investors gain from additional participation, one 
might expect legal rules or private contracts to reflect that fact’.73 
 Increased shareholder participation would be value-reducing for companies 
because it would destroy the efficiency benefits of centralised management. Similarly, 
many calls for legal reform are unnecessary because the reforms are usually based on 
‘the behavioural assumption of the interested and attentive shareholder’, but the reality 
is likely to be the opposite.74 Any legal means would be used by minority shareholders 
and since the additional regulatory costs imposed on companies would be shared 
among all shareholders, the aggregate impact of these reforms would be value-
decreasing. For example, shareholder rights to submit proposals could be profoundly 
antidemocratic because only a minority of the shareholders would use the corporate 
budget to put forward the shareholder proposals which would mostly be defeated by a 
majority of the shareholders.75 As such, legal reforms to increase shareholder 
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involvement are actually value-decreasing due to the costs arising from the extra 
regulations. 
 Thus, under contractarian theory, shareholders retain a privileged position. 
However, shareholder participation is value-reducing and unnecessary because of 
shareholder passivity, the cost of increased regulation and the efficiency of the market. 
Still, the contractarian theory has generated two different approaches with regard to 
the allocation of decision-making powers in companies: shareholder primacy and 
director primacy theories.   
 Shareholder Primacy and Director Primacy Theories 
The proponents of shareholder primacy theory seek to bridge the gap between 
ownership and control by attributing the ultimate control to shareholders. Director 
primacy theory, however, conceives the separation of ownership and control as the 
core feature of public companies, essential for their viability. A prominent Delaware 
judge described these two different theories as ‘duelling camps’. 76 This distinction 
reaches beyond academia to the marketplace and to public debate. On both sides of 
the debate, academics have developed arguments for more or less shareholder or 
director power, or to defend the status quo. 
2.4.2.1 Shareholder Primacy Theory  
The intellectual foundation of shareholder primacy theory is the contractarian 
approach which argues that shareholders own the residual claims to the assets of 
companies and that the agent-principal relationship defines public companies. Since it 
is assumed that agents, directors and managers, are tempted to follow their personal 
interests rather than shareholders’ and companies’ interests, shareholders as residual 
claimants have appropriate incentives to monitor the board and managers in order to 
protect their own interests. In the context of shareholder primacy theory, the primary 
concern of company law should be to minimise agency cost problems in corporate 
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governance, i.e. the accountability of directors and managers,77 and shareholder power 
is justified on the grounds of residual claims and agency costs.   
 This approach develops a decision-making model in which ultimate control 
should rest with shareholders to minimise agency cost problems because of their 
appropriate incentives to make efficient decisions.78 This is similar to Alchian and 
Demsetz’s model discussed above which combines the roles of ultimate monitor and 
residual claimant. This model is called the ‘standard shareholder-oriented model’.79  
 Shareholder primacy theory regards shareholder empowerment as an important 
governance strategy to deal with agency cost problems.80 In particular, the 2007-2008 
financial crisis has led academics and lawmakers to focus on shareholder 
empowerment to minimise agency costs and enhance the sustainability of firms.81 It 
assumes that where shareholders are given both strong and exclusive control rights, 
they will value and use these rights effectively to maximise shareholder value. 
Therefore, shareholder empowerment is primarily justified in the context of allocative 
efficiency and economic forces.82  
2.4.2.2  Director Primacy Theory  
The opposite of shareholder primacy is the director primacy theory, which again 
originates from the prevailing contractarian theory discussed above. Since the 
contractarian approach defines shareholders as residual claimants, one may 
legitimately ask why they do not manage the companies or why it is that the 
contractarian approach envisages a limited role for shareholders. Bainbridge provides 
the most comprehensive theoretical explanation about why shareholders are and 
should be disempowered, and the board authority should be empowered and 
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preserved.83 Unlike the traditional law and economics approach, director primacy 
theory does not consider the board as a source of agency costs; instead, it distinguishes 
the board from management and regards the board as being capable of effectively 
monitoring management. It argues that board authority should be protected for the 
efficient decision-making in large corporations. 
 This theory has two dimensions: first, the board of directors has and should 
have the ultimate authority and second, shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of 
the directors’ fiduciary duties.84 In this section, the focus will be on the first dimension 
of director primacy theory. It has both descriptive and normative aspects. With regard 
to the descriptive aspect, the board of directors in the US has not only the responsibility 
but also the right to manage companies without any intervention by outside parties 
including the shareholders.85 In the US, shareholders’ involvement in corporate 
decision-making is significantly restricted; Bainbridge therefore argues that 
shareholders’ rights barely qualify as part of corporate governance, and that 
‘corporation law virtually carves the separation of ownership and control into stone’,86 
and concludes that the US corporate governance model is better described by director 
primacy.87 
 The theory normatively claims that the board should have the ultimate 
authority and should be at the centre of corporate governance. It is argued that the 
corporation is a ‘vehicle by which the board of directors hires various factors of 
production’; thus, the board is a ‘sui generis body – a sort of Platonic guardian’.88 It is 
assumed that the limited role of shareholders is a consequence of the hypothetical 
bargain between directors and shareholders. It is, therefore, the ‘majoritarian 
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default’.89 However, this raises a core question: once shareholders are accepted as 
residual claimants, why would they accept such a relatively weak position?  
 The intellectual foundation of a centralised decision-making body relates to 
Coase’s influential theory of the firm.90 A centralised body, which has the authority to 
direct the process of production and to make adaptive changes can reduce the 
transaction costs arising from uncertainty and complexity in the market, and the 
unforeseen situations and opportunistic behaviour of parties by virtue of incomplete 
contracts. Therefore, authority emerges as a vital survival feature of public companies. 
The centralised body in Coase’s conceptualisation could be a hierarchical authoritative 
body or a collegial and consensus based decision-making body. One may ask why 
large companies tend to adopt the hierarchical decision-making body which is 
empowered to take binding decisions for the firm rather than a consensus based 
decision-making body, and what survival advantages the authority-based management 
provides. Arrow’s influential book, The Limits of Organisation answers these 
questions as follows: where the members of an organisation have divergent interests 
and different levels of information, it is more efficient and cheaper to transmit all 
information to a centralised authority in order to make collective and informed 
decisions.91  This authority in fact provides an efficient specialisation and division of 
labour. It is therefore rational for residual claimants to delegate authority to centralised 
management.92 According to the director primacy theory, shareholder meetings are 
not regarded as a decision-making body because shareholders have neither identical 
interests nor identical information. In contrast to shareholders, directors can provide 
specialised management, have more information as to the company and can make 
informed and sound decisions.93 The upshot is that an authority-based decision-
making body empowered to make binding decisions provides large companies with 
survival advantages.  
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 Director primacy theory, thus, does not accept that addressing the director 
accountability problem is the only challenge facing public companies. In contrast to 
shareholder primacy theory, it also regards the protection of the board’s authority as a 
key condition of corporate governance. Therefore, it identifies accountability and 
authority as the two core values of company law. From this perspective, it argues that 
there is a trade-off between these two values:  
‘On the one hand, directors must be held accountable for violating their 
obligation to maximise shareholder wealth. On the other hand, the substantial 
virtues of fiat can be ensured only by preserving the board's decision-making 
authority from being trumped by either shareholders or courts. Resolving that 
tension turns out to be the chief problem of corporate governance.’94 
Director primacy theory resolves this problem by favouring authority to accountability 
where there is a tension between these concepts. The core normative argument of the 
theory is that a legal framework should privilege authority over accountability and 
makes a normative claim that directors should have the ultimate authority in a 
company.95 In justifying his position, Bainbridge refers to Arrow’s comments that ‘if 
every decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the 
locus of authority from A to B and hence no solution to the original problem’.96 
Therefore, Bainbridge concludes that ‘unfortunately, they are ultimately antithetical: 
one cannot have more of one without also having less of other’ and that ‘one must not 
lightly interfere with management or the board’s decision-making authority in the 
name of accountability’.97 It is almost impossible to deny the value of authority within  
large companies, but Bainbridge adopts a near-absolute approach, that is, any 
accountability mechanisms or interference with management would destroy the value 
of authority. He does not accept the possibility that accountability and authority can 
coexist.   
 This near-absolute approach does not allow for the possibility that shareholder 
activism has different types or could vary from institutional shareholder to institutional 
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shareholder.98  Since shareholder activism inevitably requires shareholders to make 
management decisions and to take action when management underperforms, 
shareholder activism is slightly different from the situation in which shareholders have 
‘power to make management decisions in the first place’.99 Even the right to submit 
shareholder proposals is considered micro-management of the firm within the 
framework of this theory.100 Therefore, giving shareholders power to review 
management’s decisions means shifting some authority from the board and 
management to shareholders. Shareholder activism must be constrained to maintain 
the value of authority.  
 The theory does not deny the relevance of agency cost problems in large 
companies but finds that agency analysis imperfectly applies to corporate governance 
because these costs are the natural outcome of forming a centralised management 
structure. Company law could only address these problems by eliminating discretion, 
i.e. significantly diminishing the value of the board.101 Therefore, authority should be 
the primary concern of company law rather than accountability, and preservation of 
managerial discretion should always be the default presumption.102 Shareholders are 
not considered the ultimate monitors because ‘in general, shareholders of public 
corporations have neither the legal right, the practical ability, nor the desire to exercise 
the kind of control necessary for meaningful monitoring of the corporation’s 
agents’.103 
 In summation, shareholder primacy focuses on the accountability of directors 
and managers and seeks to vest the ultimate control with shareholders. Director 
primacy theory is, however, concerned with the authority of directors, i.e. the benefits 
of specialised and centralised management. Director primacy theory finds shareholder 
participation unnecessary because it reduces board authority and there are other 
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accountability mechanisms which address agency problems without affecting that 
authority. 
2.5 Do Corporate Control Mechanisms Provide Effective 
Monitoring of Management? 
In this section, accountability mechanisms relied on by the contractarian theory and 
director primacy theory will be examined to understand whether, overall, these 
mechanisms provide effective monitoring and accountability. These mechanisms 
include: the market for corporate control, independent directors, executive 
remuneration and auditors.  
 The Discipline of the Market 
There are three main markets that discipline managers: the product market, the market 
for managers, and the market for corporate control. It is argued that these markets 
impose discipline which is sufficient to ensure that managers’ actions are in the 
interests of shareholders and to enhance managerial efficiency. 104 In this section, the 
disciplinary effect of the market will be examined in the context of the theory, the 
complex circumstances in which the theory operates, and the relevant legal 
framework. 
2.5.1.1 The Product Market 
The product market as a disciplinary tool relies on the common presumption that when 
a firm operates in a competitive market, there is no scope for managerial inefficiencies; 
therefore, competition enhances managerial efficiencies.105 In highly competitive 
markets, the profits of underperforming firms generally decrease. This has at least two 
impacts on the relationship between the product market and managerial incentives. 
First, where overall profits decrease, the firm operating with high costs will 
underperform and fail to maximise profits. Therefore, the firm will experience 
difficulties in selling goods or services on the same terms as efficiently run companies 
and will be subject to a higher probability of liquidation. The failure to maximise 
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profits will inevitably affect the managers because of the managers’ firm-specific 
incentives and equity-based compensation scheme. This naturally induces managers 
to increase the firm’s efficiency by reducing unnecessary costs. Second, in the worst-
case scenario, a firm might be forced into liquidation if its managers are unable to 
reduce inefficiencies within the firm. Therefore, it is often assumed that managers are 
sufficiently incentivised through the competitive market to act in the interests of 
shareholders.106  
 It may not, however, decrease agency costs in the company because managers 
can still shirk in a well-performing firm. For example, they can simply divert profits 
to themselves which does not have any impact on the firm’s efficiency and production 
costs, and ability to survive in product markets.107 Large companies have sufficient 
resources to survive with substantial managerial inefficiencies. Consequently, 
managerial slack may not immediately translate into a credible threat of liquidation, 
so the product market may fail to discipline management adequately.  
2.5.1.2 The Market for Managers 
The second type of the discipline of the market is the market for managers.108 
Managers are subject to discipline coming from both outside and within the firm. 
Managers invest their human capital in the firm. The value of the human capital is 
likely to be measured in terms of the success or failure of the firm. The managers’ 
success or failure in the past provides information about their talent. This has an impact 
on their future wages.109 Depending on their previous success, managers are willing 
to get better positions, i.e. they are able to displace existing managers.110 The market 
for managers and directors,111 at least in theory, induces them to perform better to 
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obtain higher salaries. However, the relationship between performance in a previous 
appointment and consequences in the market may not always be clear.  
 The internal labour market of the firm may not be as strong as it is supposed. 
Many firms complain about the lack of obvious successors to current senior 
managers.112 Although it holds true that competition among managers in a firm may 
provide a certain level of discipline, the internal dynamics of the board of directors 
preclude taking disciplinary action against insiders because executive directors and 
managers have a personal relationship and they will probably consider removing a 
manager in the event of evident incapacity or wrongdoing.113  
 There are two aspects of the market for managers which are overlooked in the 
literature. First, it is assumed that the success of managers is the only factor in the 
recruitment process. However, nowadays most recruitment is carried out though 
executive search firms on behalf of the company.114 The success of managers may 
have a limited impact on the new appointments because the search market is 
dominated by only a limited number of search firms115 and a small number of people 
in these firms administer the most important recruitment processes. Like all other 
people, they can bring a candidate’s personality to the fore, rather than their skills and 
qualifications.116 For example, executive search firms are criticised by diversity 
scholars because of the lack of equality and diversity in the recruitment process.117 
Second, the labour market for directors may not have a large enough pool of candidates 
to meet the increasing demand for independent directors and to maintain competition 
in the market.118 Independent directors are often chosen from a limited pool of a ‘self-
perpetuating oligarchy’ of individuals with similar social, economic and business 
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backgrounds.119 Clearly, the disciplinary effect of the outside labour market has 
serious shortcomings which undermine the theory. 
 In conclusion, the labour market for managers, including independent 
directors, is regarded as one of the primary disciplinary mechanisms for managers. 
However, this control mechanism may not be as effective as expected because of three 
core problems arising in practice. 
2.5.1.3 The Market for Corporate Control  
The third and most important market mechanism is the market for corporate control.120 
It exerts an external control mechanism over managers who fail to act in the 
shareholders’ best interests.121 This section will examine whether it is an effective 
means of reducing agency costs in corporate governance.  
 Some authors claim that the market for corporate control makes the outsider 
corporate governance model viable.122 In theory, if management runs the company 
poorly, its shares will be valued lower than shares of similar but well-managed 
companies based on the assumption that share prices respond to failures of 
management.123 A low share price will send a signal to outsiders of an opportunity to 
obtain large capital gains from the company by replacing incompetent or shirking 
managers with more efficient managers. The underperforming company is then run 
more efficiently by the new managers. In some cases, the threat of takeover also serves 
the same function in the improvement of managers’ performance and the reduction of 
agency costs, even when an actual takeover does not occur.  
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 The theory of the market for corporate control is well-established, but there are 
crucial shortcomings in the theory which undermine its functioning and relevance.  
First of all, the theory is based on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), i.e. the 
notion that share prices reflect all available information and react immediately to new 
information124 and assumes that financial markets are efficient.125 However, EMH 
overlooks the supply and cost of information. It assumes that rational investors will 
use information until marginal conditions are met. It puts limited emphasis on the 
information with regard to the supply of investments.126 With regards to the cost of 
information, no information can be generated for free.127 In addition People often 
deviate from economic rationality in a number of areas. For example, Odeon describes 
a situation in which investors are reluctant to sell shares that lose value as a result of 
loss aversion and the hope that these shares will outperform their current winning 
shares.128 Finally, the analysis of financial crises also challenges EMH, which 
underpins financial market regulation in the US and UK and questions the assumptions 
on which the theory is grounded. EMH has been blamed for the financial crisis because 
it overlooks the dangers of bubbles.129 As a result, it seems reasonable to recognise 
that the market cannot be acting rationally all the time and that share prices do not 
reflect all available information.  
 Second, some empirical evidence shows that the link between poor 
performance of a target company and takeovers is weaker than expected.130 there is 
some evidence suggesting that weak companies are less likely to become targets for 
potential bidders and that potential bidders are looking for excellent management.131 
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Such empirical evidence undermines the underlying assumption of the market for 
corporate control, which is that the underperforming companies are disciplined 
through the market. Another factor that dilutes the benefits of takeovers is the cost of 
takeovers. The costs involved in takeovers are so high that they can be considered an 
obstacle to the smooth operation of the market.132 As noted by Frank and Harris: ‘[i]f 
many of these bids are simply vehicles for removing weak and inefficient 
management, then it seems very expensive to spend millions or even tens of millions 
to remove the chairman or part of the board of directors… [i]t is like buying an entire 
football team when only one player is wanted’.133  
 As a result, takeovers are accepted as one of the primary disciplinary 
mechanisms in monitoring management, but when the theory is considered in the 
context of criticisms of EMH and practical difficulties, its disciplinary function is far 
from complete. Takeovers might function as a disciplinary mechanism, but their 
capacity is limited and cannot be considered as a primary disciplinary mechanism. 
 Remuneration Contracts   
Another mechanism which is considered a means of controlling agency costs is 
executive remuneration contracts.134 In the 1990s, pay-for-performance contracts were 
seen as a way to align the interests of managers and shareholders and to give 
appropriate incentives to management. Thereafter, scholars focussed on how to design 
optimal remuneration structures.135 Jensen and Murphy re-interpreted executive 
compensation and it was seen as a tool for reducing agency costs between shareholders 
and managers.136 This approach, called ‘optimal contracting approach’,137 offers two 
important justifications for ‘pay-for-performance’ arrangements: such contracts 
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incentivise managers to be more efficient, and they play a significant role in aligning 
the interests of managers with those of shareholders.138  
 Jensen and Murphy argued that excessive pay is not the problem; the problem 
is how managers are paid. 139 They suggested that the increased use of a pay-for-
performance system (in turn, a higher dismissal possibility for unsuccessful managers) 
would lead to lower levels of income for less talented managers and over time, these 
less talented managers would be replaced with talented and motivated managers who 
would perform better and earn higher levels of compensation.140 Performance-based 
executive pay incentivises managers to pursue the shareholders’ agenda, and to 
perform better. In the end, it results in stronger corporate performance.   
 While excessive pay is not a problem in theory, it ignores the possibility of the 
reward for failure. Executive compensation has been subjected to much criticism in 
the wake of corporate governance failures. 141 The 2007-2008 financial crisis has 
drawn attention to the extremely high salaries of executives despite the very poor 
performance of companies.142 Executive compensation turned into a risk management 
problem rather than a way of aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. The 
executives disregarded the long-term interests of the company and shareholders by 
hitting targets to receive extra high payments. This situation shows that the pay-for-
performance theory has substantial defects and is not able to explain the problems of 
current executive pay regimes.  
 The optimal contracting theory suffers from a number of shortcomings which 
weaken the performance link at the heart of the theory and cause conflicts between 
shareholders and managers. A typical pay-for-performance contract in public 
companies contains three elements: a basic salary, a bonus related to the share price, 
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and a stock option plan. It might also include other components such as pension rights 
and severance pay. The way that these components are connected, and the bargaining 
process might cause agency problems and break the link with performance. In contrast 
to the theory, after corporate failures, these elements were considered to be a 
contributing factor to the failures since they extended the gap between the interests of 
managers and shareholders.143  
 First, the success of pay-for-performance contracts depends on adequate 
control by the board of directors over management. It fails to take into account the 
realities of executive pay structures and managerial power.144 Management may have 
significant influence over the board of directors and the board might lack the 
motivation to bargain for the best interests of shareholders for a variety of reasons.145 
Managers still have influence over the boards of directors.146 As will be seen, 
independent directors may not be free of pressure from management. Second, 
share prices are often used in pay-for-performance contracts as a benchmark for the 
performance of the company. This situation incentivises managers to inflate corporate 
earnings to prevent a decline in share prices.147 Since the Enron failure, it has been 
understood that executive managers were paid huge salaries and bonuses along with 
the CEO. It was revealed that targets were achieved by manipulating the accounts.148 
In addition to the manipulation problem, it is difficult to monitor the problem of 
postponing or accelerating the disclosure of information by managers. In practice, bad 
news about the company usually comes after, rather than before, the date on which 
managers use their stock options.149 The increased use of stock options gives financial 
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incentives to CEOs to manipulate the substance and the timing of the financial and 
accounting statements of the company.150 
 Optimal contracting theory construes executive remuneration as a means to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders. This approach depends heavily on 
the board of directors as guardians of shareholders’ interests. However, remuneration 
contracts may induce management to pursue their own interests, which in turn 
damages the efficiency and value of public companies, thereby reducing shareholder 
wealth and, indirectly, social wealth. 
 Audit 
The primary role of audit is to provide a fair and true picture of companies to the 
market and the collective body of shareholders in order to create market trust and 
confidence.151 The need for auditors derives from the agency theory.152 The 
management of a company has incentives to present the company’s situation in its best 
light.153 These problems create a demand for an objective and independent audit 
process for corporations in order to verify that the financial statements present a fair 
picture of the company’s actual position and ensure a periodic flow to investors of 
accurate information about the performance of the management. In theory, auditors 
exist to provide information, to monitor the activities of managers, to prevent 
managers from committing wrongdoing and manipulating the financial statements, 
and to provide confidence to the market.154  
 The success of auditors in corporate governance will depend on the discovery 
of wrongdoing in financial statements; it thereby reduces agency costs. This is possible 
only if the auditor is independent of the management.155 If an audit firm is 
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independent, it is able to present an objective, true and fair report of a company’s 
financial situation.156  Otherwise, it might tend to overlook material errors or 
misrepresentations in the statements. Corporate governance failures such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Independent Insurance, Lernout & Hauspie, Vivendi and Parmalat157 were 
all associated with audit failures158 and in particular were deemed to be caused by a 
lack of auditor independence.159 It has recently been asked how these financial 
institutions obtained clean audit reports just before they collapsed,160 and the 
credibility of the auditors has been challenged on account of these clean reports.161  
 Auditor independence was not regulated substantively on either side of the 
Atlantic until the Enron failure.162 According to Coffee, auditor independence 
regulation must ensure that the potential costs to auditors of compromised audits 
should outweigh the potential benefits from approving financial statements that are in 
favour of the client’s management but are misleading to shareholders and investors.163 
Audit firms could receive luxury fees for the provision of non-auditing consulting 
services (NAS) such as tax consultancy, corporate finance, information technology 
and human resources. The provision of NASs to the same company creates a conflict 
of interest which has the potential to compromise the scepticism of the auditor because 
of the self-interest motive and financial dependence on the client;164 the audit firm 
might be willing to please its client in order to provide lucrative NASs.  
 Following the Enron failure, the US preferred to regulate NASs and prohibited 
the provision of certain types of NAS.165 Even though regulating this field is a positive 
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step in enhancing independence, the inherent conflict of interest between the role of 
auditors and their financial expectation as a commercial entity still remains. The 
question remains as to ‘whether one can trust a watchdog hired and paid by the party 
to be watched’.166 
 Auditors’ primary potential cost consists of the legal liability. Coffee 
established a link between the rapid decline in liability during the 1990s and 
acquiescent auditing.167 In this context, the threat of litigation can be regarded as 
serving the regulatory function of deterring a compromised audit. Nevertheless, the 
internal dynamics of legal liability are not as straightforward as assumed by 
accounting scholarship in that it usually fails to consider legal rules.  
 First of all, the audited company’s claim against the auditor is restricted. In US 
law, the company’s claim against the auditor is also limited because the latter cannot 
be held responsible for damage if the wrongdoing is committed or known by the 
managers of the audited company.168 An auditor can easily attribute the knowledge of 
wrongdoing to the audited company, even if he is negligent in conducting the audit. 
The auditors and client company are considered in pari delicto.169 The client company, 
in return, can invoke the ‘adverse interest defence’, arguing that managers pursued 
solely their own interests and those of the company, and did not obtain any benefit 
from the wrongdoing170 although in many cases the client company gains benefits 
from the misrepresentation in its financial statements. 
 Second, audit reports have a spill-over effect since they are widely used by 
different groups that do not have any contractual relationship with the client company. 
The company might seek to use audit reports to provide confidence to creditors.171 The 
main question with regard to liability to non-contractual parties is whether auditors 
will be held liable if a third party relies on the reports. In the US, the answer to 
auditors’ third party liability, at least broadly, was provided by the leading case of 
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Ultramares Corp v Touche.172 The court did not impose any liability on the auditor for 
negligence because ‘if liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the 
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries may expose 
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class’.173  The upshot of auditors’ liability to third parties is that even 
though audit reports are used by non-contractual parties, auditors do not owe any 
responsibility unless certain conditions are met. Therefore, it has a limited deterrent 
effect on acquiescent auditing.  
 As a result, it is virtually impossible for an auditor to be completely 
independent of managers despite any regulatory improvements. Audit as a control 
mechanism does not carry out the role expected of it. 
 Independent Directors 
As discussed above, a central decision-making body, i.e. the board of directors, is at 
the heart of every large company. The members of the board are formally elected by 
shareholders and bear collective responsibility for the management of the company’s 
business. The role of the board has been evolving over time. According to Berle and 
Means, the board did not have much capacity to run the company and was accountable 
to and under the control of senior managers.174  Over time, the institution of the 
corporate board has gradually been regarded as an important means to address agency 
cost problems in public companies.175 There have been law and corporate governance 
rule changes aimed at empowering the board and reducing the impact of managers on 
the board. In the 1950s, boards were almost ‘an extension of management’.176 They 
used to carry out a primarily advisory rather monitoring role. Now, a majority of 
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directors of a typical listed company are independent directors.177 Outside directors 
primarily carry out the monitoring function of the board by acting as an independent 
eye.178 In other words, it is a mechanism to overcome the problems of separation by 
holding executives accountable for their performance.179 The board is no longer only 
a passive advisor to management but also serves to monitor and control management. 
Such a transformation in the structure of the board of directors in fact constitutes the 
basis for director primacy theory because it is argued that with the help of a number 
of changes in the law and best practice, the board are strengthened to act as monitors 
on management’s decisions and actions.180 The board becomes independent of 
management and acts as the corporation’s Platonic master.181 
 The requirements for independent directors are set out in the listing rules of 
the NYSE and NASDAQ.182 All regulations place emphasis on not having a material 
relationship with the publicly traded company that would jeopardise NEDs’ 
independence. While the primary aim of the inclusion of independent directors is to 
enhance the monitoring capacity of the board, the board is still expected to decide on 
strategic planning and to take important policy decisions.183 The modern board of 
directors is, therefore, expected to serve two almost incompatible functions.184 First, 
the board is the company’s supreme executive body; thus, it is still responsible for 
developing and implementing business plans. The role of NEDs from a broader 
perspective is similar to executives because NEDs are expected to make significant 
contributions to the decisions of the board and to be involved in audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees.185 Second, its duty is to monitor and discipline the 
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managers.186 The board of directors is assumed to be able to carry out a unique 
combination of managerial and monitoring roles.187  
 The increased independence requirements for NEDs help them to be more 
effective and to carry out their role, but the effectiveness and monitoring capacity of 
the independent boards has been challenged in the literature and after the financial 
crisis.188  
 First, the core difficulty is their independence from management. Despite the 
nominal independence of NEDs, it is often argued that they are too close to 
management.189 The primary reason is that management is still dominant in the 
nomination of non-executive directors in the absence of shareholder contests.190 NEDs 
who want to keep their position cannot be completely independent of management. 
Technically, shareholders are entitled to nominate and to appoint these internal 
monitors directly; however, in practice, it is usually predetermined by the current 
board.191 This situation also shows that without active shareholder engagement, the 
formal legal right to appoint directors does not suffice to remove the influence of 
executives over NEDs.192  Other research has shown that even though the CEO is not 
involved in the nominating committee, her or his influence cannot be ignored.193 
Therefore, management could have significant influence on the board of directors 
owing to the re-election concerns of independent directors. Management could be also 
willing to nominate independent directors, who will not challenge them. In this 
respect, the board could fail to scrutinise the merits of corporate strategies objectively 
and to monitor management adequately. 
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 Second, the appointment of other executives or former retired executives to the 
board to act as NEDs constitutes another hurdle to NED independence as they are 
mostly considered to be ‘less independent’.194 Since executives want candidates who 
do not rock the boat, they serve such directorship when they are appointed as NEDs 
to other boards.195 Many might even have a pre-existing relationship with the company 
and its executives.196 They are less likely to carry out vigorous monitoring function 
because they usually share the same or similar values and approaches as executives. 
Therefore, NEDs might be biased in favour of insider managers or directors. Another 
factor limiting the monitoring functions of independent directors are board culture and 
behavioural biases that prevent independent directors from expressing their views 
freely. Board meetings are often described as having an emphasis on politeness and 
courtesy, which may accompany a failure in the monitoring function.197 Sharpe states 
that ‘the likelihood that an independent director will be willing to criticise a CEO is 
limited because her decision making is influenced by board room norms’.198 Similarly, 
the financial crisis raises further questions whether the board is critical enough in 
scrutinising the management actions and decisions.199 Furthermore, some managerial 
errors could be related to this dynamics of the board.  The cognitive and behavioural 
limitations of small group decision making is subject to ‘group polarisation’, that is 
‘the tendency of a small deliberative group with an initial tendency to move in a given 
direction to move to even more extreme positions in that direction following group 
deliberations’.200 Overall, this shows independent directors fail to challenge 
management and criticise corporate strategies in the boardroom. Such situation is 
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against the raison d’être of independent directors and significantly reduces the 
capacity of the board to carry out the role assumed by director primacy theory.  
 Third and most importantly, the transition from an advisory board to a 
monitoring board creates information asymmetry between outsider directors, and 
insider directors and top managers, which severely restricts the ability of the board to 
monitor management. As NEDs often hold multiple positions on different boards, they 
lack the time, sufficient information, adequate resource and the right industry-specific 
knowledge to be involved in decision-making, or to monitor and challenge the 
strategic planning and important decisions of the company.201 In the financial crisis, it 
was understood that NEDs in the financial institutions, which had difficulties, may not 
have sufficient knowledge and experience about the banking sector. 202 The outside 
directors are heavily dependent on the information that insider directors and top 
managers may choose to provide or to conceal or to present in a way that supports the 
position of management. They are less likely to obtain unfiltered and complete 
information on the company and to have independent access to information, which is 
a prerequisite for the board’s oversight responsibility. The ability of the board to carry 
out the monitoring role and to verify the accuracy of the information is severely 
diminished because of the exclusive reliance on the management for information.  
Moreover, when the management provides the information, NEDs might not have 
appropriate resources or relevant industry specific knowledge203 to critically analyse 
the information in a timely manner, given time restrictions.204  More importantly, in 
some cases, management may prefer to withhold information from NEDs, in particular 
to the members of audit committees. This was particularly the case in the Enron and 
Equitable failures.205 In the Enron failure, it was discovered that ‘the board of directors 
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was denied important information that might have led it to take actions’.206 Therefore, 
in terms of information, management might capture the board and the board could 
monitor management with filtered information.207  Information asymmetry between 
directors and managers also contributes to the board alienation, which is the lack of 
awareness about management practices and operational realities. The board alienation 
problem has been the case in the Barings, Enron, Citibank, and Lehman Brothers 
failures, among other factors.208 This shows that the board capacity to act as the 
Platonic master of the company is limited because of the board’s overreliance on 
management and lack of expertise and skills.   
  As a result, the modern board is still expected to carry out the dual role: 
managerial and monitoring roles. Independent directors play a significant role in the 
modern board of directors.  Director primacy theory posits that the board of directors 
could act as a sort of Platonic guardian of companies and shareholders. In fact, the 
board is more independent from management than ever before. The practice seems to 
be very close to the director primacy model. The analysis above, however, has 
demonstrated that the management could still have a strong influence over the board, 
that information asymmetry between the board and management, and the board 
dynamics prevents the board from carrying out the unique dual role. The board of 
directors fails to obtain sufficient information to evaluate the complexities of corporate 
transactions undertaken by management and to sufficiently criticise and challenge 
management in the boardrooms. This situation often undermines the validity of 
director primacy and plays a role in corporate governance failures. 
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In outsider corporate governance models, public companies are held by a large number 
of shareholders. This has led to the creation of the image of weak and passive 
shareholders in the company law literature. Under contractarian theory, shareholders 
are not expected to participate in the management of companies because their role is 
simply to supply capital, bear residual risk and invest in different companies, whereas 
directors and managers provide the specialised management and are good at decision-
making. Contractarian scholars are generally not worried about the powerlessness of 
shareholders because of market efficiency and the benefits associated with centralised 
decision-making. Shareholders are not expected to participate in the decision-making 
of public companies. Director primacy theory makes a strong normative case in favour 
of the protection of the board authority and the disempowerment of shareholders. It 
finds shareholder activism inconsistent with efficient decision-making in public 
companies because of the inherent trade-off between authority and accountability. 
Addressing accountability concerns should not be the only concern of company law 
according to director primacy theory because agency problems are the natural 
outcomes of centralised management. A hierarchical centralised management must 
equally be the concern of company law because it addresses the problem of operating 
a large company. In contrast, shareholder primacy theory sees addressing 
accountability concerns as the principal function of company law, and attributes the 
ultimate control to shareholders to address accountability concerns. These two theories 
adopt two extreme approaches and have different focuses. While director primacy 
theory focusses on the economic efficiency of the corporate decision-making 
structure, shareholder primacy is built on the claim that directors and managers could 
pursue their own interests and maximise their own utility.  
 
    Director primacy theory may seem to be a complete theory because it does not 
deny the agency cost problem. However, in the context of the analysis pursued above, 
it is evident that the current mechanisms designed to reduce agency costs are far from 
perfect. They fail to provide effective control over management. More importantly, 
the theory falls short in that it assumes that the evolving board of directors could carry 
out a unique combination of managerial and monitoring roles in public companies. 
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This chapter, however, has demonstrated that the board’s capacity to carry out such a 
role is more limited than the director primacy theory assumes. Information asymmetry 
between the board and management, and the board’s overreliance on management 
cause the board alienation problem, which significantly undermines the validity of 
director primacy theory. Therefore, shareholder activism as an accountability 




Chapter 3. Theoretical Aspects of Shareholder 
Activism 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to address the normative question of whether the evolving role of 
shareholders is desirable given the potential problems that shareholder activism might 
cause in corporate governance. In the previous chapter, the limited role of shareholders 
in corporate governance in the director primacy theory was discussed and a gap was 
demonstrated in the web of accountability mechanisms relied on by this theory.  
 Shareholder activism could potentially address agency and accountability 
problems in public companies. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the proponents of 
shareholder primacy rely on shareholder empowerment. They basically seek to give 
shareholders as much power as possible because it would make companies more 
efficient1 and would maximise the firm value.2 Therefore, scholars have sought to 
measure the success of activism by investigating its impact on the targeted firms’ 
performance.3 The link between shareholder activism and overall financial 
performance of the company is widely challenged in the literature, and as will be seen, 
the empirical evidence is inconclusive.4 Hence, it is not sufficient to justify the role of 
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shareholder activism as an accountability mechanism. Moreover, as will be discussed, 
there are different types of shareholder activism which are used to increase the 
financial performance of companies or to bolster the social and political legitimacy of 
companies. They might not have an impact on share prices. In addition, policymakers 
and market institutions have begun to place emphasis on public interest concerns in 
the context of the role of shareholders. In this regard, the role of shareholder activism 
will be explored in the context of Hirschman’s framework, namely Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty because in this framework, voice, i.e. shareholder activism, is described as 
‘political action par excellence’.5  In this framework, voice aims to change or to 
influence the actions or decisions of the board and management.   
  In the wake of the financial 2007-2008 crisis, lawmakers placed emphasis on 
shareholder activism to address public interest concerns such as short-termism in the 
market and facilitating long-term investment in the market, thereby ensuring the 
stability of the economy in general. The concept of stewardship was introduced in the 
UK as a response to the financial crisis.6 This concept has also influenced policy on 
the other side of Atlantic. Major US institutional investors have issued a set of 
Stewardship Principles.7 These principles are a result of bottom-up forces rather than 
a regulatory force. It indicates that major institutional investors show an interest in the 
long-term investment and major policies of companies and are willing to develop 
engagement with the board. Such development is important for US corporate 
governance because it introduces collaborative or constructive shareholder activism.   
 However, the role of shareholder activism in corporate governance is not 
universally endorsed by scholars.8 There are serious concerns that shareholders could 
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use their power to exploit the company for short-term gains at the expense of the long-
term interests of the company, other shareholders, and stakeholders. In particular, 
activist funds are argued to be inherently detrimental to companies and the economy 
in general. Lawmakers should therefore consider these potential problems and, if they 
exist, should create optimal frameworks by constraining the potential deleterious side 
of shareholder activism.  
3.2 Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance 
The governance role of shareholders has been evolving over time. The rise of 
institutional shareholders has led many academics to think that the ability of 
institutional shareholders to monitor management and to enhance managerial 
accountability would increase the protection of their investment through the private 
agency-based corporate governance framework.9 Such defensive monitoring is usually 
perceived as being able to improve the efficiency of corporate governance which in 
turn enhances shareholder value and firm value.10 However, as will be seen, there are 
different types of shareholder activism.  So it is entirely possible that shareholder 
activism may be driven by financial, social or political motives. A broader framework 
is therefore needed to understand comprehensively the nature of shareholder activism. 
In this regard, Hirschman’s framework which examines the relationship between exit, 
voice and loyalty in large organisations ranging from governments to companies could 
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provide a broader framework in which different types of shareholder activism could 
fit.11      
The increasing scepticism about the monitoring capacity of the board and other 
mechanisms led policy-makers to take advantage of the increased shareholdings of 
institutional shareholders at the turn of the century.12 In the post-crisis era, it is thought 
that shareholders should engage with management in order to address short-termism 
in the market and pressure by activist funds and day traders, and to facilitate the long-
term value creation for the ultimate beneficiaries, the economy and society in general.  
This long-term value creation would enjoy the ‘implicit social legitimacy’ that 
constitutes the intellectual foundation of the UK Stewardship Code.13 The role of 
shareholders is not only to achieve private objectives but also a matter of public 
interest. The development of shareholders as stewards has also influenced US 
corporate governance. Major institutional shareholders are developing new investor 
paradigms against short-termism and pressures by activist funds.14 Institutional 
shareholders have promulgated the Stewardship Principles in the US.15 This inevitably 
requires institutional shareholders to participate in the decision-making of companies. 
The evolving role of shareholders is of importance to US corporate governance 
because, as discussed in Chapter 2, the director primacy theory and standard 
contractarian theory recognise the limited role of shareholder participation in decision-
making. These market developments are at odds with the dominant theory of US 
corporate governance. In summary, the governance role of shareholders now has two 
dimensions: an accountability mechanism for their private interests and an 
accountability mechanism that addresses public concerns facilitating long-term value 
creating and ensuring the sustainability of the broader economy.     
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 Shareholder Activism as an Accountability Mechanism 
Dissatisfied shareholders in public companies have basically two options: exit the 
company or speak out against the board and management. In its traditional definition, 
shareholder activism is a process which aims to ‘bring about change within the 
company without a change in control’.16 It is broadly ‘a continuum of responses to 
corporate performance and activities’.17 The law and economics approach emphasised 
the exit option and overlooked the possibility of shareholder activism. This section 
seeks to answer the question whether shareholder activism could function as an 
accountability mechanism. 
 In the beginning of the twentieth century, shareholder activism was primarily 
used by powerful individual investors or firms, who were represented on the board 
and had direct influence over the management of the company.18 With the formation 
of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) in 1985, there has been an increase in 
shareholder involvement in corporate governance matters,19 but it has had limited 
impact and success.20 Such governance proposals such as the majority voting and the 
removal of anti-takeover defences failed to garner considerable support from 
shareholders or were ignored by the board and management.21 However, as will be 
seen in Chapter 5, the support and effectiveness of such proposals increased 
substantially at the turn of the century.22 In addition, since the 1960s, some 
institutional investors have been submitting corporate social responsibility proposals 
and trying to influence the board and management on corporate social responsibility 
issues.23 These proposals cover issues such as local employment and economy 
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17 Gillan and Starks (n 16) 56. 
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considerations, the board’s diversity, the environment, international labour and human 
rights, and anti-discrimination.24 Social activists aim to make the behaviour of 
companies consistent with social norms. Shareholder activism on these matters may 
not have an impact on the share price. However, there are also activist funds, which 
also took a more central role in corporate governance in the mid-2000s,25 whose 
primary aim is to generate ‘abnormal’ returns following the activism.26 These 
investors are motivated by economic interests.          
 The desirability of shareholder activism is sought to be justified depending on 
its financial impact on the targeted company.27 However, measuring the success of 
shareholder activism is problematic. First, identifying the activism might be difficult 
because shareholder activism can take place behind closed doors.28 Such activism 
cannot be captured by empirical studies. Second, empirical studies fail to establish a 
causal link between shareholder activism and the increase in the efficiency and value 
of the target companies.29 There are also empirical studies that note abnormal share 
price increases after shareholder activism.30 Empirical evidence is also mixed 
regarding the impact of shareholder activism on the share price or efficiency of the 
target company.31 Academics have often assumed that shareholder activism would 
enhance the efficiency of a company; therefore, there would be a share price increase. 
However, those scholars, even initially optimistic ones, became pessimistic about the 
capability of shareholder activism because of the limited effect that shareholder 
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activism has had on share prices.32 Third, shareholder activism may be related to 
corporate social responsibilities, which is likely to have less to do with shareholder 
wealth maximisation. As such economic efficiency argument could not shed a light on 
the desirability of shareholder activism.  
 Such studies could not therefore constitute an adequate intellectual basis for 
the reform discourse on the desirability of shareholder activism. Hirschman’s 
influential book on feedback mechanisms in large organisations, Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty33 could, however, shed light on the role of shareholder activism in corporate 
governance, how it functions and whether or under what conditions it might be 
desirable. This could better inform lawmakers in preparing legal and regulatory 
proposals in this field. In general, his framework aims to identify the ways in which 
organisations varying from government to companies could avert decline and reach 
their full potential. His framework therefore complements the role of shareholders 
depicted by contractarians and brings new insight to the same situation.34 Indeed, his 
framework and the traditional contractarian approach represent two different aspects 
of the same problem. It is a different perspective on contemporary activism.35 
 In Hirschman’s framework, ‘voice’ refers to changes in the policy of an 
organisation through the appeal to a higher authority or different types of action 
including protests.36 In this regard, voice could warn the board before it is too late. 
Shareholder activism, therefore, could function as an early warning mechanism that 
transmits shareholders’ dissatisfaction with managerial policies about financial or 
                                                 
32 For example, Bernard Black, ‘Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the US’ in Peter 
Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Macmillan 1998) 459; 
Edward Rock, ‘The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism’ (1991) 
79 The Georgetown Law Journal 445. 
33 Hirschmann (n 5). 
34 Stephen Bottomley, The Constitutional Corporation: Rethinking Corporate Governance (Routledge 
2007) 12 (‘The corporate world is too complex and too variable for any single theory or discipline to 
be able to supply all of the answers to all of the problems of corporate governance. There are aspects 
of corporate life for which economic theories are well-suited but, equally, there are other aspects for 
which we need a different framework, another option on the conceptual menu. Economics can share 
the analytical stage with other approaches’); See also, Alessandra Arcuri, ‘Eclecticism in Law and 
Economics’, (2008) 1(3) Erasmus Law Review 60 
35  See Chapter 2; Bart Bootsma ‘An Eclectic Approach to Loyalty-Promoting Instruments in Corporate 
Law: Revisiting Hirschman's Model of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ (2013) 2 Erasmus Law Review 111, 
125.  




social performance of companies. Shareholders must have sufficient tools to force the 
board to take on board their concerns, otherwise the board could ignore the voice to 
maintain the status quo in the name of long-termism or better performance in the 
future, which may never come.  If the board take it seriously, the decline could be 
averted. While exit is closely related with economic behaviour, voice is closely 
associated with political behaviour.37 Voice, therefore, might be related to the 
principles of allocative efficiency as well as to social and environmental issues. It 
refers to a process of articulation of interests directed at the management or at an 
authority (i.e. the board of directors) to which management is responsible, or through 
other means such as the media, campaigns or social media.38 In the context of 
corporate governance, the role of shareholder activism is to express views and 
concerns to the board who can address them. It may entail an exchange of views about 
the company which could be carried out through formal means and/or informal means. 
It can be regarded as an attempt to change companies’ strategies rather than to exit the 
company in the case of an unsatisfactory situation. 
  Voice could be used to reveal managerial errors or flaws in corporate strategy. 
Shareholders may not be happy with the financial or social performance of the 
company. These errors, which may not necessarily constitute breaches of duties, are 
often the real causes of corporate governance failures.39 Voice could play a corrective 
function in the decision-making of corporations. In Hirschman’s framework, there is 
no one single solution to the underperformance of organisations. There is no optimal 
mix of exit and voice for all organisations. Every organisation has its own optimal mix 
of exit and voice, which could also change over time. Voice can also be excessive for 
some organisations.40  
 To summarise, voice could help large organisations to recover from 
underperformance. In the corporate governance landscape, shareholder activism 
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could, therefore, promote managerial accountability by functioning as a feedback 
mechanism. If activism is a genuine option for shareholders, we should question the 
belief that company law should be built on the assumption that shareholders prefer to 
exit a company and that voice is inherently detrimental to corporate governance. The 
question then becomes how shareholder activism should be accommodated within the 
US corporate governance framework.   
 Types of Shareholder Activism 
3.2.2.1 Offensive and Defensive Types of Activism 
In corporate governance, there are different types of shareholder activism depending 
on the objectives of shareholders. Cheffins and Armour introduced the first division 
in order to distinguish between different activism objectives. 41 The ‘offensive’ and 
‘defensive’ activism distinction is based on the presence or absence of a pre-existing 
stake in a company.42 There are also some differences in the methods of offensive and 
defensive activist shareholders, but shareholders that are offensive can adopt the 
methods of defensive activism and vice versa.  
 
 ‘Defensive’ activism is mostly undertaken by mainstream institutional 
shareholders, namely pension funds and mutual funds to protect a pre-existing stake.43 
In the case of defensive activism, mainstream institutional shareholders with a pre-
existing stake, but not enough to secure control, occasionally take action when they 
are dissatisfied with the performance of portfolio companies or their governance 
arrangements. In contrast, in the case of offensive activism, shareholders normally 
have no pre-existing shares, but accumulate a sizeable amount of a company’s shares 
in the belief that the target company is underperforming and that the value of shares 
can increase as a result of activism, although not always in confrontational forms. 
These shareholders adopt a hands-on approach rather than waiting for the market to 
impose sanctions and are equipped to take action by persuading management or 
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shareholders to implement changes to increase shareholder returns. Cheffins and 
Armour state, ‘the readiness to take a hands-on role to shake things up is the crucial 
additional dimension’.44   
 Another key difference is that in offensive activism the shareholder seeks to 
receive ‘abnormal’ shareholder returns. In this context, offensive activism is ‘a profit-
making strategy, they take economic positions in portfolio companies that enable them 
to engage in, and make profits from, activism.’ 45 Therefore, offensive activism is 
mostly performance driven activism, which aims to make significant changes to a 
company’s strategy.  
 Given the readiness of offensive activists to choose a hands-on approach and 
seek abnormal returns, offensive activism can be more accurately described as the 
market for corporate influence.46 These investors use a sizeable share ownership to 
bring about change, and unlike takeovers, they do not aim to gain full control of a 
company. In this regard, offensive shareholder activism could be regarded as a softer 
substitute to the market for corporate control. However, this type of activism has 
prompted fierce debate and it can be argued that it has a dark side that raises concerns 
for corporate governance.47 These arguments are important because they can direct 
lawmakers to constrain shareholder activism.     
3.2.2.2 Responsible Shareholder Activism 
In addition to the above classification, there is a further type of activism which not 
only focuses on financial and governance issues, but also on environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) concerns or in other words, sustainability issues. Shareholders can 
be dissatisfied with the social performance of a portfolio company just as they can 
with the financial performance of a company.48 This thesis takes responsible activism 
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to mean the incorporation of stakeholder concerns with long-term value creation49 and 
advancing social progress. 
 Recent developments in corporate governance seem to favour this approach.50 
There is also an increasing tendency for companies to show interest in stakeholder 
concerns and annual company reports often place substantial emphasis on non-
shareholder interests.51 A further point is that in the last twenty years, companies have 
started adopting codes of conduct that emphasise the stakeholder responsibilities of 
directors and managers, and establishing departments to examine the effects of a 
company’s actions on stakeholders.52 In short, there has been greater emphasis on 
long-termism and stakeholder concerns in company law and corporate governance. 
 These developments have normative implications for the behaviour of 
institutional investors and encourage them to adopt responsible investing principles. 
In fact, institutional investors have been shown an awareness of ESG issues and have 
been playing an active role in incorporating stakeholder practices in  investee 
companies.53 Hence, they are part of the corporate governance landscape.54 In the US, 
a substantial number of shareholder proposals focus on social and environmental 
issues and the average support for these proposals has been increasing.55 These 
proposals are concerned with a broader range of issues such as board diversity, 
International Labor Standards, human rights, sexual discrimination at portfolio 
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companies, and the environmental impact of corporate actions.56 The notable sponsors 
of this proposals are public pension funds and mutual funds,57 but NGOs, labour 
unions, religious groups and social activists also submit these kinds of proposals.58 
Therefore, this type of activism can be considered the integration of business and 
societal concerns.59 However, some public pension funds or religious groups can 
engage in activism for their own political or other purposes rather than the general 
interest of shareholders or the company.60 
 There are a number of factors that encourage institutional investors to adopt a 
responsible investing approach. Some funds regard responsible shareholder activism 
as a means of promoting the long-term sustainability of portfolio companies or the 
brand image of the fund.61 These investors, in particular long-term investors such as 
pension funds,62 have stronger incentives because negative publicity with regards to 
low social, environmental and labour standards could lead to brand damage and 
reduced value of portfolio companies. Institutional investors, in particular long-term 
ones, are more sensitive to bad publicity regarding the portfolio companies. 
Responsible investing could therefore serve a risk reduction function in corporate 
governance.63  
 Institutional investors might possibly focus on only the stakeholder aspect rather 
than the economic aspect of activism. 64 Some public pension funds and labour funds 
have been using shareholder activism to advance progressive social causes which were 
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heavily criticised for not being related to shareholder wealth maximisation.65 For 
instance, public pension funds may place emphasis on corporate decisions about local 
issues such as in-state employment, local plant closures or labour rights.66 They can 
be found to be inconsistent with the general dynamics of corporate governance.67 
However, as will be seen in the following chapters, this kind of proposal could be 
beneficial in the decision-making process of the board. 
 As a conclusion, shareholder activism aims to change financial and non-financial 
corporate policies. The different types of activism are not exclusive to each other. 
Institutional shareholders could adopt a combination of these different types. So far, 
shareholder activism has been analysed as an accountability mechanism depending on 
private interests. However, there are also important policy developments imposing 
pressure on institutional shareholders to address short-termism in the market and to 
facilitate long-term investments in portfolio companies to ensure sustainability of 
companies. The following section will focus on this emerging aspect of shareholder 
activism.  
  Shareholder Activism and Public Interest 
Shareholder activism was perceived as a means of ensuring the sustainability of 
companies and economy in general by addressing accountability problems in the 
corporate sector before the financial crisis. Therefore, it could be argued that there is 
an overlap between the private interests of institutional shareholders and the public 
interest. In the US, there is no single soft or hard law focussing on shareholder 
activism. The reasoning behind the codification process regarding shareholder 
empowerment could shed some light on how shareholder activism was perceived by 
US lawmakers. However, in the post-crisis era, the emphasis on shareholder activism 
as a means to address public interest concerns such as short-termism in the market and 
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to insert long-termism into the market has become evident. The concept of stewardship 
was developed in the UK.68 Such regulatory development in the UK affected some of 
the largest US institutional shareholders and they formed a framework, the Investor 
Stewardship Group (ISG), for corporate governance and stewardship.69 This section 
will examine how shareholder activism was perceived by US lawmakers before the 
financial crisis, and then will analyse how the post-crisis developments affected major 
US institutional shareholders, and the importance of the stewardship movement in US 
corporate governance.  
  The Department of Labor’s (DOL) Avon Letter of 1988 was a major landmark 
in the attempts to increase shareholder activism. The letter stated that ‘the fiduciary 
act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the 
voting of proxies’.70 The DOL issued Interpretative Bulletins (the IB 1994-1 and the 
IB 1994-2) on sections 402, 403 and 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA)71  in 1994.72 These sections regulate the voting of shares held in 
employee benefit plans and the investment and voting policy of the fiduciaries. The 
interpretative bulletins basically allowed social investing73 and considered that in 
principle the voting of shares are in the scope of fiduciary duties of the plan’s trustees 
and managers and found shareholder activism compatible with the ERISA if there is 
a reasonable expectation that such activities will increase the value of the investment 
in that company.   
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 The DOL amended these bulletins in 2008 in order to clarify its approach to 
social investing and the exercising of shareholder rights.74 The Department adopted a 
relatively restrictive approach.  Bulletin 2008-1 set forth that non-economic factors 
must be rare and, ‘when considered, should be documented in a manner that 
demonstrates compliance with ERISA’s rigorous fiduciary standards’. The 2008-2 
Bulletin stated that fiduciaries have an obligation to refrain from voting if the cost of 
voting (including the cost of research to determine how to vote) exceeds the expected 
benefit. The 2008 IBs, therefore, established higher but unclear standards for managers 
and trustees when they incorporated the ESG factors and exercised voting rights. This 
situation made it difficult for managers and trustees to exercise voting rights and 
consider ESG factors because of the possibility of violating their fiduciary duties under 
ERISA. In this respect, they had a negative impact on shareholder activism. 
 The DOL once again revised the bulletins to address misperceptions regarding 
social investments and shareholder activism. The Department reverted to its approach 
in 1994 with small changes.75 It removed the reference to the strict application of the 
cost-benefit analysis before voting and in so doing recognised more flexibility was 
needed by fiduciaries and encouraged them to consider whether any vote would impact 
on the value of the investment against the cost of casting shares. More importantly, in 
the preamble of the Bulletin, global corporate governance developments including the 
UK’s Stewardship Code, the benefits of constructive activism, ESG factors and the 
problem of shareholder passivity in the wake of the financial crisis were accorded 
greater importance. This shows that the concept of stewardship has also influenced US 
lawmakers and encouraged them to loosen the criteria regarding shareholder votes and 
activism.   
 In line with the efforts of the DOL in 1994, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has adopted a similar rule which stipulates that voting is a matter 
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of fiduciary duty for the fund managers, mutual funds or similar entities holding votes 
for the beneficiaries.76 The SEC also mandated that mutual funds disclose their proxy 
voting policies and how they exercise their proxy voting.77 These developments reveal 
the agency cost concerns in the SEC and DOL and the possibility of the failure of 
voting, which is an important part of shareholder activism. 
 Institutional investors are seen to be able to influence the future of companies 
and, as a result, the future value of the shares held by beneficiaries who make savings 
for their education, housing needs or retirement. The corporate governance failures 
before 2003 gave investors renewed interest in corporate governance and revealed the 
need for institutional investors to be accountable: ‘[a]s major shareholders, mutual 
funds may play a vital role in monitoring the stewardship of the companies in which 
they invest’.78 Therefore, the votes could increase the value of portfolio companies in 
general, thereby improving the financial position of the beneficial owners. Public 
interest is deemed to exist as a result of the cumulative effect of the increase in the 
performance of individual companies and total increase in the wealth of beneficial 
owners who are in fact long-term savers. It shows that the SEC wants to leverage 
shareholder activism as an accountability mechanism.  
 Moreover, in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was enacted 79 whose aim was ‘to 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system’.80 This act introduced say on pay regulation in 
the US, and sought to provide shareholders with proxy access.81 It seems that the 
recent financial turmoil has led US lawmakers and regulators to make an important 
change to shareholder empowerment in order to restore market trust. These approaches 
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view shareholder engagement as a positive contributor to corporate governance, 
motivating and forcing shareholders to act as an accountability mechanism, to perform 
a quasi-stewardship role and a quasi-regulatory function. This might undermine the 
characteristic features of US corporate governance which is ‘highly unusual in the 
extent to which it disenfranchises shareholders from both explicit and implicit 
influence’.82 
Parallel to the shareholder empowerment debate, there are a number of bottom-
up forces and market-driven demands for corporate governance standards and for a 
higher quality of shareholder activism. A new investor paradigm has been emerging 
in the US. The major institutional shareholders began developing a new paradigm for 
corporate governance in which they support long-term investment, engage with the 
board and management in the development of the strategy, and actively monitor the 
progress and support the management in their fights with activist funds where 
appropriate.83 When the statements and letters of major institutional shareholders are 
examined, it becomes evident that they constantly  emphasise that they are long-term 
investors to distinguish themselves from short-term investors, specifically activist 
funds. What has emerged is that long-termism and the well-being of the economy and 
society are the overarching themes in the emerging paradigm.84  
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 The Investor Stewardship Group published sets of Stewardship Principles and 
Corporate Governance Principles.85 The concept of stewardship was first developed 
in the UK to deal with the problems of short-termism, excessive risk-taking, and 
investor myopia.86 The ‘stewardship’ concept is based on the idea that shareholders 
‘need to earn at least implicit social legitimacy’ in exchange for the privilege of limited 
liability.87  The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) adopted the Stewardship Code.88 
The Stewardship Code places new responsibilities on asset owners and managers with 
the expectation of addressing agency problems in public companies and enhancing the 
sustainability of companies. 
 The Stewardship Code considers that stewardship is something more than only 
voting. Stewardship activities include monitoring and engaging with companies on 
matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure and corporate governance 
including culture and remuneration.89 Engagement is a purposeful dialogue with 
companies on these matters as well as on issues that are the immediate subject of votes 
at general meetings. Principle 1 of the Code requires institutional shareholders to 
disclose how they exercise their stewardship responsibilities. Under Principle 3, 
shareholder monitoring seeks to keep abreast of companies’ performance as well as 
internal and external developments which could affect that performance. Principle 3 
also requires that corporate governance arrangements be strong and effective, that 
general meetings be attended, and that voting power be exercised. Principle 4 urges 
institutional shareholders to escalate activism where necessary. Principle 4 of the Code 
does not limit instances of engagement to company strategy, governance, 
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coalition of institutional shareholders also issued the Commonsense Principles of Corporate 
Governance. See, Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles, < 
http://www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/GovernancePrinciples_Principles.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017. 
86 FRC, Stewardship Code (2012) < https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-
Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf> 
87 David Walker, Review of Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions (2009) 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Walker Review’) Para 5.7. 
88 See Walker Review 17; The most recent version published in 2012, see FRC, Stewardship Code 
(2012) < https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-
Code-September-2012.pdf>.  




remuneration and risk, but also ‘risks arising from social and environmental matters’.90  
The use of terms such as ‘long-term success’, ‘responsibility’, and ‘transparency’ 
emblematically indicate the nature of stewardship.91 The Code allows investors to 
consider a more holistic view of corporate governance rather than mere financial 
performance. It may be argued that Principle 4 aims to create a normative model of 
investor culture which takes into account the long-term interests of companies, ESG 
issues, and the well-being of the economy. In short, shareholders are expected to act 
as a monitoring mechanism maximising shareholder value and a general 
accountability mechanism ensuring the long-term interests of society and economy in 
general. 
Such an understanding of shareholder activism is also found in the Green Paper 
on Corporate Governance Reform published in 2016.92 One of the main focuses of the 
Paper is executive pay, along with strengthening stakeholder voice in corporate 
boardrooms, and developing corporate governance in the UK’s largest privately-held 
businesses. The UK government is of the view that executive pay causes significant 
public concern because it is disconnected from the pay of ordinary people and the 
long-term performance of companies. Green Paper considered possible changes to the 
executive pay framework by: enhancing shareholder voting rights; encouraging 
greater shareholder engagement; strengthening the role of remuneration committees, 
including by having greater engagement by shareholders and employees; enhancing 
transparency; and improving long-term incentive pay. In the Government Response to 
the Green Paper, the government decided to further increase the shareholder role in 
the executive pay regulation framework, broaden the role of remuneration committees, 
implement pay ratio reporting, introduce an enhanced transparency requirement for 
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the long-term incentive arrangements, and increase holding periods for share-based 
for share-based remuneration. This is a clear example of how contemporary 
shareholder activism is considered an accountability mechanism addressing public 
concerns and promoting the long-term interests of society and the economy in general.   
The UK market also welcomed the Stewardship Code, which reached 302 
signatories in 2015.93 By examining numbers, it can be argued that the FRC had 
successfully encouraged institutional shareholders to adopt the SC.94 UK institutional 
investors, acting through The Investment Association, published a report on the 
responsibilities of investors.95 Indeed, the market takes the concept of stewardship 
seriously. Pensions and Lifetime Savings Associations has established a ‘Stewardship 
Disclosure Framework’96 to increase transparency of the enforcement of the 
stewardship principles by asset managers who confirmed to comply with the 
Stewardship Code. Yet, in 2014 the FRC itself acknowledged that there was an 
emerging engagement deficit in medium-sized companies and that many signatories 
have failed to do what the SC requires.97 The FRC launched a tiering exercise to 
distinguish between signatories on the basis of the quality of their reporting against 
the Stewardship Code.98 The tiering mechanism was intended to improve the quality 
of reporting and thereby confirm the commitment of institutional shareholders to the 
Code. The number of asset managers in Tier 1 was initially less than 20, but increased 
to 88 in 2016.99 The tiering exercise achieved significant success in the improvement 
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97 FRC, Annual Report and Accounts 2013/14 (2014) 16 < https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
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of reporting against the principles of the Code, but the FRC was still concerned about 
the signatories that reported poorly and did not engage with the FRC. The 2016 Report 
noted that many statements of institutional shareholders included more information 
about their environmental and social activities, along with executive remuneration. As 
a result, it is reasonable to conclude that the concept of stewardship is being 
increasingly embraced by the investment community in the UK, but the quality of 
stewardship still lags behind the expectations of the FRC even though a significant 
increase in the quality of signatory statements has been observed. 
 The concept of stewardship affected major institutional shareholders in the US. 
The promulgation of the stewardship principles and the development of an investor 
paradigm in the US could be one of the turning points in the history of US corporate 
governance. It is not only important because of the size of signatories (for instance, 
the ISG collectively covers nearly $17 trillion in assets under management),100 but also 
because of its strong endorsement for constructive dialogue between the board and 
shareholders. Such activism goes beyond merely voting. These codes introduce to US 
corporate governance a principles-based framework. The ISG is of the view that ‘the 
fiduciary responsibility of all asset managers’ is ‘to conduct themselves in accordance 
with the preconditions for responsible engagement in a manner that accrues to the best 
interests of stakeholders and society in general, and that in so doing they’ll help build 
a framework for promoting long-term value creation on behalf of US companies and 
the broader US economy’.101 The  main intent is therefore to address public interest 
concerns of short-termism and to achieve long-term value creation for the ultimate 
beneficiaries, companies and the economy in general. Principle A of the Stewardship 
Principles stresses that institutional shareholders and their managers are responsible 
to their ultimate beneficiaries and should monitor beneficiary assets in a responsible 
manner. Principle B recommends that institutional shareholders disclose practices and 
guidelines on how they evaluate corporate governance factors including proxy voting 
and engagement issues. Investors are also recommended to dedicate resources to 
engaging with portfolio companies on corporate governance and other matters related 
to the long-term interests of the beneficiaries, and to disclose their monitoring 
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activities on a periodic basis if appropriate. Principle E requires investors to ‘address 
and attempt to resolve differences with companies in a constructive and pragmatic 
manner’. Finally, institutional shareholders are encouraged to act collectively where 
appropriate. The US Stewardship Principles share many similarities with the UK 
Stewardship Code. The major difference between the US Stewardship Principles and 
the UK Stewardship Code is that while the latter was a regulatory response to the 
financial crisis, the former were a result of market demand for introducing long-
termism in corporate governance and insulating companies from short-term pressures. 
The Stewardship Code and Stewardship Principles both emphasise the development 
of constructive dialogue and engagement in the investment strategies of institutional 
shareholders with the goal of facilitating sustainable long-term value creation, 
protecting the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries, sustaining the economy in general 
and ensuring other relevant sustainability issues.  
  In conclusion, shareholder voting has long been considered in the public 
interest and has been relied on by lawmakers to monitor companies. In particular, the 
recent financial crisis has emphasised shareholder activism, and the concept of 
stewardship has affected US institutional shareholders. The new investor paradigm 
and the Stewardship Principles aim to harden shareholder behavioural norms in a way 
in which shareholders could both monitor portfolio companies and address public 
interest concerns. They could also fundamentally recalibrate the relationship between 
US companies and institutional shareholders and make US corporate governance align 
with global practices. The promulgation of Stewardship Principles and the 
development of a new paradigm encourage companies and institutional shareholders 
and are particularly important for US corporate governance because they require 
companies and shareholders to work together in the development of business 
strategies, and direct companies to understand the preferences, expectations and 
policies of institutional shareholders. This type of activism in fact constitutes a middle 
ground between director primacy and shareholder primacy theories because this type 
of activism is more collaborative than the view of activism as assumed by the 
proponents of director primacy and shareholder primacy theories.102 Moreover, the 
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interests of major institutional shareholders in the development of corporate strategies 
at portfolio companies, and  their support for the long-term investment of companies 
are at odds with the role of shareholders as capital providers. Such constructive 
activism shows that not all types of shareholder activism focus on short-term returns. 
It could also support the board when activist proposals seek to extract value from the 
company.   
3.3 Potential Problems with Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activism has so far been analysed as a positive attribute of corporate 
governance. This view, however, is not universally accepted and there are several 
important arguments against the active role of shareholders in corporate 
governance.103 These arguments particularly depend on the idea that the participation 
of shareholders is inherently detrimental for corporations, other shareholders, and 
stakeholders. They have also been used to justify the insulation of board authority and 
to limit shareholder participation. This section succinctly examines these arguments104 
and investigates whether they establish a strong case for the board’s and managers’ 
insulation from shareholders. 
 The Short-Termism Argument 
Following short-term interests at the expense of the company’s long-term interests was 
recognised as a major problem in corporate governance even before the financial crisis 
and it has dominated corporate governance debates ever since.105 It is also recognised 
that companies focus on short-term value rather than long-term value, and the effects 
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of short-termism are regarded as damaging to the well-being of the economy.106 The 
short-termism view often holds that the average duration of shareholder investments, 
shareholder myopia, and shareholder activism are the major underlying reasons for 
short-termism problems in corporate governance and the market.107 This view also 
shaped corporate governance reforms that would further protect boards and managers 
from shareholder influence and free managers and boards to follow long-term 
investment and business strategies.108 This section will argue that the arguments for 
the short-term orientation of institutional investors are often misunderstood, and there 
are enough reasons to be sceptical about their validity. The short-term argument could 
not cast l2ight on the desirability of shareholder activism. Therefore, this thesis adopts 
a different approach and accepts ‘right-termism’109 rather than short-termism and 
long-termism. 
 Short-termism can be defined as the excessive focus of managers or 
institutional investors on short-term returns by neglecting its impact on the long-term 
value of companies such as reducing long-term investments.110 Policy-makers 
consider that short-termism is inherently value-destroying, so shareholder myopia is 
often used to protect management from shareholder intervention. The widely held 
view is that the average shareholding period has decreased significantly in recent 
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decades and that the turnover of shares has increased dramatically.111 Many vocal 
shareholders allegedly have short-term investment periods because they plan to hold 
shares for a short-time period and to sell after share price increases.112 In theory, these 
investors care only about short-term price changes rather than the long-term interests 
of the company, so they are blamed for being narrowly focussed on short-term share 
returns and quarterly results.113 Consequently, these shareholders are assumed to place 
pressure on management ‘to pursue myopic business strategies that don’t add lasting 
value,’ and to ‘raise share price[s] just long enough that [the institution] can sell and 
move on to the next stock that might see a short-term bump in its stock’.114 This 
arguably jeopardises the long-term performance of companies and the sustainability 
of the economy, and so leads to sub-optimal returns for ultimate beneficiaries;115 hence 
shareholder activism is often associated with short-termism in corporate governance 
and value-destroying corporate strategies.116  
 The traditional account of the short-termism argument has broader 
implications for corporate governance debates because it is often used to justify 
insulating boards and managers from shareholders,117 and deployed in favour of 
limiting the role of shareholder activism in corporate governance. Views that use 
shareholder myopia to justify managerial and board autonomy have long persisted in 
corporate governance discourse,118 and have influenced judges of the Delaware 
Supreme Court. Justice Strine, now the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, 
regarded shareholder short-termism as a ‘substantial policy dilemma’,119 and argued 
that: 
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‘it is jejune to demand that CEOs and boards manage for the long term when 
the stockholders who can replace them buy and sell based on short-term stock 
price movements, rather than the long-term prospects of firms’.120  
It becomes clear from the arguments above that the short-termist pressure could be 
transmitted to management in two ways. First, the market could be overvaluing short-
term corporate strategies; otherwise, the traditional short-termism argument would not 
make sense because it assumes that short-term investors are guided by short-term price 
changes which jeopardise the continuing existence of companies. Second, activist or 
vocal funds are capable of undermining managerial authority by directing 
management towards value-reducing strategies.  
 With regards to the first factor, in order for the short-termism argument to hold 
water, short-term corporate strategies must be overvalued in the market, i.e. they must 
be mistakenly viewed in a positive light. However, the market erroneously overvalues 
different sectors as happened in the dot com bubble. This serves as an example of 
stock market long-termism because ‘the market was valuing firms with no immediate 
prospect for strong earnings as very good investment prospects.’121 Moreover, the 
market does not always favour short-term corporate strategies. There are also 
industries such as oil production companies that require large sums of long-term 
investment. These companies have little difficulty attracting investment from investors 
for their projects.122 These examples indicate that the market has the potential to favour 
long-term corporate strategies, depending on features of particular corporate sectors. 
The first factor in the short-termism argument is not enough to justify managerial 
insulation.    
 With regard to the second factor, some shareholders might have short-term 
preferences. They could use shareholder activism to encourage the board and 
management to follow short-term investment strategies. This is often associated with 
the time horizon of investors. However, institutional investors have different 
investment horizons. It is therefore difficult to draw a general conclusion based on the 
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extreme short-term holding periods of some investors. Indeed, there is  some evidence 
documenting decreases in holding periods.123 Program traders can transfer shares in 
seconds now.124 However, apart from these program traders, the holding periods for 
the mainstream institutional shareholders have not changed in the last 25 years. 
Moreover, the average holding period has increased.125 Even for hedge funds, the 
average holding period is between one and two years.126 Extreme short-termist 
investors like day traders do not constitute a threat to corporate governance because 
these investors just seek opportunities to exploit pricing anomalies, and their view is 
too short to have an impact on company policies. Therefore, extreme short-termism 
does not constitute a problem for corporate governance.  
 Institutional shareholders, other than day traders, are the parties who could use 
shareholder activism to influence the board and management to follow short-term 
corporate strategies. They could possibly induce management to follow arguably 
value-reducing corporate strategies, which provide short-term spikes in share 
prices,127 but destroy the long-term value of the company.128 The empirical evidence 
is inconclusive here because there are also studies that find that the increase is not 
reversed following activism.129  
Criticising or praising a corporate strategy as short-term or long-term misses 
the core point; the issue is the right-term for value creation, and this may require 
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companies to be run in pursuit of short-term objectives. As noted above, long-term 
projects requiring massive investments are successfully carried out by large public 
companies such as oil companies, but companies operating in very competitive sectors 
may not have the same long-term investment opportunities, given the speed of 
technological changes and increasing globalisation. Hence, short-term strategies 
proposed by shareholders or short-term warnings through share price changes could 
be efficient recuperation mechanisms for some companies.130 The upshot is that 
shareholder short-termism may not be a problem unless it causes the board and 
management to make value-destroying choices. 
The desirability of shareholder activism cannot, therefore, be determined in the 
context of the short-termism and long-termism debate. As will be discussed in Chapter 
4, some changes in corporate strategies proposed by activist funds could be highly 
controversial and radical, such as the departure of the CEO, the restructuring of the 
company, or the distribution of dividends, and these proposed strategies could easily 
be considered to come at the expense of the long-term value of companies. In essence, 
these changes are alternative strategies to those applied by the incumbent boards and 
managements. Depending on company-specific circumstances, alternative corporate 
strategies proposed by shareholders could be useful to address accountability and 
agency problems. Therefore, the right-term, which is an investment horizon that is 
suitable for a particular company and which creates value, could be a short-term one 
for some companies. Boards and managers should not be able to freely dismiss such 
alternative strategies because of the short-termism approach, as in doing so, they might 
disregard potentially value-enhancing alternative strategies. The real issue is the 
conflict between different views of shareholders, managers and directors regarding 
how long the investment horizon of a company should be.131 There is no single answer 
to this question, and the answer depends on company-specific circumstances.   
 In conclusion, conflicting empirical evidence and theoretical arguments have 
cast doubt on the transmission of short-termism through the average investment 
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duration of shareholders, shareholder myopia, and shareholder activism. Given the 
contradictory empirical and theoretical evidence, short-termism argument cannot be 
used as a justification for the insulation of a board from shareholder engagement. Thus, 
rather than framing the debate between the short-term or long-term, the focus should 
be on the value-creation and any shareholder perspectives, even ones seeking to 
shorten the investment duration, should be seen as an alternative strategy. 
 The Conflicting Interests of Shareholders  
Another argument for the case against shareholder activism is the heterogeneous 
interests of shareholders and the possibility of a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and a company. The law and economics literature has been sceptical 
about the frequency of shareholder activism, but some institutional shareholders might 
use activism to advance their own interests at the expense of other shareholders, i.e. 
not all shareholders are interested in maximising shareholder value.132 In other words, 
some shareholders could pursue non-economic goals. 
 Public pension funds and labour unions are often criticised for pursuing non-
economic targets. These funds could have incentives to further special employee 
interests or to pursue the political interests of fund managers at the expense of other 
shareholders’ interests, or to follow an explicit social agenda. For instance, they could 
decline a takeover bid just to protect local employment or to focus on labour rights. It 
is therefore argued that these investors could use their power to engage in social 
investing and to extract private benefits which are at odds with the economic goals of 
companies.133 The fact that shareholders have divergent interests has been used for 
managerial insulation to protect shareholders from each other and to freely adopt long-
term business strategies.134 However, it should be borne in mind that these investors 
are also subject to the same fiduciary duties as other institutional investors and within 
the boundaries of such duties, they are allowed to invest in socially or economically 
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targeted projects that are beneficial to employees as long as the risk undertaken is 
similar to those of other projects.135  
 Case law, constituting the foundation of director primacy in the US, allows or 
requires the board of directors to take into consideration other stakeholders’ 
concerns.136 If the board is allowed to consider other stakeholders, then shareholder-
initiated proposals aiming to protect their interests or force management to consider 
stakeholders’ concerns should not be a major problem, since public pension funds and 
labour unions are trying to protect the interests of employees or may be interested in 
other issues such as the environment. In this regard, these proposals are likely to be 
consistent with the general approach of company law. 
 Risk Decoupled Shareholders 
Institutional shareholders could decouple voting rights from the economic ownership 
of shares.137 This causes corporate governance concerns because shareholders could 
obtain more voting power than their economic ownership or hide their economic 
ownership.  This gives rise to the possibility that they could influence the board in 
light of their own private interests.  In general, there are two types of risk-decoupling 
strategies: negative risk-decoupling and positive risk-decoupling. In the case of 
negative risk-decoupling, shareholders usually maintain the formal shareholder 
position, i.e. voting rights, but limit their exposure to share price changes. The positive 
risk-decoupling, however, allows shareholders to have greater economic interests than 
voting rights. In particular, activist funds have recognised the potential of financial 
instruments to increase their voting power without having to bear the economic risks 
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of their actions or enhancing their economic interests in a target companies without 
disclosing it.138  
 The primary aim of negative risk-decoupling transactions is to keep all formal 
shareholder rights and to limit the economic consequences of the use of voting 
rights.139 Negative risk-decoupling could be implemented in various ways such as via 
future contracts, equity swaps, forwards, puts or calls, or share lending. These 
strategies are regarded as ‘the artificial decoupling of risk and influence in shares of 
portfolio companies’ to limit the economic risk which is in fact inherent in the 
shares.140 This is often called ‘empty voting’ because the shareholder has voting 
ownership, but the voting rights have been emptied of the economic ownership.141  
 A prominent example of this phenomenon is the case of High River Ltd v 
Mylan Labs, Inc which occurred in the acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals (‘King’) 
by Mylan Labs (‘Mylan’).142 In 2004, Mylan announced its intention to acquire King 
Pharmaceuticals (‘King’) at a substantial premium over King’s trading price. Perry, a 
hedge fund, had significant share ownership in King and would benefit from the 
acquisition; Perry would make almost $28 million profit because of the premium that 
Mylan would make.143 The acquisition was not found to be in the interests of Mylan 
and was opposed by some of Mylan’s shareholders including Carl Icahn.144 Perry 
accumulated almost 10 per cent of Mylan’s shares to increase the likelihood of the 
acquisition, but at the same time it engaged in a series of swap transactions to limit the 
economic risk of having Mylan’s shares. As a result, Perry obtained voting rights 
which were equal to 10 per cent of Mylan’s outstanding shares without the economic 
risk of having the shares. Here, it appears evident that the interests of Mylan and Perry 
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were in conflict with each other in relation to the proposed merger. Perry was able to 
vote for the acquisition ̶  without being subject to share price changes  ̶  to make 
substantial profit through its shares in King even though it was against the interests of 
Mylan and its shareholders.  
 The negative risk-decoupling techniques give rise to governance concerns 
because these techniques also affect the core assumptions behind share ownership and 
voting rights.145 Shareholders, who employed these strategies, could have different risk 
profiles than ordinary shareholders; thus, they could be more or less risk-averse than 
other shareholders. In the traditional view, shareholders – as the residual claimants of 
a company – have the greatest interest in increasing shareholders’ value, so 
shareholders exercise voting rights in a way that would increase the company’s value. 
The underlying logic is that shareholders usually hold proportionate voting rights to 
their cash flow rights. Where this is broken, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that it 
causes another type of agency cost between shareholders and these shareholders may 
not make optimal decisions.146 Having more voting rights than economic ownership 
or the reverse might distort the incentives of shareholders. Compared to other 
shareholders, risk-decoupled shareholders could be more risk friendly. These 
shareholders could possibly aim to obtain the private benefits of control which are not 
usually shared with other shareholders.  
 Negative risk-decoupling techniques, however, play a role in the functioning 
of corporate governance and the market. Short-selling could help to bridge the gap 
between overvalued shares and the real value of shares.147 Short-selling could be 
beneficial by discovering and conveying new information about the underperformance 
of companies and financial misconduct to the market in correcting share prices.148 It 
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could also enhance  market efficiency and help the market in increasing liquidity and 
trading opportunities.149 Therefore, they also play a role a role in addressing collective 
action problems and in enhancing efficient monitoring over management in the 
interests of all relevant shareholders. So, any reform call must be approached with 
caution and should be neither too restrictive nor too broad.  
 Positive risk-decoupling is different from negative risk-decoupling. This 
method is preferred by investors when they seek to avoid the disclosure requirements 
of share ownership. It is quite possible for an investor to change its hidden ownership 
to actual voting power.150 Financial derivatives called contracts for difference (CfD) 
are widely used in order to effectuate the positive risk-decoupling. By using CfDs, 
investors gain the ability to obtain de facto economic ownership without becoming 
official owners of the shares.  In traditional CfD agreements, there are two parties: the 
long party and the short party. In principle, the long party agrees to pay the short party 
interest that accrues at a rate determined by the parties on the value of the shares and 
an arrangement fee in exchange for share price increases and any financial benefits 
distributed by the company to the short party.151 In return, the long-party obtains 
economic benefits as if it were the owner of shares, but without the need to financing 
such a purchase directly.  The investment is smaller than the actual value of the shares, 
yet it does still serve the same economic function.152  
   
 While CfD does not provide any voting rights to the investor, it is in fact a 
powerful tool for investors to obtain influence over management with a small 
investment. The short parties, usually investment banks, have no interest in voting 
rights attached to the shares.153 However, the banks seeking to attract swap business 
may prefer to vote in line with their clients, i.e. long parties in order to be attractive to 
clients. The long party could potentially have influence over the shares which it does 
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not own, and shares are exercised by the party who does not have any economic 
interest in the future of the company.  
 Overall, risk-decoupling strategies cause concerns in the market and corporate 
governance. Risk-decoupled shareholders could have more influence than economic 
ownership or vice versa and could aim to extract private benefits and to avoid 
disclosure regimes. These transactions that decouple voting rights and economic 
ownership of shares dilute the efficacy of shareholder voting and constitute a ‘real 
threat to the basis of shareholder franchise,’154 that is, shareholders bear the greatest 
residual risk. However, these strategies also serve important functions in corporate 
governance. Therefore, these strategies could sometimes be useful based on the 
circumstances.  So, any regulatory attempts should adopt a balanced approach rather 
than a complete ban and take into account the beneficial effects of these strategies as 
well as the potential problems that could arise. 
 Stakeholder and Team Production Theories 
Shareholder activism is also criticised by the defenders of stakeholder theory. This 
theory has been developed by many writers from different perspectives and therefore 
it is impossible to provide a unitary explanation. Nonetheless, it will be examined 
according to its relevance to shareholder activism.  
 
  Proponents of the stakeholder theory generally argue that the objective of 
corporations should be construed broadly and include the well-being of stakeholders 
other than shareholders, and should not be confined to the interests of shareholders 
alone.155 It places stakeholders at the centre of the corporation and considers them as 
‘ends’ rather than ‘means’; thus, they must have a say in the future direction of the 
corporation in which they hold stakes.156 Since this theory considers a company as ‘a 
team of people who enter into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual 
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gain’157 instead of prioritising only the interests of shareholders, all stakeholders in the 
corporation are valuable and they should be treated as such by the management of the 
company. The theory argues that shareholder primacy obstructs non-shareholders 
from making firm-specific investments because they are aware that their investments 
will only be used for shareholders.158 Likewise, Zingales argues that human capital is 
the most important asset in modern companies.159 As a result, according to this theory, 
all stakeholders bear residual risk and their interests are bound to the company. 
 
 A shift in accountability from shareholders to a broad range of stakeholders is 
an inevitable consequence of this theory. Concerning stakeholder theory, Stout and 
Blair introduced team production theory that characterised the board as a mediating 
hierarchy that considers the interests of all stakeholders and facilitates the production 
by coordinating the contribution of different stakeholders in public companies.160 This 
model challenges the norm of shareholder primacy as it advances the view that 
directors and managers have a duty to create optimal value for all stakeholders who 
affect or are affected by the actions of a company. Therefore, it aims to include other 
stakeholder concerns in the decision-making process. This stakeholder focus, it is 
argued, would increase the wealth of shareholders in the long run. Corporate 
governance therefore becomes (or should be) open and responsive to ‘the rights and 
wishes of stakeholders’.161   
 Although it is not one of the primary aims of this thesis to examine what 
corporate objectives should be, this theory has some significant shortcomings. First of 
all, it seems very difficult for the board to perform the mediating role which is a core 
aspect of this theory because management leaves little room for the board.162 Indeed, 
Chapter 2 of the present thesis demonstrated the potential problems with regard to 
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independent directors. Here, it seems less likely that such a board could play the final 
arbitrator role when there is a dispute between managers, shareholders, employees or 
other stakeholders. Therefore, it is doubtful that the board could play the role 
envisaged by the theory.  
 Second, the theory creates a stereotypical image of shareholders. It connects 
business failures with the concept of shareholder primacy. It does not seem realistic to 
establish a connection between extremely destructive actions and shareholder value 
and it is even less likely anybody would encourage such action. Furthermore, directors 
and managers are in fact given enough freedom to ignore such situations.163 The 
Deepwater Horizon disaster is taken as an example in Stout’s book to establish a link 
between shareholder value thinking and failures, due to the fact that the project was 
behind schedule, $60 million over budget and safety requirements were ignored.164 
The reasoning behind this argument is simple and obvious, namely that shareholders 
forced management to focus on short-term returns and management ignored safety 
requirements. However, it is much complex than this simple causation. The National 
Commission on Deepwater Horizon identified different problems including 
engineering mistakes, management failures, inadequate safety measures by companies 
and technological difficulties in deep-water drilling.165 The company failed to protect 
shareholder value to the extent that shareholders, including UK institutional investors, 
sued BP and other companies on the grounds of misrepresentation and failure to 
protect shareholder wealth.166  
 Given the impracticability of this theory, this thesis argues that shareholder 
activism can be reconciled with stakeholder concerns. It can become a mechanism in 
which other stakeholder concerns can be transmitted to the board room. As examined 
above, responsible shareholder activism internalises stakeholder concerns and places 
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pressure on the board and management to address stakeholder concerns. For example, 
in 1991, Cracker Barrel announced that it would not employ people who fail to 
demonstrate heterosexual values after which it fired homosexual employees.167 
However, a shareholders’ proposal to remove the company’s employment policy was 
not even put to the vote of shareholders due to proxy regulation in the US.168 In 2002, 
shareholders again took action to remove this employment policy and this time more 
than half of shareholders voted in favour of the shareholders’ proposal. Now, more 
than 85 % of Fortune 500 companies have employment policies against 
discrimination.169 Institutional shareholders submitted a large volume of proposals 
concerning the use of chemicals detrimental to human health.170 Similarly, 
shareholders submitted to abolish racial segregation on Greyhound’s buses in 1952.171 
In these examples, it can be seen that shareholder activism is not inherently detrimental 
to the interests of stakeholders. On the contrary, with the help of activism, corporate 
social responsibility or responsible activists enable stakeholders’ concerns to be given 
consideration by the board. Therefore, shareholder activism is not incompatible with 
stakeholder theory. It could be used to enhance stakeholder concerns in the decision-
making structure of public companies if shareholders are given voice in companies. 
 Concluding Remarks 
There are important arguments invoked for justifying the board’s insulation from 
shareholder participation. In particular, shareholders’ investment horizons and their 
private interests generate short-termism and excessive risk-taking, which were found 
to be major factors behind corporate governance failures. With regards to the short-
termism argument, this thesis has shown that the short-termism and long-termism 
debate cannot shed light on the desirability of shareholder activism. Even though some 
objectives of shareholders could raise concerns that they sacrifice the long-term value 
of the company for the short-term interests of shareholders, they should be evaluated 
in the context of the right-termism approach. Right-termism requires companies to 
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pursue an investment and planning horizon that, could be short-term or long-term, but 
is suited to company-specific circumstances and creates value for the company. The 
analysis demonstrated that in general the heterogeneity of shareholders’ interests does 
not raise corporate governance concerns. However, shareholders could decouple 
voting rights from the economic ownership of shares. Therefore, they can increase 
their voting power without bearing the economic risk of their decisions or enhancing 
economic interests without disclosing economic ownership. With the help of risk-
decoupling techniques, shareholders could use their influence to support risky 
business strategies that would deliver abnormal returns.  
 Insulating the board and management from shareholders would discard and 
reject the value of shareholder activism to corporate governance permanently because 
of only a risk that some shareholders could use their influence for their own private 
and short-termist interests. Even if managerial insulation from shareholders and the 
market would address the problem of short-term investors and shareholders with 
private interests, it would create direct agency cost problems. When management can 
freely dismiss feedback from shareholders and the market in the name of long-termism 
or informational advantage, it creates other unintended costs. Even if there is a 
possibility of a detrimental impact of shareholder activism, the solution is not a 
managerial insulation from shareholder activism, given accountability problems and 
other unintended consequences. Therefore, managerial insulation does not seem to be 
an appropriate solution to the concerns discussed above. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has found shareholder activism overall beneficial for corporate 
governance, despite its potential drawbacks. Shareholder activism i.e. voice could be 
used as an accountability mechanism in corporate governance. It functions as an early 
warning mechanism and provides the board with feedback regarding financial and 
non-financial corporate policies.  It is argued that empirical evidence cannot shed light 
on the desirability of shareholder activism. Hirschman’s framework revealed the real 
issue related to diverging views about the corporate policies or the right time horizon 
to maximise shareholder value. In this framework, long-termism is not always useful 
for all companies because some companies benefit from an immediate response from 
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the market. Moreover, long-termism could be used by the board and management to 
hide the underperformance of companies. In addition, shareholder activism could be 
excessive for companies too. Therefore, companies should be able to adjust the level 
of activism according to their needs.     
 In the post-crisis era, shareholder activism is increasingly conceived as a 
private sector solution to address public interest concerns such as short-termism and 
to ensure the sustainability of companies and the economy in general. The concept of 
stewardship has been developed to establish constructive engagement between the 
board and shareholders to address short-termism and attacks from activist funds. This 
is a promising development in US corporate governance because it constitutes the 
middle ground between shareholder primacy and director primacy. 
 While this thesis is of the view that the short-termism and long-termism debate 
cannot elucidate the desirability of shareholder activism, it notes the potential problem 
regarding risk-decoupling techniques. By using risk-decoupling techniques, some 
shareholders could pursue strategies to extract private benefits that are not shared by 
other shareholders. This study also considers shareholder activism as compatible with 
stakeholder theory. In fact, responsible shareholder activism, the stewardship 
principles, and the emerging investor paradigm supports this argument. Overall, the 
potential problems regarding shareholder activism do not provide persuasive 
normative implications for insulating the board. The potential benefits of activism to 












Chapter 4. The Landscape of Institutional 
Shareholders 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine the features and types of institutional investors and how 
the evolving landscape of institutional shareholders affects shareholder activism. 
Chapter 3 has demonstrated that shareholders are now expected to act as an 
accountability mechanism for their own interests, as an accountability mechanism for 
the long-term interests of the ultimate beneficiaries and companies, and for the 
sustainability of the economy and society in general. It has also highlighted the 
possibility that shareholder activism could be used to extract private benefits from the 
company and other shareholders. The monitoring capacity of mainstream investors is 
therefore of considerable importance. This section will examine the business models 
of institutional investors, with a focus on their monitoring capacity.  
 Much of the story about the emerging role of shareholders is related to the 
increase in institutional share ownership and the features of different types of 
institutional shareholders.1 The structure, incentives and behaviour of institutional 
shareholders are different from each other; institutional shareholders are not a 
homogenous group. With the growth of institutional ownership, some institutional 
shareholders took an active stance in corporate governance, but most of them were 
reluctant to take a hands-on approach in the management of portfolio companies.2  
 Hedge funds also became important share owners and they perceive 
shareholder activism as an investment strategy.3 Hedge fund activism contains many 
complexities. On the one hand, they hold management accountable and lead other 
shareholders because they are less subject to rational shareholder passivity. In this 
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respect, they also help other mainstream investors to overcome collective action and 
free-rider problems.4 With the emergence of hedge funds, mainstream investors have 
been transformed from ‘rationally passive investors’ to ‘rationally reticent investors’, 
that is, they are increasingly willing to engage in management, but they do not often 
initiate changes.5 On the other hand, they are seen as short-term predators, which 
damage the long-term interests of companies, stakeholders, and the economy. Indeed, 
one of the drivers behind the development of the concept of stewardship was to resist 
pressures by activist funds. Hedge fund activism could have broader implications on 
company law and securities law,6 beyond the concept of stewardship.7 This study 
considers the role of hedge funds in corporate governance in the middle of these polar 
characterisations of hedge funds.  
 The call for regulatory reforms could be too narrow or too broad without 
understanding the different types of institutional shareholders and the dynamics of 
investment chains. This chapter starts with the growth of institutional shareholders in 
the US, and its implications for shareholder activism. The emergence of institutional 
share ownership in the UK took place almost three decades earlier than a similar 
development in the US. Therefore, the references to developments in the UK are made 
in this chapter. Then, it proceeds to examine the factors that form the business model 
of institutional investors. This analysis also shows why some shareholders adopt a 
hands-on approach, while others do not. Finally, it will discuss the features of different 
types of institutional shareholders. 
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4.2 The Growth of Institutional Shareholders  
The core feature of corporate governance in the US and UK is the Berle-Means 
description of the dispersed share ownership of public companies. Shareholders are 
usually depicted as powerless and a group which is in need of legal protection,8 but 
now we are in the age of ‘investor capitalism’9 or ‘agency capitalism’.10 This is related 
to the growth of institutional shareholders, i.e. the economic power of shareholders. 
Changes in the market challenge the assumption of the rational shareholder apathy 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
 The increase in institutional ownership and the corresponding ownership 
concentration in both jurisdictions remain different from other jurisdictions in which 
controlling shareholders are observed.11 The change in the distribution of share 
ownership has led to the creation of a distinctive system of corporate ownership in 
which a number of institutions which hold shares on behalf of their beneficiaries own 
substantial blocks of shares in hundreds of corporations simultaneously. 
 The data collected by the UK’s Office of National Statistics on the share 
ownership of listed UK equities12 shows that institutional shareholders have increased 
their shareholdings dramatically at the expense of the direct holdings of individuals:13 
individuals have gone from 54.0% in 1963 to 11.9% in 2014, the rest of world from 
7.0% to 53.8%, insurance companies from 10.0% to 5.9%, unit trusts from 1.3% to 
9.0%,  pension funds from 6.4% to 3.0% , and other financial institutions from 10.0% 
to 7.1%. 
 Share ownership in US public companies has been in transition from individual 
investors towards institutional shareholders over the past few decades. Institutional 
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investors have started playing a greater role. 14 Although institutional investors are 
dominant players in that market, their holdings were much lower than their 
counterparts in the UK by the time the transformation started. Until the middle of the 
twentieth century, the majority of shares in US companies were held by individuals.  
For example, in the 1950s, institutional investors owned about 6% of the shares of 
public companies.15 In the 1970s, their holdings reached about 18% and by 1990 they 
had increased to 37%.16 By 2006, institutions held 70% of US equities17 and in 2015 
it was around 68%.18 Institutional share ownership is very concentrated in the largest 
US companies. 
 In addition to the high institutional share ownership concentration in the top 
1000 companies, the aggregate ownership of the top 25 institutional investors was 
around 30% of the shares of the top 10 largest US companies in 2009.19 Clifford 
Holderness found that ‘[o]n average the large shareholders in a firm collectively own 
39% (median 37%) of the voting power of the common stock’ and ‘ninety-six% of 
these firms have shareholders who own at least 5% of the firm’s common stock 
(“blockholders”)’.20 Other research on ownership structures of public companies in 
the US indicates that block-holders are not as prevalent as Holderness suggests.21 As 
a result, there is no completely dispersed ownership in which shareholders hold very 
few shares to control the performance of management. Rather, there is re-
concentration of shares in the hands of institutional investors. 
 Individual shareholders owned more than 50% of the UK equity market in 
1963, but this has steadily declined. By the mid-1970s institutional share ownership 
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exceeded individual ownership, something that was also observed in the US at the end 
of the century.22 From a comparative company law perspective, the early rise of 
institutional shareholders in the UK enabled them to influence the management of their 
investee companies and to shape corporate governance in favour of shareholders in 
the UK. Institutional investors are relatively more interested in the second role23 and 
played an important part in the development of such an engagement culture by 
systematically influencing the formation of legal rules and norms which allowed them 
to engage in low-cost activism in the event of poor management performance.24  
 In light of these changes in the share structure of US and UK companies, it is 
fair to conclude that the share ownership of listed companies is not fully dispersed as 
described by Berle and Means. The transformation of share ownership created a 
different type of separation of ownership and control in which institutional 
shareholders control the investments of the ultimate beneficiaries. 
 The re-concentration of shares in the hands of institutional investors could 
overcome the problems of collective action and free-riding.25 It obviously increases 
the proportional benefit of institutional shareholders. It is also argued that shareholder 
engagement can create positive externalities by constituting a signal to the 
management of other investee companies and thus can play a disciplinary function that 
improves portfolio value.26 Moreover, the exit option becomes more expensive 
because ‘institutional shareholders, who increasingly own large unmarketable blocks, 
must accept substantial price discounts in order to liquidate these blocks’.27 Therefore, 
in the context of a reverse relationship between exit and voice, the growth of 
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institutional shareholdings increases the possibility of voice while reducing the scope 
of exit. In such situations, engagement becomes a less costly option than exit.28 
Another impact of the re-concentration of shares on the economic analysis is that 
institutional shareholders can reach sufficient economic power to establish coalitions 
or trade organisations that could put pressure on companies to comply with good 
governance principles.29 In sum, the growth of institutional share ownership makes 
shareholder activism more likely.   
 Institutional shareholders do not engage in the same type and quality of 
shareholder activism due to cost of activism and the business model of institutional 
shareholders. For instance, attending general meetings and responding shareholder 
proposals may not constitute a significant economic burden for shareholders. In the 
US, the voting participation of institutional shareholders was around 91% in 2016.30 
The core problem in the US was that shareholders tended to overwhelmingly use 
voting rights in favour of the management proposals and against shareholder 
proposals.31 Now, the behaviour of traditional investors is changing and they tend to 
support shareholder proposals on independent directors, removal of takeover defences, 
and executive remuneration32, and oppose management proposals.33 However, the cost 
of a proxy contest against management could still be a deterrent even for institutional 
shareholders. For instance, any activism ending in a proxy fight may cost as much as 
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$10 million.34 In the case of proxy fights, the deterrent effect of the high cost of 
activism could be true, but not necessarily so in the case of simply casting votes on a 
proposal.35  Some institutional shareholders are able to exercise even costly 
shareholder activism because of their business model. Share ownership of institutional 
shareholders is not only the determinant of shareholder activism. The features of 
institutional shareholders also play a role in shareholder activism.   
4.3 Institutional Shareholders and Investment Managers 
Institutional shareholders are not a homogenous group.36 There are a number of factors 
that make up their business models. Hence, the term ‘institutional investor’ is too 
nebulous a term to capture the quality and degree of activism and for making the case 
for regulatory and legal reforms. Before discussing these factors, a distinction between 
asset managers, or fund management companies, and asset holders is needed in order 
to understand how institutional shareholders interact with the management of a 
company and how the investment chain works in practice. It would be normal to 
assume that institutional investors carry out the monitoring and governance role in 
corporate governance, but they often delegate the management of the fund to fund 
management companies. In other words, there are two dimensions of 
institutionalisation: institutional investment and asset or fund management.37 
 Investment Managers  
Fund management is a part of the institutional investment process, but the asset 
managers may not be a part of the institutional investors in the legal sense.38 Fund 
managers can be independent fund management firms, internal parts of large funds, 
life insurers or independently capitalised firms owned by insurance companies. 
Therefore, the distinction between institutional investors and asset managers is not 
                                                 
34 Nickolay Gantchev, ‘The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision 
Model’ (2013) 107 Journal of Financial Economics 610,  611.  
35 See Investment Company Institute., A Guide to Understanding Mutual Funds (2007).  
36 See Celik and Isaksson (n 1). 
37 Philip Davis and Benn Steil, Institutional Investors (The MIT Press 2001), XXIV. 




clear cut and the terms ‘institutional investor’ or ‘institutional shareholders’ may 
embrace both institutional investors and fund management firms.  
 The assets of US-registered investment companies reached $19 trillion in 
2016.39 Another study found that the assets controlled by US asset managers is around 
€33 trillion.40 Similarly, the Office of Financial Research (OFR) found that the US 
asset management industry controlled $53 trillion  in 2013.41 In the UK, the FRC found 
that the UK asset management industry reached £6.6 trillion in 2016.42 Not all the 
amount of money under management of a company is, of course, invested in stock 
markets.43 The asset managers market is highly competitive and concentrated. The 
assets under management of the top 10 US management firms accounted for 
approximately 34% of the total assets in 2012.44 A similar pattern is also observed in 
the UK. In the UK, the 10 largest firms controlled approximately 50% of the total 
assets managed by British asset managers in 2013.45 Pension funds and mutual funds 
are by far the largest clients of asset managers.  
 Two conclusions can be drawn from the structure of the investment chain and 
the concentration of the investment management industry. As the sector is highly 
concentrated in the hands of a few fund managers, forming a coalition and overcoming 
collective action problems may be easier. However, and the situation also creates an 
accountability gap in the investment chain because it increases the length of that chain 
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and exacerbates the disincentives to a higher level of engagement arising from asset 
managers’ own business model, as will be seen below. 
 Institutional Shareholders  
Institutional shareholders have different characteristic features due to their different 
business models of institutional investors. It is impossible to give an exhaustive list of 
these factors. The relevant major factors will be covered here briefly.  
 The first factor is the liability structure of institutional shareholders. It 
determines whether they can adopt a long-term or a short-term investment strategy. 
The second is the fee structures of institutional investors and investment managers. It 
is of major importance for shareholder activism because the different fee structures of 
asset managers might encourage different behaviours. There are mainly two types of 
fees: management fee and performance fee.46 Management fees are generally either a 
fixed proportion of the assets controlled or a fixed amount. These types of fees reward 
the manager for asset growth and punish them for asset shrinkage. Performance fees 
are a fixed percentage of the return delivered to the client. While traditional investors 
usually apply the management fees, activist funds apply the combination of 
management fees and performance fees. For hedge funds, it becomes more rational to 
develop firm-specific strategies and to engage in the monitoring of management. The 
impact of fee structures should be considered in the context of how the success of 
investment managers is measured.        
 In particular, pension funds and mutual funds aim to deliver competitively 
superior performance at the lowest possible cost.47 Competition forces institutions to 
measure success based on relative performance. In this regard, it does not encourage 
shareholder activism even if it would be beneficial for the ultimate investors. The asset 
manager, who engages with management, incurs all the costs of activism, and if 
activism becomes successful, all the gains will be shared by other institutional 
shareholders. More importantly, it will increase the overall success of other fund 
                                                 
46 CFA, ‘Fees and Compensation’ (April 2013) < https://www.cfauk.org/-
/media/files/pdf/pdf/5.../3.../fees-and-compensation.pdf> accessed 09 May 2017.  




managers. It therefore provides very little competitive advantage to asset managers 
that engage in activism compared to those that do not. Likewise, Rock states that ‘a 
change that benefits all will benefit none’.48  
 Furthermore, the distribution of the cost of shareholder activism between the 
external fund manager and an institutional shareholder is an important factor for the 
external fund managers. The cost of activism is not usually shared between the 
external fund manager and institutional shareholders even if the activism will benefit 
the institutional shareholders and their ultimate beneficiaries.49 Black and Coffee 
argued that if an external  ‘pension fund manager does not seek reimbursement from 
its clients for expenses, then the expected benefit must be huge to justify the manager 
incurring any expense.’50 Black and Coffee gave the example that an external fund 
manager controls 1% of a company capitalised £1,000 million; that the proposed 
changes would increase the value of investee company by 10 %, which would deliver 
£1 million gain to the fund manager’s client, and that the cost of joining a shareholder 
coalition for shareholder activism is £30,000.51 It would make sense for an institutional 
shareholder to join such coalition, given the expected benefit from activism. However, 
because of the way in which the fund managers charge their clients, the fund manager 
would receive only £4,960.52 So even when shareholder activism is economically 
rational for the ultimate beneficiaries, it may not be rational for the fund managers 
because of the combination of the fee structure and fund manager performance 
measurement. As noted above, the use of investment managers could have negative 
impact on shareholder activism. The external fund manager, therefore, mostly 
focusses on the formation of a portfolio, which best fits in its expectations. 53 In-house 
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fund managers are not exposed to relative performance measurements as much as 
external fund managers. Therefore, they are more likely to engage in activism.54  
Investment strategy is another important part of the institution’s business 
model. In principle, there are as many investment strategies as there are investors. The 
investment strategies also have an impact on management behaviour by shaping the 
outcomes of voting in companies. Nevertheless, three groups of institutional investors 
can be identified based on their investment strategies. The first group are transient 
investors who have small stakes and high turnover, employ momentum trading 
strategies (i.e. trade according to earning news).55 The second group are the dedicated 
investors who focus on specific companies, own relatively large stakes in a select set 
of companies for the long-term and trade relatively infrequently.56 The third group are 
quasi-indexers who also trade infrequently but hold small stakes in a large number of 
companies (akin to index funds).57 The quasi-indexers are traditionally perceived as 
passive owners having no interest in the decision-making of companies. However, the 
emerging literature suggests that quasi-indexers tend to become involved in a number 
of corporate governance issues such as independence of the board members, anti-
takeover mechanisms, and tax planning.58 They exert influence by virtue of their 
voting power and increasingly take an active role in shaping corporate governance and 
become ‘rationally reticent’.59  
 To sum up, these determinants make up the business models of the institutional 
investors. The business model of the institution determines the quality and type of 
shareholder engagement. Therefore, institutional investors are not a homogenous 
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group and determining factors vary not only between different types of institutional 
investors, but also within the same category of institutional investor. 
4.3.2.1 Pension Funds 
A pension fund is a fund which is established to facilitate and generate employees’ 
retirement income and is contributed to by both the employer and employee. They are 
usually formed as a separate entity from the employing entity which enables 
employees to accumulate savings throughout their working life in order to receive 
income in retirement. Thus, they are often regarded as vehicles which can adopt a 
long-term investment strategy on share ownership and management,60 but the way in 
which pension funds are managed is equally important. 
 Pension funds are usually organised on a trust basis as a separate entity from 
their sponsors61 and are obliged to act according to trust law principles.62 Trustees are 
under a duty to exercise their power and to hold assets in the best interests of their 
members and beneficiaries.63 Pension schemes can be further divided into two groups 
according to the distribution of risk between the member and sponsor: defined benefit 
and defined contribution.64 In the former, the sponsor undertakes to contribute a 
percentage of the final or average salary.65 Employers carry the risk of paying benefits 
should the fund prove inadequate. In the latter, where the contribution is fixed, each 
member’s income depends upon market returns so the risk is on the employees66 who 
have no entitlement to a fixed income in retirement. In the US, a shift from defined 
benefit pensions to defined contribution pensions took place in the 1990s.67 As a result 
of this shift, employees are in a position to make investment options given by the 
pension plan; their pension wealth mostly depends on the market and is less dependent 
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on the employer. They are increasingly choosing mutual funds for their investment 
management.68 In turn, the features of these plans determine the incentives of mutual 
funds to intervene in the management of portfolio companies. 
 Some corporate pension plans (schemes) are subject to conflicts of interest. 
Pension funds can face pressure from corporate management to support the 
management.69 An important difference exists between UK and US pension funds. As 
British funds are more likely to invest through ‘in-house managers,’ they are subject 
to fewer conflicts of interest than their US counterparts.70 In the US, these conflicts of 
interest affect the voting policy of institutional investors because the management of 
companies choose the trustees who are responsible for the plan and the trustee picks 
an investment fund manager to manage the capital.71 They are therefore less likely to 
introduce shareholder proposals against management.72  
 Pension funds are also subject to a diversification requirement in order to avoid 
the risk of large losses although a specific percentage is not specified in the 
regulations.73 This makes it easier for them to prefer an index or quasi-index 
investment strategy. They are therefore mostly interested in governance issues rather 
than developing a firm-specific approach unless they have significant economic 
power.  
 Pension funds manage their investments in a number of different ways. Some 
pension funds, particularly large ones, are internally managed, whereas the majority 
of pension funds rely on a chain of external financial intermediaries including 
consultants, actuaries, and fund managers; thus they manage their relationship with 
investee companies at a significant distance.74 Since the performance measurement of 
external fund managers are done according to relative performance, fund managers 
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will have less incentive to engage in firm-specific activism, but tend to engage in 
governance activism and to vote on shareholder proposals submitted by management 
or activist funds. In-house fund managers will be less likely to be subject to this 
disincentive because they are not under pressure to attract more clients at the lowest 
fees, unlike external fund managers. 
 Recent research into UK pension funds’ behaviour vis-à-vis portfolio 
companies revealed that large pension funds with in-house investment management 
tend to take a more activist stance in their portfolio companies.75 Large pension funds 
are able to and often exhibit a number of engaged ownership behaviours ‘namely, 
conducting company research and monitoring, voting and proxy voting, writing 
letters, and holding face-to-face meetings with senior management and boards of 
directors about structural and strategic corporate governance issues.’76 Some of them 
consider that it is also part of their duties to influence the companies.77 Internally 
employed full-time people are of great importance to the hands-on approach, but it 
requires resources which some pension funds do not have for governance engagement. 
  This analysis shows that the funds’ proximity to the investee company and the 
internal management teams play a role in shareholder behaviour and enable them to 
adopt a ‘hands-on’ approach, but this depends heavily on the size of the pension fund 
and whether they are willing to devote resources to internal departments for 
shareholder engagement.  
 Research has found that not only capacity but also willingness and 
understanding of duties with regard to trust play crucial roles in the form of 
shareholder engagement.78 Therefore, the pressure from policy-makers or the market 
initiatives discussed in Chapter 3 could force institutional shareholders to internalise 
shareholder activism into their investment policies. The result is that there is a strong 
correlation between the size of a pension fund, the size of internal specialised 
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departments and their willingness to engage in activism. In these funds, the culture of 
shareholder engagement is internalised through trustees and other internal departments 
and not regarded as a requirement to be fulfilled.  
 The majority of the rest of pension funds, however, rely heavily on external 
consultants and investment fund managers in strategic decision making. They usually 
do not have dedicated staff for this activity. The overreliance on external consultants 
such as actuaries, investment consultants and fund managers also introduce inherent 
limitations. The lack of internal specialised departments accounts for why some 
institutional shareholders are responsive to proposals but avoid taking a proactive 
stance in corporate governance.79  
 Public pension funds could pursue ESG issues or the managers of these funds 
could target political interests.80 Public pension funds in the US are subject to fewer 
regulations and conflicts of interest compared to mutual funds. For example, they can 
apply performance-based fees.81 They often invest in hedge and venture funds in order 
to avoid potential criticisms.82 In general, they are not subject to competition for 
investment capital, and accordingly they have little financial incentive to take an active 
stance in corporate governance, but they are subject to pressure by politicians, officials 
and unions.83 They could potentially support the board and management against 
controversial objectives of activist funds. Moreover, they can support shareholder 
proposals on governance issues such as excessive pay for executives.84  
 In conclusion, pension funds are long-term investors. Large pension funds are 
internally managed and have sufficient resources to exercise defensive shareholder 
activism and to establish strong engagement with the board. They can play a 
stewardship role in corporate governance. Relatively smaller funds delegate fund 
management to external managers. It is less likely that these smaller funds will take a 
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hands-on approach in corporate governance. However, they are mostly responsive to 
shareholder and management proposals. In other words, they could exercise informed 
voting and could potentially carry out stewardship responsibilities. Therefore, 
defensive and responsible activism are a better fit with most pension funds’ business 
models. 
4.3.2.2 Mutual Funds  
Mutual funds are one of the main investment vehicles for US investors. They are pools 
of assets such as shares, bonds and other types of securities. The shift from defined 
benefit to defined contribution pension plans has channelled new capital from self-
employed individuals to mutual funds.85 Currently, pension plans constitute at least 
half of mutual funds.86 In addition to retirement plans, individuals and other 
institutional investors invest in mutual funds.  
 They are, therefore, economically powerful. A total of $18 trillion worth of 
assets was controlled by mutual funds in 2016.87 Approximately 90 million individual 
investors owned mutual fund shares, either directly or through retirement plans.88 
Mutual funds are estimated to own almost 25% of the outstanding shares of US public 
companies in 2016.89 Although there are many mutual firms, their power is 
concentrated in the hands of the 25 largest that manage approximately 74% of the total 
share of mutual markets.90 This enables them to play a significant role in the 
governance of large public companies and to affect voting results on matters from 
corporate governance to executive compensation or social policy. 
 The market is very competitive because mutual funds compete with each other 
to be chosen as one of the retirement plan options by an employer. In order to survive 
in this competitive environment, they aim to provide a diversified portfolio at low cost. 
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In addition to this market incentive, the regulations encourage mutual funds to 
diversify their investments.91 As a result, mutual funds tend to hold small percentages 
of shares in many companies because of the logic of diversification. 
 Their relative performance is competitively important in attracting new clients 
and the ultimate beneficiaries. Initiating costly forms of activism may therefore not 
benefit the manager of the funds even if it would be beneficial for the ultimate 
beneficiaries. Put differently, their fee structure and performance measurement 
discourage them from developing firm-specific solutions for agency problems in the 
portfolio companies.    
  Market pressure often incentivises mutual funds to favour rather than to 
challenge management because of their business relationship or their financial interest 
to manage company’s employee benefit plans.92 As noted above, this is one of the 
major problems in the US investment industry. However, this trend has been gradually 
changing and mutual funds are becoming more responsive and more sceptical of 
management with the help of increased transparency and clarification of fiduciary 
duties. Rothberg and Lilien concluded that ‘the funds often voted against 
managements’ recommendations on issues of executive compensation, on board’s 
independence and on possible takeovers.’93 Likewise, mutual funds have been 
increasingly engaging in activism in relation to governance matters and the increased 
holding of funds is found to play a role in board independence, the removal of anti-
takeover mechanisms, the increasing use of equal voting rights and more transparency 
and less information asymmetry.94 The Investment Company Institute also found that 
favouritism towards management has been in decline.95 In line with these 
developments, it is reasonable to conclude that a shareholder engagement culture is 
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developing in the mutual fund sectors. For example, the Chairman and CEO of 
Vanguard Funds stated that:  
‘Our favourite holding period is forever. We’re going to hold your stock when 
you hit your quarterly earnings target. And we’ll hold it when you don’t. We’re 
going to hold your stock if we like you. And if we don’t. We’re going to hold 
your stock when everyone else is piling in. And when everyone else is running 
for the exits … That is precisely why we care so much about good governance.’96  
The emerging paradigm and the US Stewardship Principles discussed in Chapter 3 
show mutual funds as willing to support management in adopting long-term corporate 
strategies. The recent literature supports the argument that mutual funds are in fact 
‘passive investors not passive owners’ and are challenging the management.97 In other 
words, while mutual funds do not still actively trade shares and are long-term 
investors, they are now willing to engage with the management of the portfolio 
companies. The distinction between passive investment strategy and passive 
ownership is becoming more evident. Adopting a passive investment strategy does not 
preclude funds from developing long-term constructive dialogue with the management 
of companies.98 Kahan and Rock described this situation as ‘the awakening of mutual 
funds.’99 This shows that while mutual funds adopt passive index or quasi-index 
investment strategies, they are nonetheless responsive to proposals and could exercise 
informed voting. 
 As a result, in particular, large mutual funds could exercise defensive and 
responsible activism, like pension funds. As discussed in Chapter 3, they develop an 
investor paradigm that aims to foster constructive shareholder engagement. They can 
play a stewardship role in enhancing long-term investments. However, this does not 
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mean unconditional support for the board and management. They are also increasingly 
interested in governance issues, so they play a role in shaping corporate governance. 
4.3.2.3 Insurance Companies 
Insurers are important suppliers of long-term savings like pension funds and have long 
been important institutional investors that facilitate sustainable economic growth.100 
The activities of insurance companies fall into two groups, long-term and general. 
General activities include fire, accident, motor and marine insurance. Long-term 
activities are mostly related with life assurance, permanent health insurance and 
capital redemption. Life insurance policies may be linked with investments and may 
entitle policyholders to demand a share of the profits. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the focus will be on life insurance companies. 
 Insurance companies are under a duty to manage their investments on behalf 
of policy holders with due diligence. In this regard, defensive shareholder activism, 
i.e. the protection and enhancement of investments, is therefore beneficial. Three 
factors generally determine the insurer’s investment strategy: ‘the profile of liabilities 
… the asset universe and associated risk-return profiles [and] the framework 
conditions created by regulatory decisions’.101 They usually establish a special fund 
management arm which provides management services not only to the insurance 
company but also other institutional investors.  
 In the US, life insurance companies owned $6.3 trillion in real and financial 
assets in 2015.102 They invest in a wide variety of assets ranging from real estate to 
derivative assets. In general, equities constituted only 2.3 % of the total invested assets 
of insurance companies in 2013.103 They also directly invest in hedge funds and other 
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private equity firms.104 Insurance companies in the US are reluctant to take an active 
stance in corporate governance because of the fact that in the past insurance companies 
were prohibited from investing in shares.105 In contrast to the US insurance companies, 
historically UK insurance companies have played a significant role in the management 
of portfolio companies and in shaping corporate governance. They played a key part 
in the establishment of shareholder coalitions and removals of directors, and exert 
voting rights more often than other institutional investors.106 Stapledon found that a 
significant number of fund management arms of insurers voted very frequently and 
had regular meetings with the management of portfolio companies.107 The influence 
of UK insurance companies is not surprising because they are not subject to economic 
disincentives linked to performance measurements as much as external fund managers 
of other institutional investors. The largest insurance firms conduct active monitoring 
independent of any governance or operational crisis by arranging regular reviews and 
meetings with investee companies.108 The reason why the large insurance companies 
engage in direct monitoring of portfolio companies is that since they manage shares 
for themselves and on behalf of other investors, they readily conclude that engagement 
and other relevant costs are in the interests of all the beneficiaries and spread the costs 
among other investors receiving the benefit.109   
 To sum up, insurance companies are long-term investors and have the capacity 
to exercise both defensive and responsible activism.  
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4.3.2.4 Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have been around for almost six decades.110 They 
first appeared in the 1950s111 and over half a century, SWFs have become important 
entities in corporate governance and global markets.112 Total assets under management 
of SWFs increased from less than $1 trillion in 2000 to $6 trillion by 2012.113 
 SWFs have a unique feature: they are owned and controlled by a foreign 
government and are ‘set up to serve the objectives of a stabilisation fund … by 
investing the funds on a long-term basis, often overseas’.114 Each SWF has a different 
objective which need not be disclosed as these entities are under the control of 
sovereign governments.115 In essence, they are creations of a state, but at the same 
time they are also private market participants. This dual nature of SWFs has triggered 
debates about hidden agendas in both the public and academic world.116  
 SWFs are a heterogeneous group and can differ on the basis of their stated 
policy objectives and asset allocation. SWFs, and in particular savings and pension 
SWFs, are able to adopt an investment strategy for the long-term with a multi-year 
horizon, and to take risks.117 Those funds can also increase the long-term investor base 
for risky assets such as stocks and corporate bonds. In this way, they can play an 
important role in financial stability. For example, SWFs experienced large losses 
during the financial crisis in 2008 because of the sharp decline in stock exchange 
markets, but they recovered their losses in the following years by being long-term 
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investors.118 Despite being long-term investors, they are often reluctant to influence 
company policies by using their voting rights.119 This passivity is often a deliberate 
choice in order to avoid a political backlash, and they generally try to ensure that their 
strategies are based on commercial grounds. They therefore organise their investments 
so that they do not have a controlling interest in the investee company.120 One of the 
preferred ways to avoid scrutiny is to buy non-voting shares.  
 That  said, there is an emerging trend of SWFs adopting a more activist 
approach.121 They have the potential to engage with companies through ‘proactive’ 
and ‘reactive’ governance.122 For example, Norges Bank Investment Management 
(NBIM) adopts a ‘proactive’ kind of engagement that includes board nominations, 
proposals on corporate governance, environmental and social matters and advising 
business strategy.123 The bank applies principles of responsible investment.124 Another 
example is Qatar Holdings which took a reactive stance in the Glencore Xstrata 
merger. Qatar Holdings acted as a roadblock by increasing its shareholdings in Xstrate 
and insisted on higher compensation. Following this action, Glencore had to increase 
its offer before the transaction was approved. Qatar Holdings did not actively engage 
in ongoing governance matters but used its power as an activist.125  
To sum up, sovereign wealth funds are able to adopt a long-term investment 
horizon and can integrate ESG issues into investment strategies. Even though they are 
traditionally passive shareholders, there are some funds which adopt defensive and 
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responsible activism. Therefore, some sovereign wealth funds could play a 
stewardship role in corporate governance. 
4.3.2.5 Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds have grown exponentially, and controlled globally approximately $2.8 
and $3.22 trillion of assets in 2014 and 2016 respectively.126 Although not all hedge 
funds are non-activist, the ones that are have drawn attention in recent years.127 
Activist funds, led by a number of hedge funds, have begun carrying out an active role 
which has led a surge in shareholder activism.128 The increasing hedge fund activism 
has stimulated other institutional shareholders which are willing to take an active role 
in corporate governance, and has led to an overall increase in activism by mainstream 
shareholders.129 Icahn, one of the most prominent and long-term investors who 
purchases large stakes and seeks changes in corporate strategies, described this era as 
one in which ‘there has never been a better time than today for activist investing, if 
practised properly’.130 
 Activist hedge funds have been subjected to much criticism over whether they 
use their expertise to protect shareholder interests, or to extract private benefits at the 
expense of other shareholders and the long-term health of the economy.131 They have 
provoked fierce debate, not only in academia, but throughout society.132 
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4.3.2.5.1 Why are Hedge Funds Different? 
Hedge funds are pooled investments that are privately established and managed by 
professional investment managers who are also general partners and are compensated 
according to performance. This generally consists of a 1-2% management fee of the 
capital invested in and 15-20% performance fee of the returns. The funds are not 
widely available to the public and are limited to a number of sophisticated and wealthy 
investors.133 Unlike other institutional investors, hedge funds charge a performance 
fee, which means that they can focus on absolute returns and thereby have the 
opportunity to generate returns from their investments regardless of the market 
conditions and relative performance of their competitors. As a result, they are not 
afraid of supporting relatively high-risk strategies in their investee companies. They 
do not usually have a business relationship with the management of the target 
company, and so they are subject to fewer less conflicts of interest than other 
institutional investors who provide fund management services to companies. 
Managers of hedge funds therefore have strong incentives to undertake activism. The 
activist hedge funds are information traders.134 They are willing to collect general 
market and firm-specific information for investment decisions and to engage in a high 
degree of shareholder activism to bring about changes in corporate governance. In 
essence, they trade on the basis of their informational advantage as to the difference 
between the market value and the potential value of the target company.  So hedge 
funds usually approach target companies with a list of demands that can generate 
shareholder value in a certain period. This process has a broader impact on the market 
and makes it more efficient by expanding the available information and correcting 
prices in the market.135 
 Lock-up provisions provide protection to the fund against the untimely 
demands of investors to withdraw their investment for 6 to 24 months, and enough 
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freedom to exert influence on management without being subject to pressure from 
investors.136 Yet they cannot be long-term investors like quasi-index investors 
because, once they carry out a successful campaign to remove factors causing 
managerial inefficiencies, they start another campaign in a different company in order 
to receive abnormal returns. This investment strategy is not possible for long-term 
quasi-index funds, and therefore they are less likely to carry out such corrective 
activism. The quasi-index funds may need to leave this function to activist hedge 
funds. The average holding period of hedge funds is longer than conventional wisdom 
might suggest. Some empirical studies indicate that the average holding is between 
one and two years.137 Finally, hedge funds are usually subject to less regulation over 
the types of investments they can choose. When structuring the hedge fund, it is 
important to form the fund in a manner that reduces the number of restrictions with 
which the fund must comply.138 They take advantage of exemptions, exclusions and 
safe harbours in the regulations, and may also prefer to establish the funds in offshore 
jurisdictions to benefit from favourable tax regimes.139 It is a common assumption that 
hedge funds are unregulated and unsupervised investment vehicles, unlike mainstream 
funds, though ‘lightly regulated’ is a better description for hedge funds in the US and 
UK, given the regulatory changes in those jurisdictions.140 As a result of less 
regulation, they can build up larger stakes than other mainstream shareholders. The 
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average hedge fund block is generally between 7-9%, which means that they are less 
likely to have a sufficient stake to gain control.141 
 In conclusion, due to the incentive structure of hedge funds, relatively light 
regulation, relatively concentrated stakes in a small number of companies, well-
developed research skills, and fewer conflicts of interest, they are less beholden to 
management and are not afraid of carrying out confrontational activism. Hedge funds 
carry out a hybrid form of ‘internal monitoring by large shareholders and external 
monitoring by corporate raiders … This hybrid internal-external role puts activist 
hedge funds in a potentially unique position to reduce the agency costs associated with 
the separation of ownership and control’.142 They exercise a significant disciplinary 
function in corporate governance and the market. The business model of hedge funds 
accounts for why hedge funds can employ offensive activism. 
4.3.2.5.2 The Process of Hedge Fund Activism 
The factors above make up the business model of hedge funds that enable them firstly 
to identify potential targets for engagement, secondly to accumulate a sizable stake, 
thirdly to employ activist strategies, and finally to exit.143 
a- Identifying the Target Company 
It is crucial for an activist hedge fund to identify an undervalued (underperforming) 
target. They assess the market value of the target company, which is lower than its 
possible value after a successful intervention based on the information they have, and 
they then acquire the undervalued shares,144 buying significant stakes. In doing so, 
they provide an alternative view to the market about the actual value of the company’s 
shares. At this stage, mandatory disclosure requirements play a key role in identifying 
targets and evaluating potential agency conflicts, executive remuneration, and 
business strategy in the course of an activist campaign. 
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b- Accumulating Stakes in the Target Company 
Following the identification of the target company, the fund begins to accumulate a 
sizeable stake as a means to initiate change. It is important for the fund to buy the stake 
without alerting the market because the announcement of such activism usually 
triggers an immediate increase in the share price.145 Such a share price increase after 
an announcement of shareholder activism can be as much as around 10%.146 
 Securities law, and in particular disclosure rules at the entry stage, can facilitate 
or deter the accumulation of shares by hedge funds. The rules of initial threshold 
disclosure, the deadline for such disclosure after crossing the threshold, and the scope 
of disclosure, all play a role in a hedge fund’s ability to build up a stake. In the US, 
under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934147 and related 
regulations,148 any person acquiring in excess of 5% ownership must disclose it within 
10 days of the acquisition.149 This arguably provides the opportunity for hedge funds 
to extract sufficient benefits from the activism to make it a worthwhile exercise. The 
5% ownership threshold and the 10-day time window make US corporate governance 
one of the most activism-friendly in the world.150 For instance, the UK adopted more 
stringent rules on disclosure. According to the Disclosure and Transparency Rules, the 
disclosure threshold is relatively low (3%) and the disclosure must be made after 
acquiring a 3% or greater stake.151 It is important for an activist investor to be able to 
amass a large stake anonymously because share prices usually increase after activism 
is announced.152 Hedge funds can employ financial derivatives and other synthetic 
transactions allowing investors to decouple the economic risk of having shares from 
voting rights in order to avoid disclosure requirements and increase leverage, as 
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discussed in Chapter 3.153 Another method is the ‘wolf-pack’ approach, which will be 
discussed below. 
c- The Disciplining Stage 
Hedge funds engage in strategic and governance changes after the accumulation of a 
stake in the target company. They develop firm-specific strategies to address 
governance gaps that have arisen from deficits in the monitoring of managerial agency 
problems.154 This is why they are often referred to as ‘entrepreneurial activists’ or 
‘governance entrepreneurs’.155 They are fundamentally different than other 
institutional investors in terms of the type of activism they carry out. In this regard, 
hedge funds look upon activism as primarily an investment approach delivering 
abnormal returns,156 unlike other institutional investors that view activism as an 
ongoing process to monitor management with the aim of protecting their investments 
in portfolio companies and the savings of the beneficiaries or advancing a social 
agenda. They mostly prepare alternative business strategies, and then present the 
strategies to the board and shareholders. In this regard, hedge funds help other 
mainstream investors to overcome rational shareholder passivity by presenting them 
with an alternative business strategy or nominating independent directors. As 
discussed above, the development of firm-specific activism could be expensive for 
some shareholders but responding to such shareholder proposals is not.  Hedge funds 
therefore help mainstream investors to transform from ‘rationally passive’ to 
‘rationally reticent’.157    
 The proposed changes alert the board that there may be managerial 
inefficiencies in the eyes of shareholders. As the foundation of hedge fund activism is 
the difference between the share price and the fundamental value of a company, hedge 
fund activism will address and correct strategic and governance shortfalls in 
coordination with mainstream investors. In this context, hedge fund activism could be 
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a valuable mechanism in corporate governance when the proposed changes aim to 
address agency problems. At the same time, they are very controversial institutional 
investors due to the way they involve themselves in management.  
 Activist investors are increasingly gaining power in their portfolio companies 
and challenge management and boards to implement changes. For instance, 319 high 
impact activism initiatives against US companies occurred in 2016.158 The proposed 
changes go informally to the board at first; the activist attempts to persuade the board 
to adopt the recommended changes. At this stage, they are mostly advisory in nature 
and the activism is not meant to be confrontational. The funds’ campaign is not 
confined to the annual general meetings. They usually start with soft activism and then 
ramp up to a more aggressive form. Finally, if they cannot get concessions from the 
board, they usually heighten the level of activism and the last step is waging a proxy 
contest. At this point, the success of their campaign depends on whether they can get 
enough support from other investors.  Hedge funds may therefore not succeed in 
reaching all of their targets, even using all the legal options at their disposal.  
 The agenda of hedge funds ranges from major changes, such as the sale of a 
company, blocking an acquisition, spinning off a division or removing the CEO, to 
lesser changes such as altering the capital structure of the company, increasing R&D 
projects, share buy-backs, adjusting dividend policy, and fixing governance issues 
including board independence, executive compensation, or direct representation on the 
board. 159 The success rate of activism is remarkable. For example, TCI, a hedge fund, 
amassed 5% of Deutsche Börse and blocked its acquisition of the London Stock 
Exchange.160 A dramatic increase in the success of activist campaigns has been 
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observed. In many cases, activist funds secured board representation, either through 
negotiation and settlement or through a proxy fight.161  
 The candidates nominated by activist funds have the potential to improve 
corporate governance and increase the monitoring capacity of the board. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, in the traditional law and economics approach, the rise of independent 
directors remains an unfulfilled promise and director elections are often uncontested 
and unchallenged.  The future directors are therefore usually predetermined by the 
current board and top executives. Hedge funds are not afraid of launching a proxy fight 
to nominate directors. This enlarges the pool of candidates who are usually competent 
industry experts or corporate veterans who have more relevant industry knowledge but 
generally have no relationship to the fund.162 This also helps mainstream investors 
who are not willing to carry out a proxy contest against the management. Moreover, 
directors nominated by shareholders serve an important role which is not widely 
discussed in the literature. They may address the information gap between the board 
and management and the structural problems of the monitoring board discussed in 
Chapter 2.163 These candidates do not have to rely on the management for their 
appointment; they can therefore easily speak out against management and ask for more 
information.164 More importantly, they have access to the full resources of hedge funds 
to collect new information and can analyse the information given by management to 
the board. These candidates can reduce the reliance of the board on management and 
can bring new information to the board which is a key component of informative and 
complete discussions. As these directors often get bonus pay, they have enormous 
financial incentives to increase corporate performance. Trian Fund Management, led 
by Nelson Peltz, is a typical example of board nominations. In 2006, Trian Fund 
Management accumulated a stake in Heinz. Subsequently, it expressed concerns about 
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the disappointing earnings of the company since 1998.165 The board at that time 
thought that they ‘don’t need outside help’. However, Trian analysed boxes of old 
board meetings and financial statements and provided new information about what 
had gone wrong. The company was eventually sold at a 19 % premium in 2013.166 
Moreover, in 2015, the CEO of General Electrics invited Trian to purchase a stake in 
the company and seek board representation.167 This clearly shows how sophisticated 
investors could play a role in dealing with informational gaps between the board and 
management by analysing information, and by addressing structural problems of the 
modern board of directors. The Trian example is also an important contribution to our 
understanding of how shareholder activism is evolving in US corporate governance.  
 Hedge funds engage in governance issues, such as the independence and 
expertise of the board members, and anti-takeover mechanisms to be able to influence 
the long-term strategy or general policies of the target company to achieve higher 
absolute returns by demanding dividends or share purchases afterwards. In the course 
of their activism, they may reveal many deficits in the board or weaknesses of 
corporate governance. For instance, a letter written by Third Point LLC, a hedge fund, 
to Star Gas revealed that the CEO had appointed his 78-year-old mother to serve on 
the board of directors.168 After this engagement, the CEO had to resign. It shows that 
the board itself sometimes cannot resist the management’s demands even in extreme 
situations. 
 Many authors believe that the proposed changes in fact cause short-termism, a 
reduction in long-term projects at the macro-economic level, and a shift of value from 
the company to activist investors.169 Chiu argues that hedge fund activism can involve 
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value extraction from the company to shareholders through reallocating the company’s 
assets, for example, selling a division, spinning off a department or reducing the R&D 
budget.170 This type of value extraction naturally raises concerns.171 These concerns 
also have regulatory implications and shape lawmakers’ opinions regarding 
shareholder activism. For instance, the recommendation of the Starboard Value, a 
hedge fund, that the Winsconsin-based Wasau Paper company should close the 
Brokaw Mill and focus on its tissue business rather than free sheet-printing paper 
business because the global market for free-sheet paper had been shrinking, inspired 
lawmakers to reduce the impact and influence of shareholders in the proposed 
‘Brokaw Act’172 which aims to tighten disclosure rules.173 It is therefore better to 
approach hedge fund activism with caution. It is also quite possible that it may aim to 
advance private interests, as occurred in the Mylan case discussed in Chapter 3.      
 Hedge funds often employ controversial techniques to increase their influence 
over the target company and carry out their objectives. These techniques are 
categorised as: risk-decoupling strategies, golden leashes, and wolf-packs. Since risk-
decoupling techniques have been discussed in Chapter 3, they will not be repeated 
here. Wolf-packs are loose coalitions of hedge funds. As mentioned above, a 
standalone hedge fund rarely builds up a controlling stake reaching 20%.174 In some 
cases, they may prefer to establish loose coalitions without formal agreements between 
them in order to avoid the disclosure requirements of securities laws. The members of 
the wolf-pack quickly purchase stakes in the target firm before the wolf-pack leader 
discloses its ownership as required by securities laws. These tactics help hedge funds 
to share informational and financial resources, which in turn greatly reduces the cost 
of activism. The members of the wolf-pack receive significant gains from the increase 
                                                 
170 Chiu (n 159) 140. 
171 Martin Lipton, ‘The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge Funds’ 
(HLSFCGF, 14 January 2015) < https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/14/the-threat-to-
shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds/>.  
172 S.2720 — 114th Congress (2015-2016). 
173 Alon Brav et al., ‘Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious Case of the Brukaw Act’ (2017) < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860167> accessed 10 May 2017.  
174 William Bratton, ‘Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat’ (2016) 




in share prices that follow the announcement of the activism.175 This is arguably a 
‘low-risk high-profit’ opportunity.176 Coffee and Palia argue that hedge funds 
collectively could obtain 30% of a target company and that this may give rise to an 
effect similar to a controlling acquisition in which ordinary shareholders receive little 
or no control premium.177 It gives hedge funds significant bargaining power and places 
management in a weaker position in negotiations because management knows a group 
of activist shareholders owns the company’s shares and it needs to meet their 
demands.178 The members of wolf-packs carry relatively less economic risk in relation 
to their bargaining power because even in the worst case scenario where the members 
of the wolf-pack do not have a superior strategy or information, they will reap the 
benefits of share price increases after the announcement of their shareholder 
activism.179 As the formation of the wolf-pack is relatively easy, it may be overused 
which in turn may cause a systemic decrease in long-term investments leading to a 
situation in which the wolf-pack extracts value from other shareholders and from the 
company itself. 
 The third controversial technique is the golden leash tactic. In this stratagem, 
hedge funds offer a lucrative compensation package to nominee directors on top of the 
executive remuneration received from the company180. The supplemental package 
depends on corporate performance and the accomplishment of the objectives described 
by the appointer.181 Since hedge fund nominee directors may implement a number of 
changes as instructed by the activist fund and in return for additional payment, 
concerns have been raised regarding short-termism and the private interests of 
shareholders. One could argue that when a conflict arises, the nominee director will 
                                                 
175 John Coffee and Darius Palia, ‘The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on 
Corporate Governance’ (2016) 41(3) The Journal of Corporation Law 546, 551. 
176 Coffee (n 145) 701. 
177 Coffee and Palia (n 175) 593. 
178 Coffee (145)703. 
179 Coffee (n 145) 701. 
180  Nili ( 209) 525; John Coffee, ‘Shareholder Activism and Ethics: Are Shareholder Bonuses 
Incentives or Bribes’ (The CLS Blue Sky Blog, 29 April 2013) 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/04/29/shareholder-activism-and-ethics-are-shareholder-
bonuses-incentives-or-bribes/ accessed 08 November 2016. 





favour the interests of the fund rather than the interests of the company and other 
shareholders. An elected director could feel beholden to his or her sponsor or obliged 
to follow her or his sponsor’s strategy regarding the target company. Coffee likened  
the golden leash to bribery and argued that ‘third party bonuses create the wrong 
incentives, fragment the board, and imply a shift towards both the short-term and 
higher risk.’182 Similarly, Bainbridge described it as ‘nonsense’ and argued that ‘[i]f 
this nonsense is not illegal, it ought to be’.183 Hedge fund-nominated directors 
therefore have to be approached with caution because they may have questionable 
motives. 
 In conclusion, hedge funds take an active stance in corporate governance. As 
a result of their business models, they are well suited to develop the skills needed to 
identify and address strategic and governance shortfalls, to buy a sizeable stake to 
influence management, to prepare proposals, and to present them to other institutional 
investors. Their primary target is to obtain abnormal returns by addressing managerial 
accountability problems, and then to leave the company. They are not afraid of 
launching proxy contests and nominating independent directors. In this way, they may 
help the board to bridge any information asymmetry between the board and 
management thereby serving an important role in reducing agency cost problems by 
enhancing the board’s monitoring ability. They are less likely to be long-term investors 
as envisaged by the Stewardship Principles or Code and to engage in responsible 
shareholder activism. It seems quite possible that they may use their influence to 
advance their private interests. They also employ empty voting, wolf-pack and golden 
leash tactics to increase their influence over management without bearing all the 
economic consequences. In that regard, they may need to be approached with cautioun. 
                                                 
182 John Coffee, ‘Shareholder Activism and Ethics: Are Shareholder Bonuses Incentives or Bribes?’ 
(The CLS Blue Sky Blog, 29 April 2013) < 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/04/29/shareholder-activism-and-ethics-are-shareholder-
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183 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Can corporate directors take third party pay from hedge funds?’ (Bainbridge 
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Share ownership in the US has evolved from one that is individual to one that that is 
institutional in nature. The accumulation of share ownership in the hands of 
institutional shareholders makes shareholder activism economically more rational. 
However, some types of activism could still be expensive for some institutional 
shareholders because of the different characteristics of institutional shareholders.  
 Each type of institutional shareholder has different features. It has been shown 
that mainstream investors namely, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, 
and SWFs, are generally long-term investors. They are usually interested in 
governance issues. In particular, large mainstream institutional shareholders could 
exercise a stewardship role in corporate governance because they have enough 
resources and are usually internally managed. They have the potential to contribute to 
the decision-making of investee companies. These mainstream investors have 
transformed from ‘rationally passive investors’ to ‘rationally reticent investors’ with 
the help of regulations, political pressure and the emergence of activist funds.  
 The reluctance of institutional investors to reduce the agency cost problem 
even when it is beneficial for ultimate owners, creates a governance gap as well as an 
arbitrage opportunity in the investment chain. Hedge funds can take advantage of this 
opportunity because of their unique business models. The fee structures and disclosure 
regime are vital for hedge funds for the sustainability of their business model. In this 
regard, the US disclosure regime is one of the most activist friendly regimes in the 
world.  
 Hedge funds play a crucial role in corporate governance by pointing out the 
potential shortfalls in the monitoring of managerial accountability problems and 
raising legitimate questions in the boardroom and between shareholders. More 
importantly, they can identify the lack of quality or expertise of directors and nominate 
new directors, which could potentially address structural problems in the board. Their 
proposed changes are usually controversial and could be value-reducing for some 
companies while advancing the funds’ own interests. Moreover, activist funds employ 
empty voting, wolf-pack and golden leash tactics to increase their influence without 
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proportionately bearing the economic consequences of their proposals. Thus, activist 
funds should not be unconditionally favoured in corporate governance.   
 Overall, there is a division of labour between different shareholders in the 
market. Hedge funds could potentially complete shareholder activism in the market. 
In this respect, they could potentially bridge the gap between ownership and control. 
Mainstream institutional shareholders are the arbiter of activist proposals and could 
support the board where these proposals are value-reducing. The role of awakening 
mainstream investors and the emergence of activist funds should be taken into 
consideration by lawmakers. 
 
 











Chapter 5.  Shareholder Activism in US 
Corporate Governance 
5.1 Introduction  
The primary aims of this chapter are to explore (i) the extent to which shareholder 
activism is practicable under US company law and (ii) the judicial interpretation of 
the traditional director primacy theory. Chapter 3 concluded that shareholder activism 
is a valuable corporate governance mechanism and is now considered a self-help 
mechanism for the protection of shareholder interests and an accountability 
mechanism that provides stability and sustainability to companies in the market.1 
Chapter 4 discussed the emergence of activist funds and how mainstream institutional 
investors transformed from ‘rationally passive investors’ to ‘rationally reticent 
investors’. This raises the question of whether these market and policy developments 
can be accommodated under the current US corporate governance.   
 US corporate governance traditionally regards shareholders as ‘spectators’ or 
‘bystanders’.2 Shareholder activism has therefore always been controversial, while the 
protection of shareholder value has been at the centre of US corporate governance.3 
The increasing power of institutional shareholders and managerial accountability 
concerns are the drivers behind the recent changes in US corporate governance.4 This 
change is happening through  legal reforms and the market-driven process of 
shareholder proposals. Institutional shareholders increasingly seek to change 
corporate governance on a company-by-company basis. There are therefore some 
differences between the law in the books and the law in action. However, this is not 
                                                 
1 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
Dodd-Frank Act’), Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
2 Christopher Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World (Cambridge 2013) 38; 
Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge 2011) 63; Jennifer Hill, ‘Visions and 
Revisions of the Shareholder’ (2000) 48(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 39, 47.  
3 The preamble to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that the aim of the Act is ‘to protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, 
and for other purposes.’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law No 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
4 Jennifer Hill, ‘The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law 
World’ (2010) 18(4) Corporate Governance: An International Review 344; Stephen Bainbridge, 
‘Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder Interventions’ in Jennifer Hill and Randall 
Thomas (eds) Research Handbook on Shareholder Power (EdwardElgar 2015) 231. 
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the end of the story because the default regime, judicial sympathy to director primacy, 
and the business community still favour the board and management.  
 This chapter will focus on the three issues. The first section will examine legal 
and governance rules that reflect director primacy theory; the second will analyse how 
shareholder activism functions in the US; and the third section will discuss whether 
recent developments mean a paradigm shift in US corporate governance. 
5.2 Legal and Governance Rules that Reflect Director Primacy 
Theory 
A brief description of the US legal system is needed here to better understand how 
internal corporate governance is regulated. US corporate law is a mix of state and 
federal law. State law traditionally regulates the realm of internal corporate 
governance affairs.5 At federal level, the SEC is authorised by section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 19346 to regulate the solicitation and issuance of proxies, 
among other matters. The federal rules primarily regulate the proxy rules. Since listed 
companies’ shareholders mainly use their rights through proxies, the federal 
regulations are of vital importance in the exercise of shareholder rights.7  
 The most important descriptive feature of the US legal framework of corporate 
governance is its extensive reliance on board authority.8 US corporate governance is 
usually described by the weak governance power of shareholders and a lack of 
straightforward tools to intervene in corporate affairs.9 In addition to weak legal 
power, US courts have also been responsible for ‘relegating shareholders to the 
questionable role of bystander’10 through the application of the business judgment 
rule.11 In the development of director-centric rules, the negative and weak images of 
                                                 
5 Marc Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart 2013) 180. 
6 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) 
7 Paul Rose, ‘Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence’ (2014) 66 Florida Law 
Review 2179, 2186. 
8 Stephen Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance: in Theory and Practice (OUP 2008) 53-4. 
9 Bruner (n 2) 36; see generally note 2. 
10 Bruner (n 9) 37; Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (CUP 2011) 63.  
11 Richard Buxbaum, ‘The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance’ (1985) 73(6) 




shareholders have played a crucial role and have been used by the business 
management community to lobby for their interests.12  
 The rest of this chapter will focus on the legal and governance rules that reflect 
director primacy. 
 The Board of Directors 
The board of directors is, arguably, the most important body in modern listed 
companies. The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) attributes managerial 
power to the board of directors: ‘the business and affairs of every corporation 
organised under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation’.13 Unlike UK company law where the division of powers is left to be 
decided under the company’s constitution, US law expressly allocates the 
management and oversight powers to the board of directors. In this regard, the board’s 
authority is original and undelegated from shareholders. This is an important aspect of 
the director primacy model in US corporate governance.  
 Despite its axiomatic importance to the functioning of corporate governance, 
the law is remarkably silent on the proper composition of the board besides a basic 
rule that a company should have directors.14 
 Composition of the Board of Directors: From an Advising to a Monitoring 
Board 
The role and composition of the board differ greatly than was the case in the 1950s. In 
the past, the members of the board of directors used to be chosen by the CEO and 
tended not to challenge his/her authority.15 Thus, the board was often considered ‘an 
                                                 
12 John Armour and Joseph McCahery, ‘Introduction’ in John Armour and Joseph McCahery After 
Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US (Hart 
Publishing 2006) 7.  
13 Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law; this section also constitutes an important 
pillar of the director primacy theory. See, Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends 
of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 547, 559.   
14 Section 141 of the DGCL. 
15 Jeffrey Gordon, ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: of Shareholder 




extension of management’.16 The board’s role was advisory rather than one of 
monitoring of management.17 A number of factors have resulted in the board moving 
from a predominantly advisory to a monitoring role. First, corporate governance 
failures since the 1970s have revealed that advisory boards to have difficulty in 
realising the real financial situation and performance of the company and often a 
failure to grasp the underperformance of management.18 Second, in the wake of hostile 
takeovers, the judiciary promoted board independence by ‘sustaining of 
unprecedented defensive measures in the cases of the 1980s’.19 Third, the market for 
corporate control was found too expensive as a means of dealing with agency 
problems. Finally, as a response to the Enron failure, stock exchange rules required 
the majority of board members to be independent, with independent nomination, audit 
and compensation committees, and an enhanced independence requirement for 
directors.20 Stock exchange markets take a rules-based approach and provide details 
as to circumstances which affect the independence of directors. While the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) applies ‘no material relationship with the listed company’ as 
the independence criterion, NASDAQ bars any relationship that would impair 
independence.21 Although independence is not required by the law as such, the board 
must not have a conflict of interest in order to be protected by the business judgment 
rule which will be discussed below. It should be noted that the courts apply vague 
legal standards for independence when compared to the stock exchanges’ stricter 
criteria.22 In short, the board’s function has evolved from an advisory function to a 
monitoring role over the past half century and independent directors have become 
critically important in the composition of the board.23  
                                                 
16 Gordon (n 15) 1511. 
17 Bainbridge (n 8) 159. 
18 Gordon (n 15) 1515. 
19 Gordon (n 15) 1524. 
20 Rule 303A.02, 303A.04 and 303A.05 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual; see also Rule 5605(b) 
of the NASDAQ Marketplace Rules. 
21 NYSE 303A.02(a); NASDAQ 5605(a)(2). 
22 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc v Stewart 845 A. 2d 1040, 1050 (Del. Supr. 31 
March 2004) where the court stated that ‘allegations of mere personal friendship or a mere outside 
business relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s 
independence’. 
23 Ronald Gilson and Reiner Kraakman, ‘Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional 




 The board of directors carries out two principal functions: deciding on strategic 
corporate policies and actions, and monitoring management on an ongoing basis.24 
Much of the oversight and governance roles of the board are fulfilled through audit, 
compensation and nomination committees which are composed of independent 
directors.25 Their oversight role has become more relevant in particular for companies 
that severely underperform.  They can take radical measures, including the removal of 
top managers.  
 In the UK, the separation of chairman and CEO is recommended by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code.26 By contrast, it used to be commonplace in the US for 
CEOs to serve as chairs of the board. However, amendments to the SEC rules in 2010 
triggered the separation of the chairman and CEO positions. Boards are now required 
to disclose their role in the risk oversight of the company and whether their leadership 
structure is appropriate to monitor the management.27 Following the financial crisis, 
the separation of chairman and CEO positions has drawn the attention of activist funds 
and mainstream investors. The number of S&P 500 companies with separate chair and 
CEO roles was around 29% in 2005 but this increased to 48% in 2015.28 
 The board has been pushed to be independent, at least as an aspiration, and it 
is now more competent to carry out a monitoring role than ever before. The monitoring 
role of the board, which is the raison d’être of independent directors, can be diminished 
by management through the appointment of directors or by the information asymmetry 
between the independent directors and the top management. The board can therefore 
be trapped by the management even if independent directors are in the majority. The 
Enron and Lehman failures revealed the captive board problem: even though the board 
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was aware of questionable transactions by the management, the board adopted a very 
lax approach to its oversight role.29 
 Locus of Management 
The locus of management emerges from the requirements of listed companies. 
Management, unlike the board of directors and shareholders, is not legally defined as 
an authority. Although it is stated that the board is responsible for the management of 
the company, the management of large listed companies is beyond the capacity of a 
limited number of board members. Therefore, the phrase ‘… or under the direction of 
… [the board]’ was added to section 141(a) of the DGCL for the delegation of 
managerial functions to managers.30 The delegation of power to management is the 
norm in the US.31    
In reality, managers, i.e. corporate officers, dominate the board through their 
de facto power and carry out day-to-day corporate actions according to delegated 
authority.32 As a result of the broad’s delegation of power, executive managers decide 
on business strategies and the general direction of companies, establish business goals, 
manage risk, and coordinate production.33 Moreover, they provide information and 
recommendations to the board about the investment and business strategies that a 
company should follow and then implement these projects after the board’s approval.34 
In short, managers appear to take most decisions under the control of the directors and 
provide information and recommendations about major issues to the board.  
The separation between the roles of managers and the board has arisen from 
economics and corporate governance principles rather than law itself. The board 
therefore maintains the formal and legal authority, and also actual authority over major 
                                                 
29 Marilyn Cane and Stacey Silva, ‘Shareholder Democracy and The SEC’s Proxy Rules: in the 
Boardroom’ (2010) 15 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 241, 242.  
30 Stephen Bainbridge, Corporate Law (3rd edition, Foundation Press 2015) 73. 
31 Lyman Johnson and Robert Ricca, ‘Reality Check on Officer Liability’ (2011) 67 Business Lawyer 
75, 77-80. 
32 Barry Baysinger and Robert Hoskison, ‘The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic 
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33 Johnson and Ricca, (n 31) 77. 
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corporate decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs from the company, 
substantial changes in business strategies and executive remuneration. Importantly, 
the board’s oversight role continues, and it cannot abdicate itself from responsibility 
by delegating to the management.35   
 As a result, in the US, many managerial tasks in large companies are carried 
out by the executive managers. As such, directors are only involved in major corporate 
decisions. The board relies on the information and recommendations provided by 
management in shaping general business strategy and taking major corporate 
decisions. 
 Judicial Deference to the Board of Directors: The Business Judgment Rule 
The DGCL attributes managerial power to the board of directors, but this is only a 
default regulation. The defining feature of US corporate governance is that the 
decision-making authority lies beyond shareholders’ intervention. In return, US 
company law tries to keep them accountable under the duty of care. However, US 
courts are reluctant to assess the propriety of managerial decisions in relation to the 
corporate objective and strategy. US courts apply three tiers of review for evaluating 
decision-making: the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny and entire fairness.36 
The business judgment rule is the standard of review which generally assumes that the 
board is independent, disinterested and sufficiently informed. Unless proven 
otherwise, the business judgment rule protects the decision-making authority of the 
board. It provides the most capacious foundation for corporate decision-making. 
Therefore, the primary focus here will be on the business judgment rule. Other relevant 
standards of review for corporate decision-making will be examined briefly below. 
 The default regime is laid down by Section 141(a), but courts often fill the gaps 
that arise from the issues that were not identified ex ante or hears claims as to the 
                                                 
35 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 31 (1981) the court held that ‘directors may not shut their 
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have a duty to look.’; Graham v Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A. 2s 125, 130 (Del. Sup. 
1963). 
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violation of the duty of care of directors which aim to prevent them from taking 
careless decisions.37 The courts are reluctant to review corporate decisions. The 
directors and managers usually undertake risky investment projects in managing 
corporations. If directors were found liable for the loss from a corporate decision on 
the grounds of negligence, inattention or mismanagement, this would have an 
undesirable effect on the directors’ behaviour and corporate investments, given the 
scale of the listed companies.38  
 US courts therefore developed the business judgment rule to protect corporate 
directors from liability for honest mistakes and ‘even for judgments that appear to have 
been clear mistakes – unless certain exceptions apply’.39 The business judgment rule 
is ‘an acknowledgement of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under 
Section 141(a)’ and a corollary of the rule that ‘directors, rather than shareholders, 
manage the business and affairs of the corporation’.40 Likewise, In Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, the court indicated that the business judgment rule ‘exists to protect and 
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware 
directors’.41 So the business judgment rule draws a line between judicial scrutiny and 
judicial deference to corporate decision-making, and sets the boundaries of the 
decision-making power of the board.   
 The business judgment rule presumes that ‘in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company’.42 A shareholder 
needs to rebut this presumption to make the courts scrutinise corporate decisions. 
Accordingly, in Brehm v. Eisner, the court stated that ‘directors' decisions will be 
respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to 
the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a 
rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that 
                                                 
37 See also, Michael Dooley, ‘Two Models of Corporate Governance’ (1992) 47 The Business Lawyer 
461, 468 (the duty of care and loyalty address ‘two faces of the general problem of opportunism’).  
38 Gagliardi v Trifood 683 A. 2d 1049, 1052 (Del. 1996). 
39 Robert Clark Corporate Law (Aspen 1986) 123.  
40 Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 811-2 (Del. 1984). 
41 Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 




includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.’43 The courts 
did not establish a systematic list of preconditions of the business judgment rule; 
therefore, the kind of actions not protected by the business judgment rule vary from 
judgment to judgment.44 However, generally, it is built on three assumptions: i- 
directors acted for proper corporate purposes, ii-  directors were reasonably informed 
in making their decision and iii- directors were disinterested and independent.  
 As long as corporate decisions can be attributed to a rational business purpose, 
a decision made in good faith will be provided the protection of the business judgment 
rule. Even if the decision is substantively wrong, the board will be protected as long 
as ‘the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in 
a good faith effort to advance corporate interests’.45 This judicial concept allows the 
board to engage in prima facie philanthropic activities or otherwise non-commercial 
activities. These activities, including donations to universities, corporate strategies 
aimed at promoting the welfare of employees or the interest of local communities, are 
accepted as proper purposes for corporations. The classic example of judicial 
liberalism is the decision in the Shlensky v. Wrigley case.46 The plaintiff, a minority 
shareholder in the defendant company, sued the defendants because they refused to 
install lights at a baseball stadium which would enable the team to play at night and 
generate extra revenues. The court pointed out the potential long-term benefits of only 
day matches to the local community in increasing the attractiveness of the area near 
the stadium and refused to review the merits of the decision on the basis of a lack of 
fraud, illegality or self-dealing.47  
 A plaintiff could demonstrate a failure to act in good faith ‘where the fiduciary 
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the 
                                                 
43 Brehm v Eisner (n 42) n 66. 
44 Clark (n 39) 124. 
45 Sinclair Oil Corp v Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del 1971) (‘To employ a different rule – one that 
permitted an objective evaluation of the decision- would expose directors to substantive second 
guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would in the long-run, be injurious to investor 
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46 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App.2d 173 (1968). 




corporation …’48 or could prove that the board ‘acted in a manner that cannot be 
attributed to a rational business purpose’.49 The broad use of corporate discretionary 
power is subject to judicial scrutiny only if there is wasteful or evidently irrational 
(which is a way inferring bad faith) use of corporate resources.50 
 Judicial deference extends to almost all kinds of strategic decisions such as 
entering into a new market, the amount of dividends distributed to shareholders and 
long-term business strategy. In taking these decisions, the board must have acted in an 
informed manner,51 i.e. the board must have exercised reasonable care.52 When the 
board fails to act in an informed manner, the business judgment rule does not apply. 
The requirement of informed judgment is related to the process by which decisions 
are made rather than the substantial care exercised by the board. The courts describe 
this as ‘process due care’.53 In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court paid close attention to 
the board’s process and investigated whether the board incorporated all material 
information reasonably available to itself. The court held that ‘the concept of gross 
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment 
reached by a board of directors was an informed one’.54 Thus, a plaintiff must prove 
that the board acted in a grossly negligent manner in availing themselves of the 
available information.  
 In addition, where directors are not disinterested and independent, the business 
judgment rule does not provide protection. ‘A director is interested if he will be 
materially affected, either to his benefit or detriment, by a decision of the board, in a 
manner not shared by the corporation and the shareholders.’55 As regards the lack of 
independence, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that a director was sufficiently 
loyal or beholden to another party to affect the director’s ability to judge corporate 
                                                 
48 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (Disney II), 906 A. 2d 27, 52, 67 (Del. 2006). 
49  Brehm v Eisner (n 42) 264 n 66. 
50 Bainbridge (n 30)129. 
51 Van Gorkom (n 41). 
52 Bainbridge (n 30). 
53 Brehm (n 42) 264. 
54 Van Gorkom (n 41) 872. 




decision on their merits.56 In other words, ‘the board must be able to act free of 
personal financial interest and improper extraneous influence’.57  
  The business judgment rule makes it very difficult in practice for courts to 
review directors’ actions. Unless a plaintiff rebuts the presumption, a director will be 
presumed to be acting on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. In these situations, the 
board’s authority will be respected and protected, and the court will not substitute its 
own judgment.58 It is clearly very difficult for a shareholder to overcome the 
presumptions laid down by the business judgment rule.59 The importance of the 
business judgment rule does not lie in the requirement that the presumption must be 
rebutted by the plaintiff, but rather that the plaintiff cannot win the case by challenging 
the substantive merits of the decision. In this way, the business judgment rule makes 
a commitment to protect the substance of a corporate decision.60 In other words, the 
court will abstain from examining the substantive merits of decisions unless the 
plaintiff demonstrates that one or more of the preconditions to the application of the 
rule are not met. 
 In specific circumstances, the standard of review for corporate decision-
making shifts to enhanced scrutiny and entire fairness.61 Enhanced scrutiny62 is the 
middle tier in terms of the deference to corporate decision-making. It applies ‘when 
the realities of the decision-making context subtly undermine the decisions of even 
independent and disinterested directors’.63 Delaware courts first established the 
enhanced scrutiny for the hostile takeovers in which management resists against the 
bidder. Generally, enhanced scrutiny applies to the situations which directors are not 
personally involved in the transaction, but the nature of a transaction could potentially 
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have implications on the directors’ motives.  Hence, directors are generally required 
to show that ‘their motivations were proper and not selfish’ and that ‘their actions were 
reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective’.64 Courts do not interpret 
reasonableness narrowly. In other words, they do not seek one single reasonable 
answer rather ‘one of several reasonable alternatives’.65 In this regard, it still provides 
substantial deference to corporate decision-making and creates a middle tier standard 
of review of corporate decision-making.  
 The standard of review shifts from the business judgment rule to the entire 
fairness test where the plaintiff rebuts the business judgment rule. 66 ‘If the rule is 
rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged 
transaction, to prove to the trier of the fact the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to the 
shareholder plaintiff’.67 In other words, if directors are not sufficiently independent, 
disinterested or informed individuals, the business judgment rule has no application. 
For instance, where a director appears on both sides of transactions or receives a 
personal benefit from the transaction not shared by shareholders, directors cannot be 
regarded as disinterested or independent.68 In the case of director self-interest in a 
transaction, entire fairness test is applied. Another example is that where a director is 
beholden to an interested party to the transaction, entire fairness test is applied instead 
of the business judgment rule.69 In this case, directors are required to demonstrate ‘the 
challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its 
shareholders’.70 The court usually examines whether the decision was procedurally 
and substantively fair.71 Under entire fairness, a substantial deference to the board is 
attributed because ‘"perfection is not possible, or expected" as a condition precedent 
to a judicial determination of entire fairness’.72 The entire fairness test does not only 
require the board to act in a procedurally fair manner but also in a substantively fair 
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manner. In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, the court held that ‘the value of a corporation 
is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values…’. Consequently, when 
examining the fair price aspect of the test, the court investigates whether ‘a reasonable 
seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard as within a range of fair value; one 
that such a seller could reasonably accept’.73 The procedural and substantive aspects 
of entire fairness test could be interrelated: ‘a strong record of fair dealing can 
influence the fair price inquiry, reinforcing the unitary nature of the entire fairness test. 
The converse is equally true: process can infect price’.74 Due to the ambiguity which 
is inevitably embedded in the concept of fairness, it can be concluded that even under 
the entire fairness test a substantial level of deference is granted to the board’s 
discretion.  
There is one more important relevant issue with regards to the business judgment 
rule. The delegation of authority to the management does not absolve the board from 
its oversight responsibility. This is not traditionally within the scope of the business 
judgment rule because the rule applies only where the board exercises business 
judgment, but the oversight liability arises where the board fails to act.  
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation75 the court required the 
directors to demonstrate that they attempted ‘in good faith to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists’.76 
The underlying logic behind this decision is that while most issues do not come to the 
board’s attention, the actions of senior or junior employees might have a devastating 
impact on the company. Therefore, the court requires the board to maintain affirmative 
legal compliance mechanisms within the company. The court held that the ‘imposition 
of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging 
their fiduciary obligations’.77 In Stone v. Ritter, the court reinterpreted the Caremark 
case and stated that:  
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‘… oversight liability draws heavily upon the concept of director failure to act 
in good faith … In Disney, we identified the following examples of conduct that 
would establish a failure to act in good faith: … where the fiduciary intentionally 
fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious 
disregard for his duties.’78  
Relying on a lack of good faith, the court identified the conditions for oversight 
liability in that: ‘(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from 
being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention. In either case, imposition 
of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging 
their fiduciary obligations.’79  
Another oversight case which arose as a result of the financial crisis is in re 
Citigroup, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation.80 Shareholders on behalf of 
Citigroup Inc. brought a derivative action to recover losses arising from subprime 
lending. The shareholders argued that the board breached its fiduciary duty as a result 
of the failure to monitor and adequately control the business risks in the subprime 
mortgage market the company had taken and to disclose the risks associated with the 
subprime lending market. According to the shareholders, there had been clear red flags 
from early 2005 that should have put the directors on notice of the problems in the real 
estate and credit markets. Instead, it was argued that the directors decided to approve 
the business strategy developed by management which entailed taking excessive risks 
in the subprime mortgage market at the expense of the long-term interests and 
sustainability of the company, and did almost nothing to avoid these risks.81 In 
rejecting the arguments, the court held that in the absence of conflict of interest or 
disloyalty claims, ‘ultimately, the discretion granted directors and managers allows 
them to maximise shareholder value in the long term by taking risks without the 
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debilitating fear that they will be held personally liable if the company experiences 
losses’,82 and a judge or jury will be precluded from second-guessing as long as the 
decisions are the product of a rational and informed decision-making process. 
Therefore, the substance of corporate decisions is protected from interference. While 
it seems that directors are subject to oversight liability, it appears that it is difficult to 
prove their intentional disregard of their oversight responsibilities because the court 
imposes lax standards of review on directors. 
 Overall, very strong deference is given to the board where it exercises its 
powers or fails to act. Carney argues that the business judgment rule is ‘a rule of no 
liability for breaches of the duty of care’.83 For a long time, directors have been 
generally aware of the fact that their actions will not be reviewed by the courts on 
business judgment matters.84 The aim of the business judgment rule is well articulated 
by Bainbridge: ‘preservation of managerial discretion should always be the null 
hypothesis.’85 The court argues that the adverse implications of heavy reliance on the 
business judgment rule is balanced with shareholder activism and the market for 
corporate control for shareholders dissatisfied with managerial decisions. In relation 
to the former factor, it has held that ‘if the stockholders are displeased with the action 
of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal 
to turn the board out’.86 With regards to the latter, it states that ‘the redress for failures 
that arise from faithful management must come from the markets, through the action 
of shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from this Court’.87 However, in 
Chapter 2, it was concluded that the market for corporate control does not function as 
envisaged by theory. The extent to which shareholders can actively engage in the 
management of a company will be discussed below. 
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5.3 Shareholders’ Governance and Control Rights 
This section now moves on to examine shareholders’ governance and control rights. 
The main purpose of this section is to explore the extent to which shareholders could 
provide accountability in corporate governance as a counterbalance and to consider 
whether recent regulatory and market developments constitute a considerable shift in 
the allocation of power between shareholders and directors. 
 Amendments of Articles of Incorporation or ‘Charters’ and By-laws 
The basic internal structure of corporations is mostly regulated by the articles of 
incorporation (or charters), by-laws and company law in general.88 Section 102 of the 
DGCL states that a charter may include ‘any provision creating, defining, limiting and 
regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors and the shareholders’. The 
DGCL therefore adopts a flexible and enabling approach in distributing power 
between the directors and shareholders. The amendment is a two-step process.89 First, 
the amendment must be initiated by the board. Second, upon the board’s 
recommendation, it is presented to a shareholder vote. If shareholders that own the 
majority of shares eligible to vote approve the proposed amendments, then it is 
adopted. Suppose that Yildiran-Cebi, Inc. has 2,000 voting shares outstanding. At least 
1001 affirmative votes are required for the amendment of the charter, regardless of the 
number of shares present at the annual meeting.90 The point to note is that shareholders 
lack the power to initiate charter amendments in the US, while the articles of 
association could be altered by a special resolution at any time in the UK.91 In addition, 
in the UK shareholders holding at least 5% of the total voting rights are entitled to 
propose changes.92 
The same voting requirements applicable to charter amendments must be 
fulfilled to adopt, amend or repeal the by-laws. Section 109 of the DGCL lays down 
that ‘the power to adopt, amend or repeal by-laws shall be in the stockholders entitled 
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to vote’. Most of the internal governance of the corporation is regulated through by-
laws. By-laws mostly deal with issues such as the date of general meetings, procedures 
for proxy voting, director elections, audit and other internal matters. The role of by-
laws was depicted by the Delaware Court of Chancery as follows:  
‘Traditionally, the by-laws have been the corporate instrument used to set forth 
the rules by which the corporate board conducts its business. To this end, the 
DGCL is replete with specific provisions authorising the by-laws to establish the 
procedures through which board and committee action is taken’.93 
The by-law is in fact ‘the only statutory mechanism through which shareholders can 
bring their will to bear on the governance of a Delaware corporation.’94 The scope of 
the by-laws is very broad. Section 109(b) of the DGCL allows corporations to adopt 
‘any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, 
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or 
powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees’ 
(emphasis added).  
 Under Delaware law, shareholders are given statutory powers to adopt, amend 
and repeal by-laws.95 However, the authority to adopt by-laws can be granted to the 
board of directors through a charter provision.96 The vast majority of companies in 
Delaware confer this power upon the board.97 Since shareholders and directors 
unilaterally adopt by-laws on a broad range of matters, a large number of private 
ordering takes place in Delaware in the form of company-specific by-laws.98 By-laws 
enable shareholders and directors to customise corporate governance by adopting 
company-specific rules and terms, which are also known as private orderings.99 
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Similarly, Strine stated that in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron 
Corporation that ‘the by-laws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding 
broader contract among the directors, officers and stockholders formed within the 
statutory framework of the DGCL’.100 
 By-laws have been increasingly used by shareholders with Fisch describing 
this trend as the ‘New Governance’101 in which shareholders actively shape corporate 
governance. The use of private orderings has not been unilateral with boards 
responding through different mechanisms to limit shareholders’ power or impose 
procedural or higher requirements to the exercise of shareholder rights.102 By-laws 
became one of the key battlegrounds between the board, management and 
shareholders. The courts, unfortunately, developed divergent treatment of 
shareholder-adopted by-laws (such as the reimbursement by-laws103) and board-
adopted by-laws (such as exclusive forum selection by-laws104 and fee-shifting by-
laws105). Shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal by-laws is more restricted 
than the board’s power. 
 Courts provided larger room for board-adopted by-laws, despite the fact that 
section 109 regulates permissible by-laws for both directors and shareholders. It seems 
possible that directors devise very creative and innovative by-laws that could in 
practice effectively prevent shareholders from exercising their rights. The most recent 
example of governance innovations is litigation by-laws such as exclusive forum by-
laws, fee-shifting by-laws, and arbitration by-laws.106 These litigation by-laws 
arguably seek to address concerns regarding frequency of shareholder litigation. In 
Boilermakers v. Chevron, the board adopted an exclusive forum selection by-law for 
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disputes arising from the internal affairs of the defendant company.107 This type of by-
law is a response to multi-forum litigation by shareholders. In upholding the by-law, 
the court held that the board is granted power to adopt such by-laws under section 109 
of the DGCL. In rejecting shareholders’ argument that the board acted unilaterally, the 
court stated that  shareholders ‘will be bound by by-laws adopted unilaterally by their 
boards’108 and highlighted that ‘stockholders have powerful rights they can use to 
protect themselves if they do not want board-adopted forum selection by-laws to be 
part of the contract between themselves and the corporation’.109 This further 
encouraged directors to engage in similar private ordering through by-laws.  
 The second type of by-laws concerns fee-shifting by-laws. In ATP Tour v. 
Deutscher Tennis Bund, the court upheld a board-adopted by-law that required 
shareholders to pay directors’ attorney fees unless shareholders received  their claim 
from directors in its entirety.110 In other words, ‘if plaintiffs claimed $50 million in 
damages, for instance, but only obtained $40 million they would be responsible for 
paying the defendants’ fees, despite the obvious success of the litigation’.111 It is 
highly unlikely that a plaintiff could achieve this level of success. The fee-shifting by-
law gives rise to a central concern about the risk that directors could also restrict 
shareholders’ ability to bring a lawsuit against the board and management. In 
upholding the by-law, the court underscored the contractual nature of by-laws and 
stated that there is nothing preventing directors from adopting a fee-shifting by-law 
because corporate litigation is related to the business of the corporation under section 
109.112 The final type of litigation by-laws are mandatory arbitration bylaws. 
Following cases like Boilermakers v. Chevron, ATP Tour v. Deutscher Tennis Bund 
and AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion,113 scholars began to speculate that there is 
no remaining legal barrier which prevents directors from unilaterally adopting 
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mandatory arbitration with class action waivers.114 These director-adopted by-laws 
demonstrate how broadly director by-laws are interpreted under section 109. These 
by-laws could effectively prohibit shareholders from initiating suits to protect their 
rights which means that directors can shield themselves from accountability.  
 The court, however, found a shareholder-adopted reimbursement by-law 
invalid in CA v. AFSCME. 115 It discussed this issue and restricted shareholders’ power 
to adopt, amend and repeal by-laws. AFSCME, a union pension fund, sought to submit 
a shareholder amendment to rules governing the reimbursement of reasonable 
expenses incurred in the course of directors’ elections. The board sought to exclude 
this amendment from the proxy statements of the company.116 Thereafter, the SEC 
asked the Delaware Supreme Court whether such an amendment was a proper subject 
for shareholder action and whether it would cause the board to violate any Delaware 
law before issuing a no-action letter.  
 The court, in response, developed a two-prong test: a- whether the by-law is 
within the scope of shareholders’ by-law power and b- whether the by-law 
impermissibly intrudes on the board’s discretionary power under section 141(a). With 
regard to the former question, the court found the by-law permissible under Delaware 
law. However, the court issued critical guiding principles of the scope of shareholder 
power to adopt by-laws, and the scope of permissible by-laws. Perhaps the most 
important guiding principle is that ‘the shareholders' statutory power to adopt, amend 
or repeal by-laws is not coextensive with the board's concurrent power and is limited 
by the board's management prerogatives under Section 141(a)’.117 Director primacy 
lies at the heart of the reasoning of this principle. The court then went on to analyse 
the proper function of by-laws and stated that it is ‘not to mandate how the board 
should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process 
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and procedures by which those decisions are made’.118 Such a limitation is problematic 
because section 109 does not provide any legal ground for exclusively procedural by-
laws. Section 109(b) deliberately employs the term ‘any provision’ and provides that 
a by-law can be related to ‘the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, 
and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers 
or employees’. As such, the permissibility of by-laws depends on what the court 
understands by the abstruse terms ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’. On the basis that the 
reimbursement proposal aims to facilitate directors’ elections, the by-law was found 
to be ‘process related’, i.e. a proper subject for shareholder action.  
 The court then moved on to analyse whether the proposed by-law would 
impermissibly intrude on the board’s discretionary authority, i.e. such a by-law would 
cause the board of directors to violate their fiduciary duties. It found that the by-law 
was inconsistent with the law, and held that:  
‘the internal governance contract—which here takes the form of a by-law—is 
one that would also prevent the directors from exercising their full managerial 
power in circumstances where their fiduciary duties would otherwise require 
them to deny reimbursement to a dissident slate’.119  
It is hard to find this argument persuasive because such an understanding could deter 
all kinds of by-laws. Virtually all by-laws interfere with the board’s power to a certain 
extent and one may always come up with an interpretation that the board is forced to 
act in a certain way that violates its fiduciary duties.120 Earlier in the same judgment 
the court itself reasoned that: 
‘By-laws, by their very nature, set down rules and procedures that bind a 
corporation’s board and its shareholders. In that sense, most, if not all, by-laws 
could be said to limit the otherwise unlimited discretionary power of the 
board’.121  
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Even a by-law for the removal of a defensive mechanism could be interpreted within 
the scope of the decision. In 1997, Coffee made a similar comment: ‘on this basis, 
attempts to restrict defensive tactics arguably interfere with the board's choice of the 
optimal “time frame for achievement of corporate goals”’.122 It is difficult to determine 
what kind of by-laws would really force the board to act in a way that violated its 
fiduciary duties or would prevent directors from managing and directing the business 
and affairs of a company under Section 141(a). In short, the court held that while a 
reimbursement proposal is a proper subject for shareholder action under Section 109, 
it was invalid because it might require the board to act in a way which prevents 
directors from discharging their fiduciary duties.  
 The analysis in CA v. AFSCME shows that shareholders’ power to adopt by-
laws is controversial and more limited. While the court found the board-adopted by-
laws permissible under section 109(b), it did not consider shareholder-adopted by-
laws valid under the same section. The challenge is to explain the court’s divergent 
treatment of by-laws, i.e. why one set of by-laws is permissible, but another is not. 
There must be something that makes shareholder reimbursement by-laws less 
appropriate than exclusive forum selection or fee-shifting by-laws.  
 The reason behind the divergent treatment of by-laws appears to lie in the 
different proponents of by-laws. This distinction, however, does not arise from section 
109 but from the confusion between section 109(b) and 141(a), and the court’s strong 
commitment to near-absolute director primacy. The wording of sections 109(b) and 
141(a) causes considerable confusion. Gordon described this situation as a ‘recursive 
loop’:123 The shareholders’ power to alter and adopt a by-law is restricted by the law, 
including the authority of the board, while the board’s authority to manage the 
company under section 141(a) is limited to provisions in the DGCL including the 
shareholders’ by-laws.124 Moreover, depending on the interpretation of section 141(a), 
this may substantially limit the scope of by-laws. This has further implications for 
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shareholders’ proposals. As will be discussed in detail below, this conflict is often 
used by the management to exclude shareholders’ proposals from the company’s 
proxy materials. This constitutes a practical impediment to shareholder activism 
because shareholder resolutions regarding by-law changes are generally presented 
under Rule 14a-8. Shareholders could prefer an independent proxy solicitation for the 
by-law amendments, but as discussed in Chapter 4, the independent proxy campaigns 
are prohibitively expensive for mainstream institutional investors. Only large funds 
and activist funds could bear the cost of independent proxy campaigns. Therefore, the 
recursive loop constitutes a further limitation on shareholder by-laws and increases 
the cost of activism. 
 The Delaware General Assembly subsequently adopted several amendments 
after the controversy arising from the by-law litigation. Section 113 permits companies 
to adopt by-laws that reimburse the expenses of shareholders incurred in the course of 
proxy contests. These reactions are clearly a response to concerns about the 
accountability and responsiveness of the board and accordingly to the call for 
increased shareholder voice. Section 112 allows shareholders to adopt private ordering 
which grants shareholder access to proxy solicitation materials in order to nominate 
directorial candidates. In response to the fee-shifting by-laws and forum selection by-
laws, the Delaware legislature made amendments to sections 102(f) and 109(b), which 
now prevent a company from adopting a fee-shifting by-law or charter provision.  
Section 115 now permits a company to select Delaware courts as an exclusive forum, 
but prohibits exclusive forum provisions that prevents parties from bringing a lawsuit 
in Delaware. Yet it appears that the courts’ tendency to give weight to section 141(a) 
and to interpret section 109 more narrowly than section 141 has survived and will 
remain both an obstacle to shareholder activism and an aid to the board in excluding 
shareholder proposals.   
 An additional concern also arises from the fact that both the shareholders and 
directors hold the authority to adopt by-laws. It is not clear whether the board could 
repeal or amend shareholder-adopted by-laws under Section 141(a). There is a further 
ambiguity regarding whether shareholders can make the by-laws immune from 
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directors’ intervention.125 The Delaware Supreme Court stated in dictum that a by-law 
which is designed not to be amended by directors would be in conflict with the 
directors’ authority to adopt, amend and repeal by-laws; therefore, such by-laws would 
be void.126 The court upheld the removal of a critical by-law, despite shareholders’ 
evident opposition to the by-law’s repeal.127 The court’s reasoning was that 
shareholders could adopt the by-law again or remove directors in the next election. 
Similarly, in General Datacomm Inc., v. Wisconsin Investment Board, Strine observed 
that the interpretation that the board could repeal shareholder-adopted by-laws might 
be the correct one.128 In short, there is further legal uncertainty whether directors’ 
authority extends to shareholder-adopted by-laws and whether a shareholder-adopted 
by-law could prevent the board from repealing or amending it.  
 In conclusion, shareholders’ authority to adopt, amend and repeal by-laws is 
more limited than the board’s authority because of the judicial deference to the board. 
Delaware courts have given a broad scope to board-adopted by-laws. These by-laws 
could be self-interested and, more importantly, could restrict shareholder rights or the 
exercise of shareholder rights. The recursive loop between sections 109(b) and 141(a), 
and the immediate embracement of director primacy as a matter of case law have led 
the courts to narrowly interpret section 109(b) to prevent shareholders from adopting 
by-laws. The limitations on shareholder power does not arise from the law itself but 
from the courts’ decisions through their divergent treatments of board- and 
shareholder-adopted by-laws. 
  Proxy Rules and Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 
It is well known that many shareholders in large companies do not show up personally 
to general meetings. These shareholders usually exercise voting rights through the 
proxy access system. For public companies, the proxy process is regulated by federal 
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law.129 Federal regulations lay down criteria concerning whether shareholders are 
eligible to submit proposals and whether the contents of the proposals are permissible 
in Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act130 among other things. The Rule ‘in its 
fundamental aspects is not an invention of the SEC. It is an almost necessary 
consequence of the status of the individual shareholder under the laws of various states 
of incorporation …[The rule] is merely a recognition of rights granted by state law.’131 
The aim of proxy regulation is to ‘improve [proxy] communications and thereby to 
enable proxy voters to control the corporation as effectively as they might have by 
attending a shareholder meeting’.132 Put differently, the aim of proxy rules is to breathe 
life into state-based shareholder rights.  
 Shareholders have long been denied access to company’s proxy statements, 
even though shareholders who are present at the general meeting can nominate 
directors or submit proposals from the floor of the meeting under state law.133 While 
Berle described a shareholder meeting as a ‘kind of ancient, meaningless ritual like 
some of the ceremonies that go with the mace in the House of Lords’,134 shareholders 
are no longer as passive as was the case in the past and now show an interest in board 
and governance related proposals. Rule 14a-8 has become more important than ever.   
 Companies are required to have at least one shareholder meeting a year under 
section 211 of the DGCL at which directors are elected and other related issues are 
decided. The value of voting rights not only depends on the matters shareholders are 
allowed to vote on but also how smoothly they can add new items to the agenda of 
general meetings. The SEC has enacted Rule 14a-8 to ‘catalyse what many hoped 
would be functional “corporate democracy”’.135 It does not allow all shareholder 
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proposals to be included in the proxy materials of a company at the company’s 
expense. Instead it imposes procedural and substantive eligibility requirements.  
 Rule 14a- 8 provides important substantive grounds for the exclusion of 
proposals from the company’s proxy statements. Historically, the earliest version of 
the rule contained only one substantive ground for exclusion136 which was that a 
shareholder proposal must be ‘a proper subject for action by the security holders’.137 
The number of exclusion grounds increased to thirteen. These additional restrictions 
primarily sought to reduce the number of shareholder proposals and to limit 
shareholder access to Rule 14a-8.138 Despite the limitations, however, proposals 
became a key corporate governance tool due to increased shareholder activism. 
Shareholders usually prefer to submit proposals under Rule 14a-8.  
The procedural constraints are that the proponent must have shares worth at least 
$2000 or 1% of the company’s voting shares, whichever is the lesser, and must hold 
the shares for at least one year before submitting the proposal.139 The proposal must 
be received 120 days before the shareholder meeting. As regards the substantive 
constraints, the SEC allows companies to exclude proposals from the proxy materials 
of companies on different grounds. Moreover, the rule provides management with 
thirteen substantive grounds on which to exclude proposals from the company’s proxy 
materials. These grounds are: 1- improper under state law, 2- violation of law, 3- 
violation of proxy rules 4- personal grievance or special interest, 5- relevance, 6- 
absence of power/authority, 7- management functions, 8- relates to election, 9- 
conflicts with company’s proposal, 10- substantially implemented, 11- duplication, 
12- resubmissions, and 13- specific amount of dividends.140 If a company wishes to 
omit a shareholder proposal on one or more of these grounds, the company submits its 
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reasons for omitting the proposal to the SEC and shareholders.141 Almost every 
company seeking to omit a proposal demands a no-action letter142 from the SEC.143  
Companies often use more than one ground in justifying their exclusion. It is 
impossible to examine all of them here, but a number of grounds can be listed to stress 
the wide-ranging power that the management has to exclude proposals. As it appears, 
the rule provides very broad discretion to the board to exclude shareholder proposals 
from the proxy material of the company, and moreover prevent shareholders from 
expressing their voice. Historically, conflicts with state law, the ordinary business 
exclusion, relevance, and elections have been primarily used by companies as their 
primary reasons.144 Other than directors’ elections, these exclusion grounds are merit-
based exclusions, that are primarily used by the board and management. Among them, 
the most frequently used ground by companies is the ordinary business exclusion.145 
These exclusion grounds make shareholders design their proposals in a precatory 
rather than binding form.146 Otherwise, shareholders’ proposals could be excluded by 
the board on the grounds of improper subject under state law, i.e. an intrusion on the 
board’s authority under section 141(a). The other exclusion grounds basically 
eliminate vexatious, illegal, deceptive and frivolous proposals.    
 
The first important exclusion ground is that the proposal ‘conflicts with state or 
other law’.147 The aim of this basis for this exclusion is to respect the states’ law 
regarding the allocation of power between shareholders and directors, and other 
related issues.148 As seen above and in the courts’ profound understanding of director 
primacy theory, this exclusion ground leaves only a limited capacity for shareholder 
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proposals under Rule 14a-8. A proposal that mandates an action or directs the board 
would be improper under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). This also accounts for why most 
shareholders frame their proposals in a non-binding form rather than a binding 
fashion.149 If such a proposal passes, directors are not required to implement it. These 
non-binding shareholder proposals, therefore, are mainly regarded as a 
communication method between shareholders and the board rather than effective 
governance tools.150 As discussed above, a by-law regarding a specific business 
decision is probably invalid. However, it is not clear whether by-laws that impose 
constraints rather than require the board to take action are permissible or not under 
Delaware law.  
 
The second exclusion ground is the ordinary business exclusion.151 Most 
shareholder proposals are excluded on the grounds of ordinary business exclusion; 
therefore, it is the most litigated and debated exclusion ground. The SEC often 
struggles to draw the dividing line between ordinary business matters and others 
because of the design of the exclusion ground as an open-ended standard. This 
exclusion was originally promulgated to maintain the distinction between the board 
and shareholders under state law but extended to proposals that were designed in non-
binding form.152 This exclusion ground has been revised several times. 153 The major 
revision to the exclusion ground came in 1998 when a change was made to the 
interpretation of the rule. The SEC issued a sweeping no-action letter in the Cracker 
Barrel case discussed in Chapter 3. This no-action letter created a bright-line test for 
excluding all proposals relating to employment matters. With far-reaching 
implications for the public, the SEC returned to its earlier case-by-case examination 
and developed a two-prong test to decide whether a proposal can be excluded.154 The 
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first prong is related to the subject matter of the proposal. If the proposal is related to 
ordinary business matters, then it is in principle excludable, unless it raises significant 
social policy issues. Proposals relating to such matters but raising significant policy 
issues would transcend day-to-day business matters and would be appropriate for a 
shareholder vote. The second prong relates to where a proposal ‘seeks to ‘‘micro-
manage’’ the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon 
which shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed 
judgement’. In such circumstances, the proposal is excludable regardless of the 
significance of any social matters.155  Despite the fact that this exception is not applied 
to proposals involving the important issues of public policy that transcend the ordinary 
business of companies,156 the SEC has been ambiguous and inconsistent in the 
application of the exclusion in the absence of meaningful and objective standards. 
Proposals treated as subject to exclusion on the ground of ordinary business matters 
have become includable as having significant public policy implications and vice 
versa.157 
 
The exclusion grounds continue to create controversy. For instance, the SEC 
issued a no-action letter for a shareholder proposal that asked the board to revise the 
company’s policy regarding the use of antibiotic medicines in feeding animals, which 
is detrimental to public health according to shareholders.158 However, upon 
reconsideration of the no-action letter, the SEC concluded that it is ‘unable to concur 
in Tyson's view that it may exclude the proposals under rule 14a-8(i)(7)’.159 A recent 
example is Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.160  The case was related to a 
proposal that asked directors to develop and implement standards for the sale of high-
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capacity firearms. The board obtained the no-action letter under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). 
Shareholders challenged the no-action letter and the trial court held that the proposal 
did not fall within the scope of  ordinary business matters because the proposal raised 
significant policy issues which should be subject to a shareholder vote.161 However, 
on appeal the Court of Appeal reversed the decision and held that the proposal was 
excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because although the proposal was related to 
significant policy issues, these matters did not transcend the ordinary business matters 
of the company.162 The court adopted a more stringent approach than the SEC and 
required that a shareholder proposal must raise a significant policy issue and must 
transcend the company’s ordinary business.163 This new analytical understanding 
could be too restrictive for shareholders. The SEC’s traditional approach is broader 
than the new analytical understanding because the proposals raising a significant 
policy issue would transcend the ordinary business matters of companies.164  
Similarly, Judge Schwartz argued that the proposal ‘lacks the focus needed to trigger 
the “significant social policy” exception’.165 Three different perspectives, viz. the 
SEC’s/Judge Schwartz’s opinion, the district court’s opinion, and the court of appeal’s 
opinion emerged from the same dispute. This presents a noteworthy example of the 
inconsistent and ambiguous application of the rule. In short, the rule is in state of 
disarray. 
  
The third exclusion ground is ‘relevance’ which is designed to address proposals 
considered irrelevant to the company’s business.166 It is again a vague rule and does 
not provide clear guidance. The initial version of this exclusion sought to bar social 
proposals promoting ‘economic, political, racial, religious or social causes’.167 For 
instance, the shareholder proposal which was submitted to abolish segregation on 
Greyhound buses in 1952 was excluded and the SEC approved the exclusion on the 
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grounds of a lack of relevance, owing to the proposal’s ‘general political, social, and 
economic nature’.168 However, the SEC recognised that there might be some social 
issues relevant to a company’s business and amended the exclusion. Rule 14a-8(i)(5) 
lays down that a proposal relating to operations accounting for less than 5% of the 
company’s assets, earnings and sales, and that is not ‘otherwise significantly related 
to the company’s business’ may be omitted from the company’s proxy materials. The 
vagueness of this rule has led to unclear and inconsistent decisions by the SEC and 
allowed companies to exclude shareholder proposals even if they raise concerns 
regarding forced labour, human embryonic stem cell research or other similar 
issues.169 This exclusion ground is very similar to the ordinary business exclusion 
ground because where a shareholder submits an economically-orientated proposal 
falling short of 5% of the company’s assets, the outcome of the proposal would likely 
be immaterial for the company and would fall within the scope of the ordinary business 
exclusion. As regards the non-economic aspects of the exclusion ground, it is not clear 
how the SEC or judges decide whether a shareholder proposal has sufficient ethical or 
social significance to justify the inclusion of the proposal in the company’s proxy 
statements. In the end, the rule was aimed at excluding shareholder proposals 
promoting general economic, social, racial and political causes. So the exclusion could 
possibly be interpreted very broadly to the extent that it leaves very little scope for 
shareholder proposals relating to social concerns. The final restriction concerns the 
directors’ elections. Since it is examined in detail in the section on directors’ elections, 
it will not be covered here. 
 Such restrictions make it difficult for shareholders to present an alternative view 
to the board and other shareholders which might, if presented, contribute to the 
sustainability of the company. Shareholder activism could serve companies in 
addressing managerial inefficiencies and increasing the immediate performance of 
companies as well as in gaining social legitimacy. The importance of Rule 14a-8 was 
not recognised until after the 1990s, specifically, after the Enron failure.170 There was 
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a noticeable increase in the number of ordinary and contested proposals and in the 
support for these proposals.171 Nowadays, the majority of shareholders usually support 
governance related or firm-specific proposals.172 In line with increasing shareholder 
support, board responsiveness to shareholder proposals has also increased.173 The 
agenda of shareholder proposals has evolved from social and environmental issues to 
board and governance issues since the Enron collapse.174 These proposals mostly 
target underperforming companies or companies with poor corporate governance 
structures but there is no strong evidence of systemic agenda controlling.175 The 
increasing use of shareholder proposals leads to a decrease in the number of staggered 
boards, anti-takeover mechanisms and plurality voting, and the separation of chairman 
and CEO positions. These kinds of proposals are not to disrupt the board’s authority 
but to draw their attention to governance or other related matters. The exclusion 
grounds, therefore, lead to an unnecessary waste of resources and time. Since 
shareholder activism aims to produce changes to the way in which the company is run, 
the broad interpretation of rules undermines the value of shareholder activism.  
 Appointment of Directors 
In the US, the legitimacy of directorial power depends on the shareholders’ power to 
elect directors.176 The underlying logic is simple: if shareholders are dissatisfied with 
the board and management, they can theoretically replace the board and management 
in the next shareholders’ meeting. The board’s election is a mechanism to ensure that 
directors are well-equipped and skilled for the position and to monitor poorly 
performing management.177 The possibility of replacement incentivises the board of 
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directors to perform better and to reduce agency costs in listed companies.178 Even if 
an attempt to replace the board is unsuccessful, it may still create discernible positive 
outcomes such as incentivising the management to focus on shareholder value and to 
reveal the shortcomings in the governance of the company. Succinctly, the right to 
nominate and appoint directors, i.e. a competitive board election, is a means of 
bringing discipline to the board of directors179 and management. 
In the US, directors’ elections are regulated at the federal and state law levels. 
Under federal law, the board is granted the power to exclude shareholder proposals 
from the company’s proxy cards on a range and number of issues.180 However, the 
substance of the right to nominate is regulated under state law. Since many 
shareholders do not attend meetings in person in the case of public companies, proxy 
access is as important as the substance of the voting right. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the appointment and nomination rights at these two levels. 
 An historical examination of the nomination power of shareholders will show 
how weak shareholders were and how they started to gain power gradually over the 
last decade, in particular after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. A combination of state 
and federal laws restrict shareholders’ power to nominate or choose nominees.181 
Increased shareholder activism and the financial crisis generated significant 
momentum for relatively shareholder friendly director elections in the US. 
5.3.3.1 Shareholder Proxy Access in the context of Director Elections  
The former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt famously said in 2006 that ‘a director has a 
better chance of being struck by lightning than losing an election’.182 In 2011, only 26 
out of 16,822 candidates (0.15%) in the 3000 largest public companies were 
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nominated by shareholders.183 Directors are often faced with a low probability of 
replacement by shareholders. While some argued that shareholders had enough power 
under existing rules,184 the evidence from directors’ elections above, the statement of 
the chairman of the SEC, and the costs of running an independent proxy contest (which 
can be around $2.5 million)185 challenge this view.  
The proxy access of shareholders has also been restricted but it has always 
been the subject of reform by the SEC.186 Under Rule 14a-8, the board had discretion 
to exclude shareholder-nominated candidates from the corporate ballot for a long time. 
Only the names and information about management nominees are sent to shareholders 
through a company’s proxy statement and the board can exclude the shareholders’ 
nominees from the company’s proxy statements. As such, it becomes mostly a 
foregone conclusion that shareholders do not play any role, other than voting for the 
candidates nominated by management. Eisenberg stated that ‘to give any group 
exclusive access to the corporate proxy materials for the purpose of designating its 
directorial candidates would be virtually tantamount to giving that group the power to 
elect the board’.187 This significantly diminishes the impact of the threat, which is a 
considerably important tool in shareholder activism. It also constitutes a dilemma 
since the judgments of courts in the case of the business judgment rule have argued 
that if shareholders are unhappy with management, they should elect new directors. 
However, without having any chance to nominate directors, shareholders are mostly 
left with the incumbent board’s candidates. Therefore, the court’s reasoning does not 
function properly in practice.   
 Contested elections, furthermore, play a key role in the determination of the 
future business strategies of companies. The incumbent directors and top managers 
therefore make significant efforts to maintain their positions and, conversely, 
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opponents try to replace them in order to influence the management of the company. 
In the past, contested elections were used only by potential acquirers, but now they are 
often used by activist funds who do not seek to gain the full control of the board but 
only to influence the strategy of the company. However, the limitations on 
shareholders’ powers of nomination significantly reduce the disciplinary force of 
shareholder activism.  
5.3.3.1.1 Historical Background to Proxy Access 
The historical background to the reform of proxy access is important in order to 
understand the strength of corporate lobbying groups in the US and how they are able 
to shape corporate governance. In general, all discussion revolves around Rule 14a-
8(i)(8)188 which lays down the substantive basis for a company to exclude a proposal 
related to a board election and Rule 14a-11 which was invalidated by the court but 
would have provided the proxy access to shareholders.189 
As mentioned above, proxy access has always been a subject of interest to the 
SEC. From 1942 up until the Enron collapse, proxy access had been reconsidered 
several times and was found to be unnecessary due to opposition from the business 
community.190 In the wake of the Enron failure, proxy access was once again on the 
agenda of policy-makers. However, strong opposition from corporate lobbying 
groups, including corporations, executives, directors and law firms, meant that the 
SEC refused the proposal.191 Instead, the SEC focused on increasing the independence 
of directors rather than allowing companies to make structural changes.192 The fact 
that even a limited shareholder nomination right was not welcomed by corporate 
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lobbying groups indicates how powerful these groups were in shaping corporate 
governance rules in the US.  
Institutional investors, however, created self-help mechanisms through private 
ordering arrangements and proposed ‘by-laws that would open the issuer's proxy to 
director nominations by shareholders – that is, direct access via by-law amendment 
rather than by SEC rule.’193 AFSCME, a previously mentioned union pension fund, 
proposed a proxy access by-law to establish procedural conditions for shareholders to 
nominate directors. The board in that case excluded the proposal from the company’s 
proxy card and the court held that the company could not exclude a shareholder 
proposal which seeks to establish a procedure under which shareholders can include 
their nominees in the proxy materials of the company.194  
 Following the AFSCME case, the SEC made an attempt to clarify the position. 
Accordingly, it first prepared an access proposal that would allow shareholders to 
establish the procedural rules for the nomination of candidates to the board.195 
However, the SEC adopted a non-access proposal which prohibits any proposal related 
to the nomination of a director or a procedure for such nomination196 because of the 
belief that it would lead to ‘contested elections for directors without adequate 
disclosure.’197 According to Fisch, this ‘was the most restrictive approach to 
shareholder nomination that the SEC had ever taken.’198  
 The historical pattern of continual rejection of proxy access reforms not only 
indicates the difficulty of drafting proxy access provisions, but also how the business 
community in the US has blocked shareholder proxy access.199 In revising the proxy 
                                                 
193 Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy 
Access and Focus on E-Proxy’ (2008) 61(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 475, 485.  
194 American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Employees’ Pension Plan 
(AFSCME) v. American International Group 462 F.3d 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
195 SEC, Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 56160, Investment Company Act Release No. 27913, (2 
October 2007); See also Marilyn Cane and Stacey Silva, ‘Shareholder Democracy and the SEC’s Proxy 
Rules: in the Boardroom’ (2009) 15(1) Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 241, 250-1. 
196 SEC, Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 56160, IC-27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,487 (3 Aug  
2007); SEC Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors Release No. 34-56161; IC-
27914; SEC, Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Release No. 56914, IC-
28075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (11 Dec. 2007). 
197 See SEC Release No. 56914 (n 196). 
198 Fisch (n 181) 644. 
199 Fairfax (n 186) 1278. 
175 
 
access rules, the SEC failed to consider the role of contemporary shareholder activism 
in addressing accountability concerns and in enhancing shareholder value. A 
prohibition on access to proxy statements of companies and the adoption of private 
ordering for proxy access unreasonably favours management. The nomination right 
already exists in state law, but the SEC only prevents shareholders from exercising the 
right to nominate effectively. 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis revived the shareholder empowerment debate 
to increase the accountability of directors. In contrast to the response to the Enron 
collapse, law makers directly aimed to enhance the nomination powers of shareholders 
by passing the Dodd-Frank Act. In this regard, the SEC proposed an amendment 
seeking to change Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and to introduce a new version of Rule 14a-11.200 
This proposal was adopted.201 
5.3.3.1.2 Rule 14a-11 
Rule 14a-11 would basically have allowed shareholders to have proxy access to 
nominate up to 25% of the board if shareholders or a group of nominating shareholders 
held at least a 3% ownership interest for at least three years. The rule was designed on 
a mandatory basis, i.e. the terms of Rule 14a-11 would apply regardless of whether a 
company had proxy access or not. 
  A company was not required to include more than one candidate or candidates 
representing up to the 25% of the board, whichever was the greater. Direct access to 
the corporate ballot reduced a substantial part of the costs of running a proxy contest 
and made shareholder activism more meaningful. In light of the fact that the board had 
already been sending and receiving proxy cards from shareholders, such a change 
balanced the disadvantageous position of rivals. The rule was invalidated by the court 
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but still reflects the SEC’s efforts and willingness to increase shareholder 
engagement.202 
The minimum ownership threshold was the most controversial condition in the 
debate on the shareholders’ nomination power. The idea behind the minimum 
ownership threshold for nominating a director was to provide this right to a 
shareholder who had a substantial financial interest in the company and to prevent 
unnecessary contests in the company. Given the institutional share ownership of listed 
companies, this threshold may appear appropriate and could have prevented any 
potential abuse by shareholders who had no material ownership in the company.  
 Rule 14a-11 also requires continuous share ownership for at least 3 years. 
Bearing in mind that the average holding period of hedge funds is around 1.5 years, 
this condition significantly undermined the value of contemporary shareholder 
activism. It left only mainstream institutional shareholders as shareholders that could 
exercise the nominating power. While mainstream institutional shareholders have 
become active owners, they usually engage in more reticent forms of shareholder 
activism. Although the SEC’s preference was to provide a nominating power to long-
term investors to address the short-termism problem, as shown in Chapter 3, the short-
termism arguments are not fully supported. Furthermore, Chapter 4 showed that 
activist funds are better incentivised to identify the existing agency gaps and to fill 
them. Therefore, a 3-year period would likely have prevented the only remaining 
shareholders - namely activist hedge funds - from nominating directors. The impact of 
such a rule would be limited. 
5.3.3.1.3 Rule 14a-8(i)(8) 
The 2009 amendments of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) basically reversed the 2007 changes. This 
enables shareholders to submit shareholder proposals concerning nomination 
procedures as long as the proposals was not in conflict with the proposed Rule 14a-
11. While shareholders do not now have a default proxy access, they are able to 
establish nomination procedures through private ordering. In the past, Rule 14a-8 has 
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limited the ability of shareholders to adopt nomination procedures through private 
ordering. Shareholders were able to distribute the proposal independently rather than 
through the companies’ proxy material, but as discussed before, the independent proxy 
campaigns are usually prohibitively expensive. This was an important impediment to 
the exercise of shareholders’ nomination rights. 
 Proxy access proposals have become very topical in the US recently. In 2015, 
around 190 of the S&P 500 companies adopted proxy access proposals.203 Shareholder 
access to proxy material is increasingly becoming the market norm. The approval of 
these proposals also reflects the increased willingness of institutional investors to 
engage in corporate governance because similar proposals failed to receive the support 
of majority shareholders in 2007.204 The key terms of proxy access proposals show 
similarities with each other. The majority of the proxy access proposals have a 3% 
ownership threshold, a 3-year holding period, a 20% maximum restriction on the 
number of existing directors and an aggregation limit of 20 shareholders.205 Chapter 4 
discussed how shareholder nominees could address the structural deficits of the 
monitoring board. Therefore, any limitation on the number of shareholder nominees 
undermines the value of shareholder activism. The aggregation limit would also deter 
middle-scale institutional investors from nominating directors. Thus, it has a negative 
impact on the effectiveness of proxy access. As discussed in the context of Rule 14a-
11, a 3-year holding period reduces the ability of activist funds to nominate directors. 
Other funds may not be willing to nominate directors as much as the activist funds. 
These limitations therefore dilute the expected impact of proxy access. 
5.3.3.2 Delaware Law on Director Elections 
Shareholders’ nominating powers are given by state laws,206 while their proxy access 
is regulated through federal law. In theory, shareholders can nominate a director at the 
general meeting but because of the dispersed shareholdings of companies, without 
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proxy solicitation, such nominations are ineffective. State laws theoretically allow 
companies to customise the nomination procedure through charter and by-law 
provisions that limit or facilitate the nomination of directors by shareholders. The 
ability of companies to exclude proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and the recursive 
loop between sections 109(a) and 141(a) have long impeded the effective use of 
private ordering in the context of director elections.  
 Even in an uncontested election, shareholders should be able to demonstrate 
their dissatisfaction with the management and to unseat a director. However, the 
default regime in Delaware law207 is the plurality voting rule (PVR). The PVR means 
that the candidates who receive the most affirmative votes are elected without regard 
to votes against or not cast. In an uncontested election, the PVR prevents shareholders 
from voting down a nominee put forward by the company because a director could be 
elected by a plurality of the votes without considering withheld votes or the votes 
against. One affirmative vote could in theory be enough for a director to be given a 
seat on the board. In 2009, 93 directors at 50 companies failed to receive the majority 
of votes cast at their respective general meetings but nevertheless managed to secure 
seats because of the plurality system.208 Thus, under the PVR model, there is a  lack 
of a genuine threat of removal of directors.  
 The PVR has produced a great deal of criticism and activist investors waged 
‘withhold-the-vote’ and ‘just say no’ campaigns against the election of particular 
candidates.209 Moreover, activist investors forced companies to switch from plurality 
voting to majority voting in order to improve director elections in 2005.210 Under the 
majority voting rule (MVR), a director has to receive the majority of votes cast in the 
election in order to be elected. In other words, it prevents any director from being 
elected if he/she fails to receive the support of a majority of the shareholders. It 
rectifies the shortcomings of PVR and provides an inexpensive way of disciplining 
management. The threat of replacement is gaining credibility. In order to ensure a 
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smooth transition, section 141(b) of the DGCL articulates that ‘each director shall hold 
office until such director's successor is elected and qualified or until such director's 
earlier resignation or removal’. This is called a ‘holdover rule’. This rule minimises 
the negative implications of a failed election.  With the ‘holdover rule’, the director 
would remain in the board after an uncontested election despite being rejected by 
shareholders, but this would only be temporary measure. The rejected director would 
be under pressure to transfer the directorship to a new director. So while the holdover 
rule delays the effect of a shareholder vote, it does not necessarily render director 
elections meaningless. Institutional shareholders have showed great interest in 
majority voting. In 2005, only nine of the S&P 100 companies had adopted the MVR 
but by 2014 almost 90% of the S&P 500 companies had applied the MVR.211 This is 
a significant improvement, which was generated by the market as a result of action by 
institutional investors. Unlike the by-laws regarding general issues, the by-laws 
relating to MVR are protected under Delaware law and cannot be repealed by the 
board of directors.212 
In parallel to the SEC’s reform initiatives in 2009, Delaware amended its corporate 
code to allow shareholders to adopt a by-law which permits proxy access.213 Although 
many commentators had thought this kind of proposal would be valid under Delaware 
law, the former version of 14a-8 precluded the courts from resolving this issue by 
immediately allowing the board to exclude the shareholder proxy access proposals.214 
Section 112 now explicitly allows companies to establish a procedure for director 
elections that permits proxy access.  
A further issue with regards to nomination by shareholders is ‘golden leashes’. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this method is highly controversial. It was argued earlier that 
shareholder nominees provide the independence of the board which is necessary for 
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contemporary shareholder activism.215 However, since the candidates might have 
made a number of changes set by the activist fund in return for additional payments 
conditional on the specified changes, an elected director could feel beholden to her or 
his sponsor or obliged to follow her or his sponsor’s strategy for the target company. 
While this concern has substantial merit, it obscures the real underlying doctrinal 
framework, independent legal doctrine and the duty of loyalty. Concerns not only arise 
as a result of the substance of the changes, but also from the impact of the bonus 
payment on the independent judgment of directors.  
In extreme cases, this might affect the business discretion of directors, but such a 
situation has yet to be reached. The courts have adopted a similar approach. In Frank 
v. Elgamal, the Court held that: 
‘… merely because a director is nominated and elected by a large or controlling 
stockholder does not mean that he is necessarily beholden to his initial 
sponsor’.216 
In Kahn v. M & F Worldwide, the Court held that: 
‘past business relationships with the proponent of a transaction or the person 
they are investigating are not enough to rebut the presumption of 
independence’.217 
This shows that the mere fact that there has been a financial relationship may not be 
enough to challenge the independence of directors. Instead, material issues that affect 
a director’s ability to assess objectively the relevant changes in companies must be 
demonstrated. It therefore appears that golden leash clauses alone are not enough to 
challenge per se the independence of directors under Delaware law and constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover, in 2016, NASDAQ addressed these concerns by 
requiring listed companies to disclose the payments by third parties to the directors or 
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nominees.218 Enhanced disclosure provides a balanced protection against potential 
abuse by activist funds. 
 Overall, there have been significant developments in the procedure for the 
elections of directors. The courts have long relied on the ability of shareholders to 
choose a new director in justifying their strong degree of deference to the board’s 
authority. However, this has not been the case in practice and shareholders have long 
been precluded from nominating directors or even withholding votes. More 
importantly, they have been prevented from submitting shareholder proposals 
regarding any procedure for the directors’ elections, which goes against the grain of 
the enabling nature of US corporate law. US law has now at least lowered the 
impediments to private ordering. However, the default regime of US corporate 
governance still maintains obstacles to shareholder activism. 
 Removal of Directors 
State corporate law not only regulates the nomination and appointment of directors 
but also the removal of directors. Shareholders possess an inherent power to remove 
directors with or without cause by a simple majority of shares under section 141(k). 
The existence of this shareholder power to remove directors is particularly important 
in terms of corporate governance because in the absence of such express authorisation, 
directors could only be removed at the end of their term of appointment or if the 
director had been grossly negligent.219  
 This default position does not apply if the board is staggered.220 In other words, 
shareholders can remove directors only with cause. Even if the company does not have 
a staggered board, shareholders do not possess the right to call a general meeting; they 
have to wait until the next director election. This has led to the common assumption 
that it is more difficult for US shareholders to remove directors than UK 
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shareholders.221 In the UK, section 168 of the Companies Act  2006 stipulates that a 
director can be removed by a simple majority of shareholders at any time without any 
reason for doing so.222 
 The existence of staggered boards does constitute a significant impediment to 
shareholder activism as well as the proper functioning of the market for corporate 
control. In a staggered board, a director could be up for re-election every 2 or 3 
years.223 Therefore, in the US, the directors’ contract terms are not coterminous. 
Classified boards grant an additional layer of insulation to the board of directors in the 
case of hostile takeovers because the prospective acquirer of the company will have to 
wait at least 2 years to gain control which means that it has to launch at least two 
expensive proxy contests in consecutive years. The resulting cost and time delay 
therefore significantly deters potential acquirers and Bebchuk et al. consider it the 
most powerful anti-takeover mechanism.224 The staggered board reduces the power of 
shareholders to replace the board of directors and to influence the manner in which the 
company is managed.225 The reason why Delaware law enables the board to ‘opt-out’ 
from the removal without cause rule is to favour board stability and autonomy from 
shareholder participation. In this regard, Delaware law provides contractual freedom 
to the board as a means of balancing the power between shareholders and directors on 
a proactive and ex ante basis.  
 The classified board used to be a very common practice in the US. In 1999, 
303 S&P 500 companies had classified boards.226 Institutional shareholders have been 
actively opposing staggered boards, and since then, have been supporting shareholder 
resolutions to declassify boards.227 In the past, although shareholder proposals to 
abolish classified boards often received majority support, the boards did not 
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implement at least two-thirds of such proposals.228 However, as a result of the 
increased power of institutional investors, the boards have responded to shareholders’ 
claims positively, with the number of staggered boards in S&P 500 companies reduced 
to 126 at the beginning of 2012 (from 303 in 1993); and during 2012, 42 of these 126 
companies also removed the staggering of their boards.229  
 Shareholders in the US have gained the ability to elect an entire board in the 
market, which is a necessary component of shareholder voting power. This is an 
important development that makes director elections more meaningful, but it needs to 
be supported by a straightforward nomination process to make the threat of 
shareholder activism more credible. 
 Defensive Mechanisms in the Context of Takeovers 
The widespread use of defensive mechanisms is a highly controversial aspect of US 
corporate governance. While UK law adopted a market-based approach and regulated 
takeovers through a market-based institution, the US left the issue of hostile takeovers 
to the courts. The UK legal framework  prohibits employing anti-takeover tactics 
without the consent of shareholders and is strikingly shareholder orientated.230 
Regulation in the UK has been based on the ‘no frustration’ rule which prevents the 
board from adopting defensive mechanisms ‘during the course of an offer, or even 
before the date of the offer if the board of the offeree company has reason to believe 
that a bona fide offer might be imminent’.231 Given that the majority of US public 
companies are incorporated in Delaware,232 the courts of Delaware have played a key 
role in the development of takeover rules in the US. In the literature, it is argued that 
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US law provides shareholders with a far less limited role in the area of hostile 
takeovers compared to UK law.233 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, when the hostile tender offer wave was at its height, 
management developed defensive mechanisms to deter takeover bids.234 The most 
common defensive tactic was the ‘poison pill’, often called a ‘shareholder rights 
plan’.235 This is a mechanism designed to dilute the value of a hostile bidder’s stock. 
This mechanism achieves its goal by granting existing shareholders the option to 
purchase new shares at a discounted price in the company. Poison pill rights are 
generally expressed in the charter or by-laws and triggered when a person or group 
acquires a significant block of shares in the target company. Once the poison pills and 
the staggered boards are applied at the same time, the firm becomes almost ‘takeover-
proof’. 
 
 The court had basically two main options: to allocate power to shareholders or 
directors. The merits of each approach are hotly debated and inconclusive in the 
contractarian school of thought.236 The Delaware courts have developed arguably a 
middle ground solution. By recognising the inherent conflict of interest between the 
board and shareholders in the context of takeovers, it has not applied the traditional 
business judgment rule, but it does not overlook the potential benefits that an 
independent board could contribute to decision-making processes even if it is related 
to control-related transactions. The court developed an ‘enhanced scrutiny test’237 in 
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Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Inc.238 to review the defensive mechanisms employed 
by the board to ward off the hostile bid. 
The Unocal case established that where the board has employed defensive 
mechanisms, the burden of proof shifts to the board to demonstrate both a- ‘reasonable 
grounds for believing that there is a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness’ and 
b- the proportionality of the employed defensive measures. The Unocal test constitutes 
a threshold or additional procedural mechanism in determining whether the board is 
entitled to strong deference in terms of the business judgment rule.  
Not all kinds of threats, however, justify defensive mechanisms; the boards need 
to take into account a number of factors ranging from inadequacy of the offer to the 
impact on other stakeholders other than shareholders.239 However, the substantial 
element of the examination of threat depends on whether it entails ‘substantive 
coercion’, which was developed by Gilson and Kraakman.240 Under this classification, 
substantive coercion refers to ‘the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an 
under-priced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic 
value’.241  
In Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., the board of Time blocked a 
hostile offer from Paramount to carry out a long-planned merger with Warner 
Brothers. This was despite the fact that Paramount made an offer to buy all the shares 
in Time for $175 per share when the market price was around $126.242 The board 
found this offer inadequate and expressed ‘their concern that Time stockholders would 
not comprehend the long-term benefits of the Warner merger. Large quantities 
of Time shares were held by institutional investors.243 In Paramount, it is difficult to 
identify whether it was a commercial necessity or the honest belief of the board rather 
than managerial entrenchment because Time also entered into an agreement with other 
                                                 
238 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Inc, 493 A 2d 946, 953 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
239 Unocal (n 238) 956. 
240 Ronald Gilson and Reiner Kraakman, ‘Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is 
There Substance to Proportionality Review?’ (1989) 44 The Business Lawyer 247, 267; Air Products 
& Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A. 3d 48, 96 (Del 2011). 
241 Gilson and Kraakman (n 240) 267. 
242 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A. 2d 1140, 1148, n 17 (Del 1989). 
243 Paramount (n 242) 1148; the same view was reiterated in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 
651 A.2d 1361 (Del.1995). 
186 
 
banks not to finance third parties other than Warner who wanted to take over Time. 
However, the court upheld the anti-takeover mechanisms employed by the board and 
found a protectable interest in maintaining the pre-existing business plan and 
expanded the scope of the threat beyond the immediate economic interests of 
shareholders. While the substantive coercion doctrine aimed to prevent the board from 
blocking non-coercive bids, the courts could be over-permissive of defensive 
mechanisms, depending on the interpretation of the two prongs, and boards are indeed 
allowed to ‘just say no’ in the case of a hostile bid.244 The court provided an 
‘authoritative stamp of Delaware’ to management.245 
It is difficult to agree with the court’s reasoning and the open-ended interpretation 
of the Unocal test in the age of shareholder capitalism. Institutional shareholders now 
have the capacity to comprehend long-term business strategies and evaluate the 
company’s culture and can bring new information to the board in deciding on the 
future of the company. This line of argument has also been recognised and supported 
by the Delaware Court of Chancery in reviewing the poison pill in Airgas v. Air 
Products & Chemicals.246 The court held that:  
‘Airgas's stockholder base is sophisticated and well-informed, and that 
essentially all the information they would need to make an informed decision is 
available to them. In short, there seems to be no threat here—the stockholders 
know what they need to know (about both the offer and the Airgas board's 
opinion of the offer) to make an informed decision.’  
Despite this recognition, the court felt bound by well-established case law. Since broad 
and often vague justifications can satisfy the first prong of the Unocal test, the law is 
over-permissive to defensive mechanisms and, more importantly, it is impossible to 
distinguish the real motivation behind the defensive mechanism. Effectively, 
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Delaware allowed boards to ‘just say no’ in the case of a hostile bid by expanding the 
scope of the threat. 
In recent years, institutional shareholders and proxy advisory firms have prepared 
shareholder proposals and have launched public campaigns against poison pills.247 
Boards take proposals to remove poison pills seriously. Their number has decreased 
substantially in the last decade and are expected to continue to decline.248 As a result 
of these sustained attacks, poison pills are no longer as prevalent as they were in the 
past. Removing a poison pill does not ensure the board will not adopt a new poison 
pill unless a charter amendment is made that limits the board’s power to do so. This 
movement significantly reduces the power of poison pills in the context of shareholder 
activism in US corporate governance. 
To sum up, alongside anti-takeover statutes, the adoption of a broad interpretation 
of a threat has led to an over-permissive approach. This approach restricts the proper 
functioning of the market for corporate control as discussed in Chapter 2. However, 
the proposals to remove poison pills have gained market-wide success and in reality, 
poison pills are not as prevalent as they were in the past, along with classified boards 
and plurality voting. 
 Defensive Mechanisms in the Context of Shareholder Activism 
Defensive mechanisms could also be employed to prevent any shareholder from 
accumulating a sizeable as opposed to a controlling stake in a target company. It is yet 
to be seen if boards will systematically adopt defensive mechanisms to dilute the 
power of institutional shareholders and whether the courts will uphold these defensive 
mechanisms or will appreciate the value-enhancing role of shareholder activism.  
 In a very recent case, Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, the court upheld poison 
pill arrangements which were designed to ward off activist funds.249 The court applied 
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the Unocal test in reviewing the board’s action. In doing so, the court might have felt 
obliged to employ the enhanced scrutiny test because it held that courts must apply the 
Unocal test in reviewing the defensive mechanisms adopted by boards of directors.250 
In the case of Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, William Ruprecht was the chairman, 
president and CEO of Sotheby’s, the target company, and Third Point was a hedge 
fund holding which had accumulated 9.4% of the shares of Sotheby’s. After Third 
Point’s stake reached 9.6%, the board adopted a Rights Plan. Applying the first prong 
of the Unocal test, the court held that the board had reasonable grounds to regard Third 
Point as a legally recognisable threat. The court found a potential ‘conscious 
parallelism’ between activist funds. While it did not provide an exact definition of 
‘conscious parallelism’, it stated that there ‘was the objectively reasonable possibility 
that Third Point was working in connection with one or more other hedge funds in an 
attempt to create a control block within the Company’s stockholder base’.251 Similarly, 
in Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, LP v. Riggio, the court justified the poison pill 
which was designed to be triggered at 20% activist ownership to prevent ‘the 
formation of a de facto control … through conscious parallelism’.252 In this respect, 
where activist funds are acting together to carry out a common target, they could be 
deemed as a threat to corporate policy. As regards the second prong of Unocal, the 
court held that the plan was proportionate as there was a reasonable threat. A higher 
threshold would make it easier for hedge funds acting with ‘conscious parallelism’ to 
accumulate a sizeable stake ‘without paying a premium’.253 In short, the 
implementation of the rights plan met the requirements of the Unocal test. 
The application of the Unocal test may give excessive power to the board and 
management because the first prong requires there to be a danger to corporate policy. 
However, contemporary shareholder activism in fact aims to make changes to the 
business strategy of the company. Such understanding significantly undermines the 
value of shareholder activism. In examining the proportionality of the poison pills, the 
court emphasised the possibility that hedge funds can act with ‘conscious parallelism’. 
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Conscious parallelism is a vague term. It is based on the possibility that activist funds 
could act together, even if there is no formal agreement between them. More 
importantly, they regard ‘conscious parallelism’ as a reasonable threat to the board. 
The use of ‘conscious parallelism’ can become over-permissive due to the lack of a 
clear definition.  
The courts’ approach can encourage boards to implement broader and stronger 
poison pills which in turn reduce the incentives of shareholders to engage with 
companies as activists. This increases the cost of shareholder activism substantially. 
This excessively punitive approach may make it difficult for shareholders to form 
coalitions and thereby reduce the power of shareholders as well as increase agency 
costs and managerial inefficiency. The courts could find a way to accommodate 
shareholder activism as a monitoring tool and an accountability mechanism in general 
into their judgments.  
How would courts incorporate the evolving nature of shareholder activism into 
their decisions? Shareholder activism inherently aims to bring change to board 
policies. The courts could incorporate shareholder activism into their decision by 
softening the understanding of section 141(a).254 A softer interpretation of section 
141(a) would provide sufficient room for shareholder activism. In light of this, the 
court could soften its paternalistic approach by recognising the fact that institutional 
investors have the capacity to make independent decisions when they are faced with 
shareholder proposals and that shareholder activism in its many varied forms could 
enhance shareholder value and reduce agency costs and managerial inefficiency. 
Shareholders now have the capacity to evaluate takeover bids, shareholder proposals 
and the qualifications of board candidates. As Gilson, who was one of the developers 
of the substantive coercion doctrine, and Gordon now argue: ‘substantive coercion is 
no longer a useful doctrinal account of the circumstance faced by today’s shareholders 
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in the large public companies domiciled in Delaware’.255 Even Lipton, who created 
poison pills, accepts that institutional investors do not blindly approve 
recommendations made by activist funds and do consider well-designed business 
strategies for the sustainability of companies.256 In Airgas,  there were signs of change 
in the court’s perception of shareholders. The judgment of the Unocal case provides 
sufficient flexibility to the courts; it stated: ‘… our corporate law is not static. It must 
grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and 
needs’.257 Therefore, courts could recognise the fact that shareholders in the market 
are now capable of understanding and evaluating activist proposals properly, with the 
guidance of the board of directors.  
 Overall, the board is given almost near-absolute authority in US law. The board 
is allowed to employ defensive mechanisms in the case of shareholder activism. This 
could potentially reduce the incentives of shareholders to be active and inevitably 
creates an unnecessary tension between shareholder activism and corporate law. 
 Say on Pay 
Say on pay is employed by company law to monitor self-enrichment by directors and 
managers. It enables shareholders to have input into executive compensation in order 
to control excessive remuneration problems in corporate governance. Say on pay has 
recently become an important aspect of US corporate governance and around the 
world258 in monitoring agency costs arising from executive remuneration contracts 
discussed in Chapter 2.259  
Say on pay has been an aspect of US corporate governance since 2006, even 
though it was codified after the financial crisis. Institutional investors have been 
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submitting non-binding say on pay proposals under 14a-8 since 2006.260 Corporate 
management has resisted these kinds of proposals on the grounds that the board of 
directors is responsible for setting executive pay and this would prevent the board from 
acting effectively.261 In the UK, shareholders have had an annual advisory vote on the 
implementation report of the executive remuneration since 2002 (and a binding vote 
on the directors’ remuneration policy since 2013);262 a similar approach was not taken 
in the US until the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
The Dodd-Frank Act addresses executive remuneration in sections 951-957. 
Section 951 of Dodd-Frank requires an advisory vote on executive remuneration to 
take place at least once every 3 years. An advisory vote is also required for golden 
parachutes. This section regulates the form of the say on pay proposal and the position 
of executives that are subject to the vote. The US expanded shareholders’ rights in the 
process of executive pay settings despite the fact that the vote is not binding and 
enhanced the disclosure requirements with regards to executive remuneration. 
Shareholders vote only for the overall compensation package and do not have a voice 
in the specific provisions of remuneration packages.  
Bainbridge criticises this regulation because he argues that it is ‘expected to 
affect director decisions’ and interfere with the board’s authority.263 Some empirical 
evidence suggests that say on pay regulation has not led to a substantial reduction in 
overall executive pay.264 However, Correa and Lel found robust evidence that say on 
pay regulation decreases the growth rate of executive pay in comparison with other 
countries that do not have say on pay. 265 It could be argued that the say on pay 
regulation has led to a relative decline in executive pay.  
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It is puzzling why shareholders do not vote down excessive executive 
remuneration packages.266 There are two explanations for continuing support for 
executive pay practices. First, it has been observed that negative vote 
recommendations of proxy advisory firms lead to compensation plan changes and 
make companies more responsive to shareholder views.267 Before the vote takes place, 
the communication between shareholders and management may lead to revisions to 
the pay arrangements, i.e. it increases the negotiating power of shareholders in the 
shadow of the law. In short, it increases the pay for performance sensitivity of 
companies. In the shareholder meeting, shareholders vote for what they consented to 
before the meeting. Second, and more importantly, contrary to the widespread belief 
that a shareholder vote would keep overall executive remuneration at reasonable 
levels, shareholders have tended to focus on the company’s performance. When 
shareholders consider there is misalignment between the performance of the company 
and executive pay, then they are likely to refuse executive pay proposals.268  
 In conclusion, the say on pay regulation has had a significant impact on US 
corporate governance. It has increased the disciplinary power of shareholders. This 
recent change provides shareholders an additional right to participate in corporate 
governance and an additional line of communication between shareholders, the board, 
and management. In this regard, a shift from near-absolute board authority (board 
centrism) is happening in US corporate governance. 
 Concluding Remarks: A Paradigm Shift in the US? 
US corporate governance is in a state of flux and evolving. The market-driven process 
of shareholder proposals has led the law in action to evolve at a greater pace than law 
on the books. Legal reforms in the US and market driven changes could be 
underestimated by those ignorant of US law because many rights such as the right to 
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nominate directors or the right to submit proposals could be regarded as basic rights 
of shareholders.  
 Although US company law is known to be flexible and enabling in the internal 
structure of corporate governance, in practice the board controls the allocation of 
power between shareholders and directors. The board and top management are in 
charge of the corporate proxy system, which carries out formal communications with 
shareholders and disseminates important information to shareholders. The courts’ 
near-absolute interpretation of section 141(a) and federal law has long restricted 
shareholders’ ability to adopt new governance rules. This effectively closes decision-
making to shareholder participation. Many issues such as employee recruitment, anti-
discrimination or weakness of current business strategies cannot be raised by 
shareholders. More importantly, shareholder proposals relating to directorial elections 
including the nominations of directors and election procedures have been prohibited 
until recently. Shareholders have been left with a costly proxy contest option to 
challenge management. In sum, shareholders are practically precluded from bringing 
their own resolutions. 
 Shareholder participation has not been a primary theme in the US in contrast 
to the protection of shareholder interests. Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
shareholder empowerment has been preferred as a governance strategy which aims to 
increase shareholder participation in corporate decision-making in order to address 
accountability concerns. The Dodd-Frank Act provided shareholders with the legal 
power to submit shareholder proposals regarding director nomination procedures and 
say on pay. More importantly, corporate governance changes are being made through 
private ordering, i.e. shareholder proposals in the market. Institutional shareholders 
are aware of shareholder rights in other jurisdictions and are keen to transfer different 
types of shareholder activism between jurisdictions. 
 Institutional shareholders are now reshaping US corporate governance in the 
market. Companies are removing staggered boards and increasingly separating the 
roles of chairman and CEOs in the US. In the US, the board has the power to adopt 
defensive mechanisms in the case of take-overs or offensive shareholders. However, 
in practice defensive mechanisms are becoming rare. This therefore increases 
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shareholder power in the course of take-overs or shareholder activism. The majority 
of companies now provide the right to convene a meeting. MVR has become the 
market norm. Accordingly, the ability of shareholders to replace directors has 
increased significantly. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act has allowed shareholders to 
submit proposals through Rule 14a-8 in order to have proxy access to the ballot within 
individual firms and provides say on pay. 
 The reforms in the legal and regulatory rules, the emergence of activist funds 
and the new paradigm developed by mainstream investors is causing a seismic change 
in US corporate governance which is now clearly evolving towards a more shareholder 
friendly model. This appears to challenge the traditional assumptions about the US 
corporate governance model. Shareholders who were formerly relegated to the side-
lines are now slowly moving to the centre of US corporate governance. This study 
considers these developments a promising foundation for the evolution of relationship 
between the board and shareholders.  
 This is not the end of story because private ordering through by-laws can be 
used by the board and shareholders. The board can adopt restrictive by-laws or ones 
that impose stringent requirements for shareholder rights. For instance, for proxy 
access, it may require a 9% threshold or a 5-year holding period. Such private ordering 
serves the function of diluting the efficacy of shareholder activism by imposing 
stringent preconditions. Furthermore, it is shown that the boards could adopt defensive 
mechanisms in the case of shareholder activism. This could dilute the voting power of 
activist shareholders. Moreover, shareholders still do not have strong participatory 
rights in director elections. These shortcomings could prevent the meaningful 
functioning of shareholder activism. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that US corporate governance is in flux in terms of the 
power of shareholders and there is a shift towards shareholder empowerment. 
Traditionally, the courts have provided strong deference to the board of directors 
through the business judgment rule. The courts justified this strong deference by 
reference to the ability of shareholders to replace directors. However, this rationale 
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has been challenged by this chapter because shareholders do not possess meaningful 
power in director elections.  
  Close scrutiny of the legal and regulatory reforms to date shows that 
shareholders not only have limited participatory rights but also have been prevented 
from exercising their existing rights. There have been incremental changes brought by 
legal reforms and private ordering. Lawmakers and regulators consider increased 
shareholder activism as a means of ensuring greater director accountability, and favour 
the shareholder empowerment view and expanded shareholders’ participatory rights. 
The combination of the legal and regulatory reforms, and the increasing use of private 
orderings demonstrates the emergence of progress towards more shareholder friendly 
US corporate governance. Shareholders are moving to the centre of corporate 
governance. However, several aspects of the law limit the ability of shareholders to 
participate in the process of private ordering and directorial elections. First, the courts 
provided strong deference the board-adopted by-laws, even the ones that limit 
shareholder power. In justifying this situation, the courts argued that shareholders also 
have power to adopt, amend and repeal by-laws. However, this chapter has shown that 
while the board can restrict shareholder power, shareholders cannot limit the board’s 
adoption of a by-law with which they do not agree. This asymmetry undermines the 
justification of the strong deference to the board’s authority in the context of private 
orderings. In this respect, the board could reverse shareholder-adopted private 
orderings to undermine shareholder activism. Furthermore, shareholder proposals are 
primarily submitted under Rule 14a-8. However, Rule 14a-8 provides the board with 
strong power to exclude shareholder proposals from proxy materials of the company. 
These exclusion grounds could be overly used by the board and management to 
undermine the effectiveness of shareholder activism. Second, with regard to director 
elections, PVR and the no-access rule undermines the ability of shareholders to 
nominate directors and to show their dissatisfaction with the current directors. 
Shareholders have to make changes through private ordering, which is also subject to 
the aforementioned limitations. In these areas, legal reforms are much needed in order 
for US corporate governance to accommodate shareholder activism. 






Chapter 6. Accommodating Shareholder Activism 
in the US System of Corporate Governance 
6.1 Introduction  
The primary aim of this chapter is to discuss whether the director primacy model 
provided in the US should be softened to accommodate the evolving role of 
shareholders in US corporate governance. As discussed in Chapter 2, director primacy 
has been developed in an absolute form and does not welcome shareholders’ 
participation. Chapter 5 also discussed how the courts interpret the board authority 
under section 141(a) and how shareholder activism has long been impeded on the 
grounds of anti-empowerment rhetoric as discussed in Chapter 3. Shareholders, who 
were once excluded from the decision-making of companies, are now increasingly 
engaged in management and are willing to play an active role in corporate governance. 
However, tensions between the board and shareholders remain. As such, director 
primacy recognises a very limited role for the shareholders. These developments raise 
a fundamental question: whether a new understanding of director primacy is needed 
to reflect the evolving allocation of powers between shareholders and directors. If so, 
it is uncertain how the new role of shareholders should be accommodated in the US 
corporate governance model. Drawing on the analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, a 
normative claim can be made questioning how or indeed whether the director primacy 
model should survive in the US.  
 This first section of this thesis offers an alternative approach whereby the two 
important of attributes of corporate governance, namely authority and accountability, 
could be compatible with each other in the context of contemporary shareholder 
activism. Hence, corporate governance should be built around these core values. 
Moreover, it argues that it could enhance the independence and monitoring capacity 
of the board of directors. Pursuant to this line of reasoning, director primacy should 
not be allowed in such an extreme form and should provide more room for 
shareholders. The following section analyses the UK corporate governance model, a 
possible alternative that shows that a board’s authority can be compatible with strong 
shareholder rights. It will be shown that the new role of shareholders is consistent with 
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Delaware’s traditional approach to company law and director primacy. The final 
section analyses the shareholder-centric policy reforms which aim to increase the 
functioning of contemporary shareholder activism within the internal structure of 
public companies. It makes the case for creating a level playing field for private 
ordering and making director elections more meaningful. At the same time, it argues 
for the regulation of the role of shareholders in securities law given the potential 
problems related to shareholder activism discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
6.2 From a Positive Theory of Contemporary Shareholder Activism 
to a Normative Claim for the Future Direction of Company Law 
The aim of this section is to present a positive theory of shareholder voting which 
supports a normative claim that director primacy theory should not be allowed to 
survive in its extreme form described in Chapter 2. Director primacy and shareholder 
primacy theories often reach normative conclusions by producing empirical evidence 
and purporting to show that their model is more efficient than the other. However, as 
seen throughout this thesis, empirical evidence is inconclusive. As Jensen stated:  
‘… the reason we have an interest in developing positive theories of the world 
is so that we can understand how to make things work more efficiently. Without 
accurate positive theories of cause and effect relationships, normative 
propositions and decisions based on them will be wrong. Therefore, the two 
objectives are completely consistent’.1  
Director primacy and shareholder primacy theories cannot draw consistent and 
coherent normative conclusions and policy implications from the conflicting empirical 
evidence. This thesis relies on the cause and effects of contemporary shareholder 
activism in its many varied forms to draw normative conclusions and tries to avoid the 
polar characterisations of shareholder activism. 
 Director primacy theory explains why near-absolute decision-making power 
should be given to the board of directors: the centralised decision-making authority at 
the hands of the board of directors addresses decision-making costs such as 
information, talent, expertise, coordination, collective action problems, and conflicts 
                                                 
1 Michael Jensen, ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems’ 
(1993) 48 The Journal of Finance 831. 
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of interest that would be incurred if shareholders managed companies. Thus, 
centralised management provides the most efficient and effective decision-making 
mechanism for public companies. Such an understanding is not only embraced by the 
courts, as discussed in Chapter 5, but is also used to determine the desirability of any 
legal and regulatory reform. In this framework, the optimal balance of power does not 
provide much room for shareholder participation in management and the case for 
corporate reform is primarily ignored.  The role of shareholders has been relegated to 
the side-lines because of the near-absolute interpretation of board authority in this 
framework. Furthermore, according to director primacy theory, shareholder-friendly 
governance would be inefficient and value-decreasing because it reduces the board’s 
authority. In this schema, the protection of the board’s authority and limiting 
shareholder intervention are the ultimate goals to which all aspects of corporate 
governance should be directed. Furthermore, shareholders are assumed to willingly 
delegate decision-making authority to the board in exchange for specialised 
management in director primacy theory. However, the theory has difficulty explaining 
why institutional shareholders submit shareholder proposals to increase their influence 
in corporate governance. More importantly, it also struggles to account for why the 
proponents of director primacy theory actively oppose the removal of legal obstacles 
to shareholder-adopted forms of private ordering if such near-absolute director 
authority is rational and value-increasing for institutional shareholders. Another 
weakness of this theory is that the board and other corporate accountability 
mechanisms are said to be sufficient to hold management accountable. However, 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that corporate accountability mechanisms are subject to 
inherent limitations. The board’s ability to monitor management is more restricted 
than is assumed. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, independent directors lack the time 
or sufficient knowledge and expertise about the problems of companies. Moreover, 
independent directors might be too close to management and too reliant on the 
information supplied by it. The board could therefore be trapped by management, and 
more likely to refrain from close monitoring.   
 The proponents of shareholder primacy theory rely on managerial 
accountability problems. They conceive the reduction of agency cost problems as the 
primary target of corporate law and to which all aspects of corporate governance 
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reform should be directed. So they find director primacy theory inefficient and value 
decreasing. Both sides of the debate have sought to justify their position in empirical 
terms and have made normative conclusions based on their empirical evidence.2 As 
seen throughout this thesis, the empirical evidence is inconclusive and there is no 
consistent relationship between shareholder empowerment and the financial 
performance of companies. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, shareholder activism is 
neither good nor bad per se and can be excessive or have a suspect side in which 
shareholders extract private benefits from activism without bearing the economic 
consequences of their actions.       
 Each theory regarding the allocation of power is, therefore, subject to certain 
shortcomings. What is more in this debate, the concepts of authority and accountability 
are found to be incompatible with each other. Bainbridge argued that ‘they are 
ultimately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less of the 
other’3 and makes the normative claim that ‘one must not lightly interfere with the 
board's decision-making authority in the name of accountability’4 because it is argued 
that ‘directors cannot be held accountable without undermining their discretionary 
authority’.5 Hence, it is assumed that there is an inherent trade-off between authority 
and accountability.  
 Contemporary shareholder activism, however, indicates that accountability 
and authority could function together. Institutional shareholder activism consists of 
different types of shareholder activism, which differ in terms of motives, business 
models and targets. In other words, mainstream investors exercise reticent activism 
and are interested in the way that companies are governed. These developments aim 
to create constructive engagement with the board and management, and do not lend 
unconditional support to activist funds. Activist funds conceive activism as an 
investment strategy, and can adopt confrontational approaches towards the board and 
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management. Alternatively, some institutional shareholders can be driven by social 
and environmental motives. According to Hirschman’s framework, shareholder 
activism is ‘any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable 
state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management 
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a 
change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including 
those that are meant to mobilise public opinion’.6 Therefore, shareholder activism is a 
means of resolving potential conflicts between shareholders’ views and the existing 
management’s strategy through the board of directors. In this regard, the board is the 
ultimate decision-making authority in public companies. In this context, shareholder 
activism serves two important functions: challenging the board to change its corporate 
policy, and engagement with the board. Shareholder activism not only provides 
monitoring, but also enhances the decision-making capacity of the board of directors. 
In this aspect, there is no trade-off between shareholder activism and the board’s 
authority as such. This conceptualisation requires us not to think of the allocation of 
power as a zero-sum game in which authority is transferred from board to shareholders 
in the name of accountability. In this respect, rather than focussing on who should 
have the ultimate power in public companies, the goal must be to address 
accountability problems while maintaining sufficient room for the board to make 
decisions. This delicate task does not exclude any constituencies from corporate 
governance and acknowledges the role of shareholders and the economic importance 
of the board’s authority. 
 Likewise, Moore argues that accountability ‘is not equivalent, or even 
tantamount, to the qualitatively distinct notion of decision-maker disempowerment’.7 
Accountability refers to ‘the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct’8 and 
account means ‘a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or 
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untoward behaviour – whether that behaviour is his own or that of others’.9 In the 
context of corporate governance, accountability ‘provide[s] normatively cognisable 
reasons in attempted support of her decisions or conduct, irrespective of whether any 
such decision or course of conduct is past, present or proposed to be carried out by [a 
decision-making body] in the future’ to the beneficiaries of decisions. The aim of 
‘compelled reason-giving’ is not to extract information from the decision-making 
body but to obtain a normatively cognisable explanation about the benefits of a 
decision.10 In this context, compelled reason-giving enables shareholders to carry out 
oversight of the decision-making body at low cost. The value of accountability is, 
therefore, broader than instrumental criteria such as efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, 
and efficacy, which have been used to justify the desirability of any legal reform or 
changes. The upshot is that director accountability and authority are not mutually off-
setting. On the contrary, they enhance each other.   
 Locating Shareholder Activism in the Decision-Making Processes of 
Public Companies 
The ultimate authority to manage the company is given to the board of directors. 
Shareholder activism only brings an element of moderation to the corporate discussion 
table. In this regard, it functions between the board and management. It plays this role 
by serving two important functions in listed companies. First, it addresses the 
deficiencies of the current board structure that limit its ability to monitor management. 
It challenges the existing corporate strategy and reveals flaws in the governance 
structure or the business model. In doing so, it brings new information to the board by 
either formal or informal communication means or by appointing an industry expert. 
Second, contemporary shareholder activism also includes engagement with the board 
and management. This collaborative activism enables the board and management to 
turn mainstream investors against activist funds. In this respect, the heterogeneity of 
institutional investors plays an important role. Shareholder activism reveals the flaws 
in the current business model from different perspectives. The board’s accountability 
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to shareholders therefore, could still be obtained without rejecting the authority of the 
board, in contrast to director primacy.11  So contemporary shareholder activism serves 
a managerial error correction function rather than exercising decision-making 
authority. The ultimate decision-making power belongs to the board, and the power 
imbalance between the board and shareholders continuous. These two aspects will be 
examined in detail in the following section. 
6.2.1.1 Challenging the Board of Directors 
The board of directors and management are two distinct institutions of public 
companies.  As noted in Chapters 2 and 5, the oversight role of independent directors 
is difficult and problematic because they are mostly part-time and often do not have 
expertise in the relevant field, i.e. they are ‘thinly-informed’. This significantly 
reduces the board’s capacity to carry out the managerial and monitoring roles, and 
undermines the validity of the director primacy theory. Independent directors have 
little incentive to challenge management due to re-election concerns, the influence of 
management on the appointment process, and their reliance on the information 
supplied by management in forming major business strategies or scrutinising business 
plans proposed by the management. In this respect, activist funds can address an 
important short-coming of the modern board of directors. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
boards often fail to challenge and to critically evaluate corporate strategies. This 
situation plays an important role in corporate governance failures. 
 Challenging the board is important in the decision-making process because 
‘insurgency, contention and debate are fundamental to effective corporate 
governance’.12 The board has to provide a justification for its current corporate 
policies. A value creation board should be able to ‘balance the following contradictory 
forces: trust and critical challenge, monitoring and involvement, collaboration and 
independence’.13 Corporate failures such as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco showed that 
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challenging management could be the most effective way of dealing with managerial 
inefficiencies.14 This became evident once again in the 2015 Volkswagen emissions 
scandal where it is argued that the board was biased towards management and that 
there was a culture of silence.15  
 Activist funds often voice serious criticisms of the business strategy of the 
current management. These criticisms are shortcomings of the company according to 
the activist funds. In the course of activism, they provide new information and 
alternative business proposals to shareholders and the board, and sometimes nominate 
business experts as board candidates. More importantly, their nominated directors are 
not afraid of speaking out against management. Activist funds are information traders 
and have resources to collect, process and analyse a large volume of information, 
independently of management. They present this information either directly to the 
board or through directors nominated by them. For instance, in 2015, General Electric 
invited Trian, a hedge fund, to purchase shares to help the board in executing and 
developing new business strategies.16 This would have been impossible just a few 
years ago in the US and is a sign of the normalisation of shareholder activism in that 
jurisdiction. 
  
Once the board encounters information-rich shareholder proposals arguing that 
the incumbent management is underperforming due to serious strategic mistakes, the 
board has two options: either to defend the existing model and to ask for support from 
other investors, or to modify the existing strategy. If the information brought by 
activist investors to the board improves the performance of the company, it is more 
valuable than the information provided by the management to the board or vice-versa. 
In this regard, a novel role for the board emerges: ‘it functions as an arbitrator between 
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different stakeholders who wish to take the firm in different directions’.17 A serious 
alternative business plan by an activist fund will raise significant questions in the 
boardroom and between mainstream investors. There is nothing wrong with a choice 
between the current and alternative business plans presented to the board, and if the 
board does not accept the alternative proposal, it can present its case to the 
shareholders. In this case, the counter-move comes from the board and management 
in order to defend the current business strategy and to maintain their positions. This is 
where the current model of the board reaches its limitations. Independent directors 
with limited information about the industry may not provide an answer to the activist 
funds and cannot be a credible arbitrator in the eyes of mainstream investors. However, 
the board is still in an advantageous position because it knows the fundamental value 
of the company better than anyone. The possibility of offensive activism further 
requires the board to have an ongoing engagement with shareholders to maintain the 
current business strategy and even their position and slow down the activist funds. The 
board must provide justifications for their judgment and offer solid grounds to 
mainstream investors and other activist funds to reject the alternative business plan. 
6.2.1.2 Engagement between the Board and Shareholders: A New Paradigm in 
the US 
The screening function of mainstream investors actually depends on the nature of the 
engagement with the board. The engagement between the board and shareholders is 
the collaborative aspect of shareholder activism. This aspect of shareholder activism 
plays a decisive role in the success of activist funds and in the future directions of the 
company. As discussed in Chapter 3, mainstream institutional shareholders show 
interest in the development of major business strategies and  place importance in ESG 
and CSR issues, i.e. to exercise responsible shareholder activism, to hold direct 
engagement with directors and to support business plans to achieve long-term value 
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creation.18 It is, however, a new paradigm for US corporate governance.19 American 
style activism was mostly proxy activism.20 Since shareholders had limited means of 
influencing the board, the boards did not feel any compulsion to address shareholders’ 
voice outside of shareholder meetings. So, the shareholder vote, in particular non-
binding shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, was mainly regarded as a 
communication method with the company.21 Now, even Lipton, who is well-known 
for assisting companies against shareholder participation and is against shareholder 
empowerment,22 now acknowledges that ‘some shareholder activism should be 
encouraged’.23 
 This kind of engagement is essential in the era of investor capitalism, given the 
fact that even large companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Sony, eBay and PepsiCo 
have been targeted by activist funds.24 Boards need to provide normative explanations 
for their decisions, i.e. justify their business plan against any alternative strategies in 
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Economy’ (HLSFCGFR 26 February 2013) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-
apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ accessed 05 November 2016; 
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order to obtain support from mainstream shareholders. Continuing engagement, as a 
matter of fact, enhances board authority by securing the acquiescence of shareholders 
with the board’s business strategy and substantially decreases the possibility of 
unilateral agreement on the removal of the board of directors.  
 Continuing engagement provides a low-cost proxy for detailed oversight by 
shareholders of the board’s decisions and actions, and also reduces the tension between 
shareholders and management. This interaction enables the board to understand 
shareholders’ concerns about the management of the company and the general 
structure of governance, rather than announcing their concerns through stock markets 
when they exit. They can therefore respond to these concerns, either incorporating 
them into policies or rejecting them with sound reasoning.25 This enables the board to 
shape corporate policies that better reflect shareholder interests and preferences, and 
to be prepared for future issues and potential problems. These concerns are not 
necessarily related to financial issues or the short-term interests of shareholders. Some 
of them incorporate ESG issues into their business models, so that they can carry out 
‘representative bargaining for other stakeholders’26 along with their own interests and 
seek change in social policy at portfolio companies. Shareholder engagement, 
therefore, enriches the board from different perspectives and forces it to be more 
critical about management.   
 Engagement creates collaboration between the board, mainstream investors 
and even activist funds. It enables the board to transmit its explanations to shareholders 
to be more patient and remove any potential misunderstandings. This allows 
shareholders to make more informed decisions in future votes. It may help to establish 
harmony between the shareholder base and the purpose of the firm.  
 In the case of confrontational forms of activism, this ongoing engagement with 
shareholders will insulate the board from pressure from activist shareholders. For 
engagement to be meaningful for the board, shareholders should be able to evaluate 
the explanations of the board objectively. Mainstream institutional investors are 
                                                 
25 Lisa Fairfax, ‘Mandating Board - Shareholder Engagement’ (2013) 2013(3) University of Illinois 
Law Review 822 at 833. 
26 Chiu (n 13 ) 131. 
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responsive to proposals by management or activist shareholders; they are passive 
investors, not passive owners. The question then becomes whether institutional 
investors other than activist funds can screen the initiatives of activist funds and 
support the board when needed. A hedge fund manager has said that ‘the big 
institutional players listen to both sides and are willing to back the activist fund if they 
believe in them… You can win with persuasion and ideas’.27 The CEO of Vanguard, 
a large mutual fund, explained this relationship as: 
‘The nature of activist investing has changed significantly since the 1980s. 
Today, we’re seeing a greater trend toward constructive activists rather than 
destructive activists. Activists are not inherently good or bad … They often raise 
legitimate questions. And when they raise legitimate questions and tie their 
business cases to long-term shareholder value—that gets our attention. There 
have been a number of cases where a board wasn’t asking the right questions 
and eventually lost touch with how the company was being run, and how it was 
being perceived by investors’.28  
When institutional investors are not convinced that the proposals of activist funds 
enhance shareholder value, they will be less likely to support them. For example, 
Biglari Holdings Inc., a hedge fund owning almost 20% of Cracker Barrel Old Country 
Store, proposed that Cracker Barrel should take on a significant amount of debt in 
order to announce a $20 per share dividend.29 Other shareholders did not favour short-
term returns over long-term interests in the company, and Biglari was defeated. 
Indeed, this is crucially important because shareholder activism might have a darker 
side. Some activist funds through wolf-packs, golden leashes and empty voting could 
undermine the screening capacity because in some cases activist funds can act on their 
own without the need for a coalition with other shareholders.  
                                                 
27 Alexandra Stevenson, ‘No Barbarians at the Gate; Instead, a Force for Change’ The New York Times 
(6 January 2014) < http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/no-barbarians-at-the-gate-instead-a-force-
for-change/> quoting Gregory Taxin, president of the Clinton Group and a co-founder of Glass Lewis 
& Company, the independent research and proxy advisory firm.  
28 William McNabb, ‘Getting to know you: Sharing practical governance viewpoints’ (Speech at 
University of Delaware John Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance, 30 October 2014) < 
http://lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/WCCG/PDFs/events/Transcript%20_UDel%20Corp%20Gove
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 Concluding Remarks 
Managerial accountability does not come at the expense of the board’s authority or 
vice versa. These two concepts sustain each other. It is possible to address 
accountability concerns while preserving sufficient discretionary room for directors. 
Director primacy therefore should not survive in its extreme form which does not 
accept even light interference. A softer version of director primacy, which is open to 
shareholder voice, should prevail because it can address both the decision-making 
costs of large companies and the accountability problems faced by those companies. 
This version of director primacy aims to address managerial accountability more 
effectively and to enhance decision-making processes of public companies while 
preserving the board’s discretionary powers to make necessary decisions. Legal 
reforms should therefore not aim to shut down shareholder activism, as the critical 
views it brings from different perspectives about the financial and non-financial 
performance of the company are beneficial. 
 The board’s role could become one similar to that of an arbitrator between an 
activist fund and the incumbent management. This would require the board to be 
objective and to be more critical about management proposals. In other words, the 
board would still be the supreme decision-making authority in corporate governance, 
but it would have to account for its decisions and actions to maintain the current 
business strategy and its position, and to prevent further escalation of shareholder 
activism. This requires continuing engagement between mainstream investors and 
shareholders. 
 Contemporary shareholder activism makes an attenuated form of director 
primacy possible. It plays a crucial role in reducing the influence of management over 
the board. It collects new information and provides it to the boardroom either through 
communication means or the appointment of new directors. Shareholder activism not 
only serves a monitoring role but also enhances decision-making authority. In doing 
so, it ensures the independence of the board from management. The board finally 
becomes truly independent of management and more critical of management as a 
result of shareholder activism. In this respect, it could function more effectively in its 
role as envisaged by director primacy theory.  
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6.3 Board Authority is Compatible with Strong Shareholder Rights 
The UK’s corporate governance model is one of the most shareholder friendly legal 
frameworks in the world.30 Shareholder participation has been comparatively 
uncontroversial in the UK31 while the value of the board is recognised and protected 
by the courts and shareholders. A scholar who favours director primacy as described 
in Chapters 2 and 5 might imagine that the board of directors plays a limited role or 
that the board is vulnerable to shareholder pressures.32 However, this does not reflect 
the reality of UK corporate governance which recognises the role of three main actors: 
shareholders, directors and managers. Rather than discussing the ultimate control of 
shareholders, it recognises the private negotiations and the market realities that 
constitute the foundations of corporate governance. As will be seen, the board is 
overwhelmingly accorded ultimate decision-making powers by shareholders. This 
shows the market and economic factors have influence over shareholders. UK 
corporate governance reflects a combination of positive law, market realities and a set 
of private orderings that recognise economic necessity and the value of centralised 
management. 
 Board Authority in the UK 
Authority is not statutorily allocated in the UK. UK company law considers the 
division of power between the board of directors and shareholders a contractual matter 
which should be laid down in the articles of association. In the absence of specific 
regulations in the articles of association, the Model Articles (default articles of 
association) apply unless excluded by the shareholders.33 Most companies apply the 
Model Articles.34 With this in mind, the Model Articles and case law will be used to 
examine the board’s authority for decision-making in the UK. Article 3 of the Model 
                                                 
30 See Chapter 5; Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012) 56; Luca 
Enriques, Henry Hansmann, and Reiner Kraakman ‘The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of 
Shareholders as a Class’ in Kraakman et al. (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (OUP 2009)  29.  
31 Marc Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart, 2013) 187. 
32 Alan Dignam, ‘The Future of Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis’ (2013) 
639 Seattle Law Review 639. 
33 Most companies apply the model articles of association. See Dignam (n 38) 660. 




Articles confers a broad range of powers on the board. The board of directors is the 
primary and default organ for the management of the company. The efficiency 
arguments relating to centralised decision-making authority are therefore also fully 
acknowledged by UK shareholders. The board of directors is the ultimate decision-
making body in the UK.35 The decision-making primacy of the board is a result of 
private ordering. Shareholders do not attempt to consolidate power in their hands and 
recognise the economic costs of decision-making in public companies. 
 Since the board’s authority is a result of private orderings, it is important to 
understand how it is protected by the courts and the extent to which the board can 
exercise its power. In principle, UK law does not have a rule similar to the US business 
judgment rule. However, similar judicial reluctance to second-guess business 
judgements and particular managerial decisions serves a similar normative effect in 
UK corporate governance. In public companies, bona fide decisions of the board of 
directors concerning a broad range of subjects including charitable, political and 
educational spending have been traditionally protected by the courts as long as 
decisions are related overall to the advancement of the company’s business.36 Striking 
a balance between the board’s authority and accountability to shareholders has not 
been a straightforward task for the courts. The core question has been whether the 
board of directors is able to take decisions against the wishes of shareholders. 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the UK courts stopped equating 
shareholders with the company and recognised directors as the company’ agents in 
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v. Cunninghame.37 The court 
decided that the power given to the board could be exercised by them and that 
shareholders have no power to interfere with their discretion. In another decision, the 
court denied that directors are agents of and bound to serve shareholders and accepted 
that the company can be the only principal of the directors.38 The modern doctrine on 
                                                 
35 Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edition, 
Sweet&Maxwell 2016) 355. 
36 Moore (n 31)  150. 
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the legal effect of the articles of association on the division of power between 
shareholders and directors is found in Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v. Shaw39 and was 
reiterated in Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd: 
‘Just as it is established that directors, within their management powers, may 
take decisions against the wishes of the majority of shareholders, and indeed that 
the majority of shareholders cannot control them in the exercise of these powers 
while they remain in office.’40 
It seems clear that where the default regime is applied, common law protects and 
respects the authority of the board of directors. It is difficult to deduce that the board 
is vulnerable to activist shareholders as a result of the allocation of power between 
shareholders and directors. However, it is still possible that the authority of the board 
could be constrained by a special resolution directing the directors what to do,41 but in 
practice, it will be very difficult given the dispersed share ownership of UK public 
companies because special resolutions require a 75 % of the votes cast by the 
shareholders.42  
The manner in which directors are allowed to exercise their powers can also 
constitute a limitation upon their discretion. The authority of the board of directors is 
subject to the general duties of directors to ensure that the delegated power is not 
misused. The general formulation of directors’ duties does not confer any obligation 
to focus merely on shareholders’ interests. Rather, section 170 clearly sets out that the 
duties are owed to the company. Section 172 mandates a director to act ‘in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard’ to stakeholders’ 
concerns. If the shareholders’ interests are equated with the interests of the company, 
the result may be an inconsistent situation in which, on the one hand, the company is 
a separate legal entity from its shareholders and, on the other hand, its substance is the 
interests of shareholders. Dignam argues that if directors are indirectly obliged to 
                                                 
39 Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 K.B. 113, CA. 
40 Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum [1974] A.C. 821, 837; see also Quin & Axtens v Salmon 
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pursue the interests of shareholders, it is questionable to what extent they can take 
action against the shareholders’ demands and that they would violate their duties if 
they acted against the interests of shareholders.43 In this case, he further legitimately 
asks, ‘what exactly are the directors for if no real delegation of power takes place?’44 
The scope of authority, therefore, is also based on an interpretation of the 
interests of the company. The difficulty is that the company is an artificial legal entity 
and its interests are often identified by reference to its shareholders. In some cases, the 
judiciary have adopted a narrow approach in which they have recognised the 
shareholders as the substance of the company. In other cases, they have applied a 
broader approach where the board has delegated power and uses its power for proper 
purposes.  
The courts are also aware of the danger that strict adherence to a narrow 
approach could undermine the authority of the board. The courts solve this problem 
by adopting a broader approach when the board exercises power for the proper 
purposes.  
First, the courts have made a distinction between ‘current’ shareholders and 
‘future’ shareholders.45 The courts acknowledge that the interests of the company 
cannot be determined without including current and future shareholders within the 
concept of the company as a whole.46 The emphasis on the future interests of 
shareholders within the interests of the company highlights the point that shareholders’ 
interests are also related to the company’s long-term performance, because the 
interests of future shareholders depend on investment in R&D projects, the reputation 
of the company on ESG issues, and training programmes for employees. The interests 
of shareholders therefore involves both the immediate and long-term performance of 
companies. Indeed, this distinction is required because, as seen in Chapter 4, the 
shareholder base of a listed company consists of different types of shareholders and 
                                                 
43 Dignam (n 32) 663.  
44 Dignam (n 32) 663. 
45 Gaiman and Others v National Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch. 317, 329. 
46 See Gaiman and others (n 45). 
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there is no one single or typical interest of the shareholders. It also implies that there 
are a variety of interpretations of the interests of shareholders. 
The courts have interpreted the concept of the interests of the company broadly 
to embrace some stakeholder concerns and this, in turn, expands the board’s authority. 
The early and often-quoted example is the Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co. case in 
which, while acknowledging the significance of shareholders’ interests, there were 
early signs of stakeholder concerns that could be incorporated into the decision-
making of directors. Lord Justice Bowen stated that:  
‘The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be 
no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company … 
liberal dealing with servants eases the friction between masters and servants, and 
is, in the end, a benefit to the company.’47  
This broad understanding of the interests of the company is even more evident in 
Evans v Brunner Mond & Co.48 The court held that a company can make donations to 
universities for educational purposes even if there is no expectation of an immediate 
and direct return to the company. The Fulham Football Club v. Cabra Estates case 
supports this understanding: ‘the duties owed by the directors are to the company and 
the company is more than just the sum total of its members’. 49  
This shows that the courts tend to broaden the scope of the concept of the 
‘company as a whole’ and indirectly the authority of the board. This inclusive 
understanding is now found in Section 172. This establishes the concept of 
Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) by imposing a duty on directors to ‘promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so 
have regard’ to the concerns of stakeholders in discharging the duty. Some have 
considered that, with ESV ‘UK corporations are moving towards a more stakeholder 
model of governance’.50 Others argued that ESV is an emerging third way between 
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the shareholder primacy model and the stakeholder model.51 However, many consider 
that ESV is little different from common law, which has long required directors to act 
in the best interest of companies for the benefit of members, including current and 
future shareholders, and allowed directors to consider interests of other stakeholders 
as long as it was done for the benefit of the company.52 It is also argued that ESV does 
not bring any material change in the objectives of UK companies because directors 
may have regard the interests of stakeholders when their action most likely promotes 
the success of the company for the benefits of members as a whole.53 This thesis will 
not go into the details of the discussion over whether ESV represents a significant 
change in UK company law or not, but it is clear that directors have discretionary 
power to consider the long-term consequences of their actions, which may be at odds 
with the wishes of current shareholders and short-term interests of some shareholders.   
This common law interpretation by the courts is significant for the authority of 
directors because it expands the scope of the board’s power by allowing the board to 
justify their actions with reference to the success of the company even if it is against 
the wishes of current shareholders. The courts acknowledge the fact that directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the company and that the interests of the company could be different 
from those of shareholders and should not be sacrificed for a group of shareholders.54 
From a legal point of view, directors are not required to maximise the short-term 
profits of the company at the expense of its long-term success. In short, once the 
authority is used for proper purposes, the board has a licence to take difficult decisions 
within the scope of its delegated power.  
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When the board uses its delegated powers for what appears to be improper 
purposes, then their actions are subject to judicial scrutiny. The directors are not 
allowed to exercise their authority as they wish.55 In the Howard Smith v. Ampol 
decision discussed above, after emphasising the importance of the independent 
discretion of the board, the court held that the issue of shares to thwart a takeover bid 
was not a proper use of the delegated power because the power had been provided to 
raise capital. This decision shows that when the power is delegated for a specific 
purpose, it must be used for this purpose, rather than with the aim of protecting the 
board or management.56 The authority of the board in the context of takeovers of public 
companies was further restricted by the establishment of the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers in 1968, as discussed below. 
 At first glance, it may be reasonable to conclude that the board has no 
substantial power and cannot make decisions against the wishes of shareholders. In 
practice, the board is granted a broad range of powers. The CA 2006 and case law do 
not lend any support to the idea that shareholders are entitled to force the board to 
focus only on their interests. The board’s discretion is further expanded and protected 
by the courts and statutory duties that incorporate the current and future shareholders’ 
interests and various stakeholders’ interests into the interests of the company. 
Therefore, it is fair to conclude that, even one of the most shareholder friendly 
jurisdictions does not unequivocally embrace a pure form of shareholder primacy. 
 The Role of Strong Shareholder Participatory Rights  
The board’s authority is well-protected and respected by UK company law. At the 
same time, shareholders possess strong governance and control rights. As will be seen, 
UK company law is relatively generous compared to US company law at providing 
formal participatory rights within the scope of corporate decision-making. These 
rights might appear to be inconsistent with centralised decision-making, but their role 
                                                 
55 Hogg v Crampborn [1967] Ch. 254. 
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is limited to accountability. The board’s authority is consistent with strong 
participatory rights. 
  
 In the UK, shareholders are entitled to proactively add items to the agenda of 
the general meeting. Sections 338 and 338A of CA 2006 allow shareholders to add an 
item and a new matter to the agenda of the AGM. Under these sections, shareholders 
owning at least 5% of the voting rights who are entitled to vote, or 100 members with 
at least a paid-up average sum of more than £100 can ask the company to add their 
resolution or new matters to be reviewed at the meeting. Any shareholder resolution 
or the request to add an item must be included in the proxy card which is usually 
distributed to all shareholders in advance of the general meeting.57 Shareholder 
proposals are in principle legally binding on the board of directors; thus, they are more 
coercive than their equivalents submitted under Rule 14a-8 in the US. However, rights 
to add items to the agenda of the annual general meeting in the UK have limitations 
as well. Under section 338, the board has the right not to circulate the resolution if it 
is frivolous or vexatious or would be ineffective because of some inconsistency with 
the law or the company’s constitution. 
  
 This strong right to add items to the agenda has been rarely used by 
shareholders.58 Buchanan et al. reached a similar conclusion that proposals initiated by 
management are significantly greater in number than shareholders’ resolutions in the 
UK.59 For example, in 2007, shareholder proposals constituted only 0.2% (a total 5 
shareholder proposals)  of the total submitted proposals (2,776) at FTSE 250 
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companies60 and this low level of proposals submitted by shareholders continues.61 
Despite the shareholder friendly legal framework in the UK, shareholder activism 
through proposals has not been a prominent aspect of UK general meetings compared 
to US general meetings.62 Management proposals are rarely rejected in the UK. In 
2015, within the FTSE 250, only three management-proposed resolutions were 
rejected by shareholders.63 Glass Lewis’ Proxy Report of 2015 is in line with these 
results.64 
 The right to remove directors is one of the most coercive powers possessed by 
shareholders. This marks a crucial distinction between UK company law and its US 
counterpart. It can be argued that the right to remove a director by an ordinary 
resolution significantly restrains the discretionary power of the board and provides a 
strong degree of bargaining power for shareholders.65 Admittedly, as a practical 
matter, there is however one formal and one behavioural limitation that restrict the 
ability of shareholders to remove directors, and it will be shown that shareholders can 
remove directors in the case of serious misconduct rather than for arbitrary reasons. 
First, under section 168(5), a director cannot be deprived of any claim for 
compensation in the event of termination. The resolution removing a director may 
oblige the company to pay a substantial amount of compensation if section 168 is 
triggered without any reasons – other than for serious misconduct. This can be 
prohibitive for shareholders unless there are solid reasons to remove directors. The 
second limitation comes from coordination problems and the market culture of the 
UK. As noted in Chapter 4, institutional shareholders are now the dominant players in 
the market. However, they need to form a coalition to remove the board of directors 
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or management.66 Such coalitions are indeed formed in practice, but rarely, and only 
on an ad hoc basis.67 The actual use of the right to remove directors manifests itself in 
extreme cases of corporate mismanagement.68 The removal of management takes place 
when its lack of ability becomes evident or there is no doubt that the company’s 
management is in error. Until this point, institutional shareholders usually maintain a 
dialogue with the existing board and management.69 
 
 Shareholders have proxy access regarding the board’s election far more than 
their counterparts in the US.70 The Companies Act 2006 is almost silent about the 
appointment of directors71 and according to Article 20 of the Model Articles for Public 
Companies, the general meeting has the power to appoint a director by an ordinary 
resolution which is adopted by a simple majority.72 In practice, the board usually 
prepares a list of proposed board-level candidates for the shareholders to appoint. It 
does not often lead to contested elections in listed companies.73 
 
 While compulsory say on pay regulation is a recent development in the UK, 
advisory say on pay regulation has been in force since 2002.74 Directors are required 
to product two reports: a backward-looking annual report (advisory) and a forward-
looking remuneration policy (binding at least every three years).75 The first report is 
related to the implementation of remuneration policy reports and is subject to an 
advisory vote of the shareholders every year. The empirical evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of say on pay regulation is conflicting. Some empirical evidence 
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suggests that the regulation has had no substantial impact on executive pay growth.76 
Nevertheless, it might have, ‘a moderating effect on the level of CEO compensation 
only conditional upon poor performance’.77 Despite this inconclusive empirical 
evidence on the link between say on pay regulation and the level of executive 
remuneration, (see Chapter 3), the UK Government is considering increasing 
shareholder power and enhancing shareholder engagement in the executive 
remuneration framework,78 imposing stronger consequences for companies that 
encountering significant shareholder dissent over executive pay. It has invited the FRC 
to revise the UK Corporate Governance Code to lay out actions that companies should 
take when they face significant shareholder opposition in this area such that even if a 
majority of shareholders do not oppose executive pay, the objection of a significant 
minority will oblige companies to revise their executive remuneration structures. 
Shareholder activism will thus become more meaningful in the UK executive pay 
framework.  
 Shareholders’ voice extends to takeovers as well. Takeovers are regulated 
through The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Takeover Code).79 The code 
aims to ensure the fairness and efficiency of takeover bids from the perspective of a 
target company’s shareholders. The primary means established by the Code is the 
board’s passivity or ‘no-frustration’ rule.80 The UK legal framework is very prohibitive 
of employing anti-takeover tactics without the consent of shareholders. It considers 
the takeover to be a transaction between the bidder and the shareholders of the target 
company. The board of directors, in principle, does not have legitimate grounds to 
intervene directly. The core tenet of the UK takeover regulations is that the future of 
the target corporation rests only with its shareholders.  
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 It may appear that the board has not been given authority in the context of 
takeovers and the takeover rules are strikingly shareholder orientated. However, the 
board holds indirect power to prevent a hostile takeover by advising the target 
shareholders.81 This view of the board’s influence is based not just on theoretical 
grounds, but also by some empirical research.82 The Panel recently added a new section 
to the notes explaining Rule 25.2. This sets out that the board can take into 
consideration the financial merits of the offer, as well as other relevant factors, and the 
bid price is not the only factor to be considered in providing an opinion from the board.  
In the context of section 172 of the CA 2006, the general duties of directors, the new 
interpretative notes to the Rule 25.2 and general principle 3 of the Takeover Code, the 
board of directors has broad discretion and can consider a range of issues from the 
financial merits of the bid to the sustainability of the company in forming its opinion 
of the bid. Directors, therefore, do play a role in the context of takeovers, albeit 
indirectly.  
 
 The preceding examination of the decision-making powers of shareholders 
indicates that such participatory rights constitute a significant part of UK corporate 
governance. A further distinctive feature of UK corporate governance is the statutory 
anti-dilution rights that protect the voting power of existing shareholders. In the UK, 
institutional investors have traditionally placed special emphasis on anti-dilution 
rights because they have the practical effect of limiting the scope of management to 
disempower shareholders in the UK.83 Institutional shareholders retain the power to 
permit the board to issue shares in future without specific shareholder approval. Under 
article 43 of the Model Articles for Public Companies: ‘without prejudice to the rights 
attached to any existing share, the company may issue shares with such rights or 
restrictions as may be determined by ordinary resolution’. It shows that where the 
board needs to take action as a result of the financial needs of a company, the board 
can override the procedural requirements and decide on the issuance of new shares. 
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This demonstrates that shareholders’ approval is not required when the board might 
need to act immediately. Anti-dilution rights force the board and management to 
establish a dialogue with shareholders in which the company’s officers and senior 
executives develop reasons for the request for the authorisation. 
 Shareholders are provided strong governance and control rights in the UK. 
These rights are not frequently invoked in practice, at least not to the extent that the 
board’s authority is significantly diminished. The rights are not used to intrude into 
the boards’ prerogatives. They primarily engender an ongoing account-giving to 
shareholders. In addition, they provide a formal forum to discuss the fundamental and 
controversial issues related to the company.84 The board must provide a reasoned 
account for their actions and decisions such as the issuance of shares or the refusal of 
a takeover bid. Such reasoned account-giving is internalised in corporate governance 
through strong shareholder rights. The existence of such rights not only requires 
effective and ongoing account-giving at shareholder meetings, but also outside of 
shareholder meetings. In other words, it forces the board to develop engagement 
mechanisms with shareholders. In this respect, the rights bring moderation to the 
power imbalance between shareholders and directors arising from the legal framework 
and the economic needs of public companies.85 UK company law combines the board’s 
authority with strong shareholder rights. It demonstrates that the board’s authority can 
be consistent with strong participatory shareholder rights. 
6.4 Regulatory Implications of the New Investor Paradigm 
Strong shareholder rights are not found to be inconsistent with the board’s authority. 
The present analysis finds that contemporary shareholder activism is compatible with 
a softer version of director primacy theory. Contemporary shareholder activism is 
highly complex. On the one hand, activist investors have become one of the foremost 
players in corporate governance over the last two decades and are not afraid of 
exercising confrontational activism. They play an important role in revealing 
managerial divergence from shareholder wealth maximisation, ensuring the 
independence of the board and stimulating other institutional shareholders. On the 
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other hand, mainstream institutional shareholders are developing long-term 
collaborative engagements with the boards. There are growing policy developments, 
i.e. a new paradigm and the stewardship principles, that recognise public interest 
concerns and short-term pressures from activist funds. These developments seek to 
modify shareholders’ behaviour. In the context of these policy developments, 
shareholders are expected to carry out a monitoring role to promote their interests and 
to provide an accountability mechanism for the sustainability of portfolio companies, 
the economy and society in general. As a result, this thesis is of the view that 
shareholder activism in its varied forms has the potential to benefit companies, other 
shareholders and the market despite the possibility of activist funds having a darker 
side. Overall, shareholder activism has significant potential to play a preventative role 
in corporate governance and to address accountability problems in public companies.  
 This investor paradigm is at odds with US corporate governance. Since 
shareholders are willing to engage in corporate management and shareholder activism 
is not inherently detrimental to corporate governance, we should abandon the belief 
that company law should be built on shareholders as rationally apathetic and that 
shareholder participation is inherently detrimental to corporate governance. Chapter 5 
has demonstrated that while US corporate governance is becoming more shareholder 
friendly, it still maintains aspects that cause unnecessary tension between the board, 
management and shareholders. The courts and company law overregulate 
shareholders’ proposals. In contrast to company law, the US’s disclosure regime 
provides one of the most fertile disclosure environments in which to engage in 
controversial tactics. The disclosure regime, therefore, underregulates shareholder 
activism to the extent that it allows activist funds to employ wolf-packs and risk-
decoupling techniques. 
  Overall, US corporate governance should accommodate shareholder activism 
into the functioning of public companies and reform should not focus on neutralising 
activist funds or the efforts of mainstream investors in corporate governance. In this 
respect, it could deal with agency cost and accountability problems more effectively 
than the traditional director primacy theory, and public companies would have better 
decision-making processes. Regulatory and legal reforms discussed in Chapter 5 
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played a significant role in enhancing shareholders’ voice in US corporate governance, 
but they fail to accommodate the investor paradigm into US corporate governance and 
to control the possible side effects of activist funds. In order to accommodate the 
investor paradigm, i.e. the emergence of activist funds and the awakening of 
mainstream institutional shareholders into US corporate governance, possible changes 
in corporate governance and regulatory rules in relation to private ordering, director 
elections and disclosure rules governing activist funds will be reconsidered below. 
 The Case for Creating a Level Playing Field for Private Ordering 
6.4.1.1 Private Ordering under State Law 
Shareholders in the US have the authority to unilaterally adopt, amend and repeal by-
laws, which is one of the few direct powers shareholders have. In this respect, by-laws 
are one of the most important tools with which shareholders can make changes to the 
internal structure of corporate governance in order to increase managerial 
accountability and engage in the decision-making process. Like shareholders, 
directors also possess the authority to unilaterally adopt, amend and repeal by-laws. It 
is not uncommon for directors to adopt different mechanisms to limit shareholders’ 
power or to impose procedures or higher requirements to the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights.86 Chapter 5 has demonstrated the different treatment of shareholder-adopted 
and board-adopted by-laws. The divergent courts’ decisions become even more 
puzzling when the responses to Delaware’s legislature are considered.87 There is a 
compelling need for coherent and consistent approaches to by-laws.   
 The judicial deference to the board arises from the recursive loop between 
sections 109(b) and 141(a) of the DGCL and the courts’ strong commitment to the 
preservation of the near-absolute authority of the board. Board-adopted by-laws are 
subject to more limited judicial oversight, compared to shareholder-adopted by-laws. 
Directors are given broad powers, which may allow directors to adopt creative and 
self-interested by-laws. Obvious examples are poison pills that target activist funds 
and mainstream investors, or the fee-shifting by-laws discussed in Chapter 5. In this 
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regard, the board and management could adopt restrictive by-laws to insulate 
themselves from accountability or to limit shareholder activism.  
 The value and function of shareholder-adopted by-laws are, however, poorly 
understood by the courts. Shareholder activism could play a corrective function and 
enhance decision-making without limiting the scope of managerial authority of the 
board over corporate policy and affairs. By-laws are not necessarily related to 
shareholder empowerment. They could be related to public interest concerns such as 
short-termism in the market or ESG issues. They could also be used to adjust the level 
or type of shareholder activism. Chapter 3 demonstrated that shareholder activism 
benefits companies depending on a myriad of factors such as the features of the 
industry in which the company operates and the size of the company. It was further 
concluded that while activism could be beneficial for some companies, it could be 
excessive for others. By-laws allow shareholders seeking to maximise the benefits of 
activism to experiment to establish an optimal structure for particular features of 
companies and markets. Therefore, this thesis favours private ordering because at least 
in theory it allows shareholders and directors to shape governance rules according to 
particular circumstances and to abolish value-reducing decision-making processes and 
governance practices of the board and management. In doing so, shareholder activism 
generates new information to companies, directors and capital markets. The upshot is 
that shareholder-adopted by-laws, within reasonable limits, are important tools for 
shareholders to protect themselves from board opportunism, to remove value-reducing 
structures and to establish the optimal governance structure according to the needs of 
the company.           
 The current legal framework restricts shareholder participation in decision-
making, which almost creates a one-size-fits-all situation in terms of shareholder 
activism. The current situation does not adequately address the range of needs of 
different companies. As noted above, different companies obtain diverse benefits from 
varying degrees of shareholder activism. By-laws could allow shareholders to modify 
the governance rules of companies according to the most useful model of activism for 
the company. The limitation on shareholders’ ability to adopt private ordering arises 
from the recursive loop between sections 109(b) and 141(a), and near-absolute 
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understanding of the board’s authority. Most importantly, the courts concluded that 
any shareholder-adopted by-law would be invalid if it placed restrictions on ‘the 
board’s management prerogatives under section 141(a)’.88 The court further provided 
two important guiding principles: by-laws could only be designed to address 
procedural issues rather than to mandate substantive issues, and by-laws must not 
cause directors to violate Delaware law. This approach is problematic from the 
perspective of contemporary shareholder activism because any by-law could be 
regarded as intruding impermissibly upon the board’s discretionary power.  
 As argued above, shareholder activism does not necessarily come at the 
expense of the board’s authority. In a similar vein, courts should not consider it as a 
zero-sum game between shareholder by-law powers and the board’s discretionary 
powers. Put differently, the purpose of a by-law could be to address managerial 
accountability problems or ensuring an ESG issue is addressed without mandating 
board action. By-laws are usually defensive in nature and do not impose a specific 
course of action on the board.89 They regulate the ways ex ante in which the board’s 
discretionary power is exercised. This does not necessarily mean excessive intrusion 
on the board’s authority.90  The law should provide enough room for shareholders to 
adopt by-laws to limit inefficient structures of corporate governance and to modify 
internal governance rules. These by-laws should not be controlling and should support 
the functionality of the board of directors. Therefore, the reasonable scope of 
permissible by-laws should be identified clearly.  
 In our view, the criteria based on substance or procedures fail to provide a 
coherent framework for deciding whether a by-law infringes the board’s authority 
under section 141(a). Such a taxonomy is too restrictive because any by-law could be 
interpreted as being related to substantive issues and intruding on the board’s 
authority. Moreover, it is problematic in light of the description of by-laws under 
section 109(b). A by-law should be interpreted broadly unless it mandates a particular 
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action or decision because a by-law could be related to a general policy of a company. 
Therefore, controlling by-laws are the ones that do not leave discretion to the board.91  
 So far, this thesis has revealed the inconsistent approach of the courts towards 
shareholder-adopted and board-adopted by-laws and has endorsed private ordering 
through by-laws. There are a few alternative ways to address the divergent treatment 
of by-laws and the potential misuses of them by directors. Fisch calls for rigorous 
judicial scrutiny of board-adopted by-laws.92 However, much controversy flows from 
the interpretations of the relevant sections of the DGCL. Common law decisions have 
increased ambiguity about shareholder-adopted by-laws. The Delaware courts 
immediately embraced a near-absolute understanding of director primacy as a matter 
of common law. Without any clarification of the DGCL, it seems that such narrow 
interpretations of shareholder by-law powers by the courts will remain. The suggested 
remedy would level the playing field because the courts failed to accommodate 
shareholders’ role in corporate governance in the absence of definitive statutory 
language. Therefore, Delaware law could be modified to reconcile the tension between 
109(b) and 141(a), and to address the potential conflict between shareholder-adopted 
and director-adopted by-laws. The delicate task is to ensure enough room for 
shareholders’ by-law authority while preserving sufficient decision-making powers 
for the board of directors.  
   First, the tension between 109(b) and 141(a) of the DGCL has led courts to 
make a narrow interpretation of shareholder power, having director primacy accepted 
as a matter of common law. Any change in the wording of these sections would reduce 
the tension and encourage the courts to revise their positions. It is recommended that 
the artificial distinction between procedural and substantive by-laws be abolished. The 
proposed changes would also relieve directors by eliminating the possibility of a 
breach of their fiduciary duties by complying with shareholder by-laws. Section 
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109(b) could be amended to clearly indicate that by-laws could be related to procedural 
or substantive matters.93 The proposed section 109(b) would be as follows:  
‘The by-laws may contain any provision, procedural or substantive, not 
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the 
business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or 
the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.’ 
In this way, there would be no need for the definition of the terms ‘procedural’ and 
‘substantive’ by the courts and this insertion would prevent courts from interpreting 
the scope of permissible by-laws narrowly. 
 Second, in order to distinguish controlling by-laws from permissible by-laws 
and to preserve the managerial authority of the board, it would be useful to add the 
following sentence to the end of Section 109(b) which would empower shareholders 
and clearly specify the scope of permissible by-laws: ‘the bylaws may not be used to 
mandate the decision itself’. Such a criterion would draw a boundary between what 
shareholders cannot do and the legal space for shareholders who are willing to play an 
active role. This modification would at least provide room for the emergence of an 
investor paradigm in the US and bring moderation to the power imbalance between 
shareholders and directors by requiring the board to provide a normative explanation 
for their actions.  
 Third, it would also be useful to amend section 141(a) to provide that the 
limitations might come through by-laws as well.94 In the current version, it states that, 
‘… except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, or in its certificate of 
incorporation …’. The amended version would be as follows: ‘… except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter, in its certificate of incorporation, or in its by-laws’. 
This amendment would supplement the changes to section 109(b) and would 
encourage courts to reconsider their positions. This constitutes an important 
development which would increase shareholder influence and benefit listed companies 
as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. As a result, Delaware law would become more 
                                                 
93 See, Smith (n 87) 184. 
94 See Smith (n ) 181. 
229 
 
receptive to shareholder by-laws which is a prerequisite condition for the emerging 
role of shareholders. 
 Fourth, another problem discussed in Chapter 5 is whether directors may 
amend or repeal shareholder-adopted by-laws. The debate again hinges on the 
recursive loop between sections 109 and 141. Clarification is needed, because when 
the board can easily undo shareholder-adopted by-laws, by-laws lose their value and 
have little function in corporate governance. This does not only enhance the role of 
shareholders, but also improves the predictability of judicial decision-making. 
Delaware law is silent about whether directors can amend or repeal a shareholder-
adopted by-law. In the literature, there are two opposing views. Hamermesh argues 
that the board does have the power to undo a shareholder’s by-law which seems to be 
limiting the board’s authority.95 However, Coffee argues the opposite.96 The company 
laws of other states contain clearer regulation of shareholder-adopted by-laws. For 
instance, Section 211 of the California Corporate Code, which follows the Model 
Business Corporation Act (MBCA),97 states that ‘the articles or by-laws may restrict 
or eliminate the power of the board to adopt, amend or repeal any or all by-laws’.98 
Such certainty does not exist in Delaware. Given the frequent use of by-laws by 
shareholders, it is becoming increasingly important for the Delaware legislature to 
address this problem. There are a number of alternative ways to address the 
aforementioned uncertainty. The first option is to do nothing and to wait for the courts 
to decide on this matter. From the strong commitment of courts to traditional director 
primacy, it seems likely that the courts could decide the board has the power to amend 
and repeal shareholder-adopted by-laws. As discussed above, in an era of increased 
shareholder activism, this option would undermine shareholder activism and further 
insulate the board and management from shareholders. Another alternative is that 
directors could amend a shareholder-adopted by-law unless otherwise provided by the 
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by-law. This is similar to the MBCA’s approach. This option, however, could create 
a trap for shareholders who neglect to add no-amendment clauses into their by-laws. 
The final alternative is that directors cannot amend a shareholder-adopted by-law 
unless otherwise stated in the by-law. This option would reduce the ways in which 
directors could undermine shareholder power. It would remove the possibility that 
directors could reverse changes in the market such as proxy access or the right to call 
meetings as discussed in Chapter 5. This option is also close to what is articulated in 
section 216. Section 216 stipulates that a ‘by-law adopted by the stockholders, 
prescribing the vote required for the election of directors, may not be amended or 
repealed by the board of directors’. The only difference is that the proposed solution 
provides that shareholders could opt out from a no-amendment rule. The developments 
of shareholders’ rights would therefore be ensured and shielded from the board’s 
amendment. To this end, a sentence could be added to the end of Section 109(a) as 
follows: ‘the board cannot amend a shareholder by-law unless otherwise stated in the 
by-law’.  
 In conclusion, under the current US corporate governance shareholders cannot 
adopt by-laws on an equal footing with the board, even though such restrictions do not 
exist under section 109. This asymmetry undermines the value of shareholder activism 
because by-laws are the only means that shareholder could initiate and bring changes 
in management. In order to use by-laws optimally, shareholders should be able to 
effectively set governance rules through by-laws. One solution is to wait for the courts 
to develop a fair allocation of power. However, it seems unlikely this would ever occur 
given the strong commitment of the courts to director primacy. This thesis proposes 
statutory amendments to create a level playing field. These changes would ensure that 
shareholders will have sufficient shareholder by-law power as well as guarding against 
any changes by the board. In short, the proposed amendments adapt the law to make 
it conform to contemporary shareholder activism. 
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6.4.1.2 Private Ordering under Federal Law 
By-laws are usually submitted through the Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8.99 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the role of Rule 14a-8 in shareholder activism and the 
substantive restrictions imposed on shareholder participation by that rule. The rule 
breathes life into private ordering. With the increasing use and success of shareholder 
proposals in US corporate governance, some major institutions, and scholars too, call 
for reforms to tighten Rule 14a-8 which would effectively eliminate the use of 
proposals for most shareholders. However, while the general framework of Rule 14a-
8 is sensible, it fails to facilitate private orderings and to reflect the evolving features 
of shareholder activism in the era of investor capitalism. The debate therefore becomes 
whether and how the rule should be structured in the new investor paradigm.  
 These calls for reform are, in a sense, a response to the dramatic increase in 
the use of shareholder proposals on a wide range of matters over the last two 
decades.100 It is argued that the rule is in a need of modernisation.101 The proposed 
changes are aimed at imposing additional restrictions on the submission of shareholder 
proposals through Rule 14a-8 and reducing the role of shareholders in US corporate 
governance. The critics of Rule 14a-8 are of the view that the rule is overly used by a 
limited number of shareholders who submit similar proposals to a large number of 
companies, but only own a small amount of shares of the companies. These 
shareholders are regarded as having no material interest in the creation of value and 
of being self-interested.102  Shareholders are able to submit a vast number of proposals 
because of the low ownership threshold set out in Rule 14a-8. It is argued that the 
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$2000 ownership threshold does not reflect the reality of share prices in the current 
market. An illustration of this is that three shares of Google is enough to satisfy the 
requirement.103 A minority of shareholders, therefore, bring significant costs to the 
company at the expense of other shareholders.  
 From the traditional director primacy perspective, Bainbridge argues that 
‘many proposals address issues traditionally regarded as board or management 
prerogatives, as a substantial number effectively seek to manage or even micromanage 
corporate decisions’.104 Even though proposals are non-binding in nature, they become 
a powerful tool in influencing the board and management. Moreover, shareholder 
proposals are used to enhance shareholder participatory rights. Shareholders are 
debatably characterised as having an ‘essentially passive and reactive role’ under state 
law.105 Bainbridge therefore claims that Rule 14a-8 undermines the corporate 
governance structure created by state law because it allows shareholders to play an 
active role.106 However, ordinary business exclusion has, it is argued, failed to protect 
the board from shareholder proposals.107 Furthermore, the SEC and federal courts are 
criticised for reducing the number of excludable proposals by precluding the exclusion 
of proposals that involve matters ‘which have significant policy, economic or other 
implications inherent in them’.108 Hence, it is in essence argued that the rule fails to 
preserve the allocation of powers between shareholders and directors under state law. 
Bainbridge suggests tightening the number of ordinary business exclusions to 
eliminate social shareholder proposals.109 He further proposes that the courts consider 
whether a shareholder proposal has material economic importance for the value of 
shares rather than searching for whether a shareholder proposal implies a significant 
policy issue that transcends the ordinary business of the company. Similarly, Business 
Roundtable has sought reconsideration of the ordinary business exclusion to limit the 
number of shareholder proposals, increase the $2000 ownership threshold and extend 
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the holding requirement. Calls for reforms aim to reduce the role of shareholders in 
corporate governance.  
 The descriptions offered by critics fail to accurately reflect the state of the 
shareholder proposal process. The most significant trigger of reform calls is the 
increasing use and success of proposals.110 Academics and institutions calling for 
restrictions on the use of shareholder proposals aim to avoid such influence by limiting 
the shareholders’ proxy access. The critics of Rule 14a-8 often overlook the fact that 
a wide range of institutional shareholders rather than a minority of shareholders are 
interested in corporate governance, practices and strategies. At present, not just social 
funds but also mainstream investors as well as activist funds are the proponents of 
shareholder proposals. Therefore, the claim that the process of shareholder proposals 
is abused by a minority of shareholders lacks credence.  
 Turning to the criticism that shareholder proposals are inconsistent with US 
corporate governance, this objection overlooks the fact that Rule 14a-8 does not grant 
an additional right to shareholders, but only effectuates the use of private ordering. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, US company law adopts a flexible approach which enables 
directors and shareholders to shape corporate governance rules. Shareholder access to 
proxy statements is a prerequisite for flexible company law because in listed 
companies, shareholders do not generally attend meetings in person and exercise their 
rights through proxy voting. It is therefore nothing more than making meaningful the 
right of shareholders to initiate private ordering through resolutions and by-law 
amendments. Any restriction on Rule 14a-8 limits shareholders’ authority to adopt by-
laws.  
 Critics of Rule 14a-8 undervalue the contributions of shareholders to corporate 
governance through shareholder proposals. Proposals provide companies with the 
means to obtain the collective views of shareholders, i.e. their feedback on corporate 
performance. The process of shareholder proposals forces the board to provide 
normative account-giving for their actions. Consequently, shareholder proposals drive 
increased communication between the board and shareholders. Directors and 
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managers can better understand the shareholders’ approaches and behaviour. It not 
only provides a snapshot of the views of shareholders, but also enhances the decision-
making of the board as discussed above. As a result of activism, many companies have 
made a number of changes to their corporate governance structures. The changes were 
not limited to governance issues, but also covered social issues such as gender pay 
equity, board diversity, equal employment opportunities, animal welfare and 
sustainability efforts.111 Even though socially responsible proposals do not often 
receive sufficient support from shareholders, they can signal to companies potential 
weaknesses in corporate governance and strategies. For instance, a shareholder 
proposal calling for the appointment of a climate expert to the board of Exxon-Mobil 
failed to receive a majority, but in the end, Exxon itself appointed a climate expert 
director to the board.112 In short, proposals are critical components of direct 
communication and engagement between shareholders and the board. So tightening 
Rule 14a-8 would deprive the board and managers from the valuable insights of 
shareholders.  
  Some aspects of Rule 14a-8 could, nonetheless, do with updating. The rule 
entered into force at a point in time before significant shareholder activism took place 
in US corporate governance. At that time, the Wall Street Rule and the subsequent 
share price reactions were accepted as the primary mechanism between the board and 
shareholders. During that era, even the submission of a shareholder proposal could be 
regarded as a kind of abuse.113 The way in which substantive exclusion grounds are 
structured also demonstrates that shareholder proposals were seen as a threat to 
corporate governance rather than an integral part of corporate governance. As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, shareholder activism became one of the important 
aspects of US corporate governance and can no longer be regarded as a form of abuse. 
The history of the enforcement of Rule 14a-8 by the SEC and courts has been 
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tumultuous, and the Rule itself has undergone a number of changes as discussed in 
Chapter 5.114 However, it does not reflect the changes in shareholder activism, and the 
increased engagement between shareholders and the board/managers. The proposed 
approach is to make proxy rules consistent with state-based shareholder rights. Under 
the current regulation, legitimate shareholder proposals sanctioned by state law can be 
excluded from proxy statements of the company. A typical example was the directors’ 
election proposals discussed in Chapter 5. Clearly, the substantive exclusion grounds 
need to be reworked and narrowed substantially. Of course, this does not mean 
unlimited access to a company’s proxy materials on any matter. In principle, such 
limitations should not be related to substantive matters. In line with the general 
approach described above, the proposed amendments would enhance shareholders’ 
rights while maintaining the centralised decision-making authority of the board.      
 There are overall thirteen exclusion grounds under Rule 14a-8. Three of them 
are merit-based exclusion grounds discussed in Chapter 5. The decision whether a 
proposal is a proper subject under state law, or an ordinary business matter, or 
‘substantially related’ to a company’s business – three exclusionary grounds – actually 
tests the merits of shareholder proposals. The remaining grounds for exclusion 
primarily seek to eliminate vexatious, illegal and deceptive proposals. They are 
therefore necessary to filter out unnecessary proposals.   
 Merit-based exclusion grounds are the most controversial. Among them, the 
ordinary business matter is the most litigated and used by companies. Revision of Rule 
14a-8 should focus on the removal of subjective and vague terms and interpretations 
by the SEC that create controversy and tension in their application. Rule 14a-8(i)(1) 
‘proper subject under state law exclusion’ stands on different ground than the other 
two merit-based exclusion grounds. It is a filter that aims to eliminate proposals which 
would not be valid under state law, so it does not impose any additional restrictions 
on shareholders. However, this could cause difficulties for the SEC when examining 
whether a proposal is a proper subject under state law.115 When they are not sure about 
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the permissibility of a proposal, the staff of the SEC should allow it, leave the matter 
to shareholders and ultimately to the Delaware courts. Congruously, Strine, who was 
Vice Chancellor and is now Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court stated that:  
‘I think those of us from Delaware would say one of the things the Commission 
could do to facilitate this is to make clear that if it's uncertain under state law 
and it's a by-law proposal, then it shouldn't be excluded and they should be able 
to put it on absent some showing, and then leave it to us, hold us accountable, 
and if we make the wrong decisions, you can bet we are going to hear about it 
from the institutional investor community and from the management 
community’.116 
The upshot is that the proper subject under state law exclusion grounds should not be 
interpreted broadly.  
 The relevance exclusion ground was originally introduced to prevent proposals 
‘promoting general economic, political, racial, religious or social causes’.117 The SEC 
abandoned this rule and adopted an objective relevance test (5% of the company’s 
assets, earnings or gross sales) and a subjective test (if a shareholder proposal is not 
otherwise related to the company’s business). There are basically two possibilities: 
first, a proposal’s sole focus might be economically-orientated, in which case it is 
relatively straightforward to determine whether it satisfies the 5% economic test. 
Second, even though a proposal does not satisfy the economic test, it could be 
‘otherwise significantly related to the company’s business’. As regards the first 
possibility, if a proposal is economically insignificant and has no social aspect, its 
outcome will likely be immaterial. This type of proposals is likely to be within the 
managerial prerogatives of the board under section 141 of the DGCL. Therefore, the 
‘proper subject under state law’ and the ‘ordinary business matter’ exclusion grounds 
ensure the omission of the proposal. As regards the second possibility, if a proposal is 
related to a company’s business and social issues, the economic test rarely matters. It 
is difficult for the SEC to assess the merits of social and political proposals. The 
determination of the ethical and social significance of the proposal could be left to 
shareholders. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, these issues might also be value-
                                                 
116 Leo Strine, ‘the Roundtable on the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation Law’ (SEC, 7 May 
2007) < https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-transcript050707.pdf > accessed 10 June 
2017.  
117 SEC, Solicitation of Proxies, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,425 11431 (18 December 1952).  
237 
 
enhancing for some companies and could be related to the sustainability of companies 
and the economy in general. Therefore, instead of leaving the decision to the SEC or 
federal judges, it seems appropriate to leave the ultimate outcome to shareholders. The 
board and management could make a case against the proposal and could persuade 
shareholders. If the proposals were prepared in a way which undermined the board’s 
authority, they could be excluded under the ‘proper subject under state law’ ground. 
This analysis suggests a repeal of this exclusion ground is needed.  
 The ordinary business exclusion ground is the most used and litigated 
exclusion ground by companies. This exclusion ground aims to filter out proposals 
involving ‘routine, day-to-day matter[s] relating to the conduct of the ordinary 
business operations of the issuer’.118 However, it imposes a difficult task on the SEC: 
to decide whether the proposal is within the scope of the ordinary business exclusion 
ground and whether it raises significant policy issues which are ‘so significant that it 
would be appropriate for a shareholder vote’.119 The SEC faces difficulties in analysing 
the merits of proposals and developing a consistent and coherent criteria in applying 
the exclusion ground. There have been shifts away from proposals being treated as 
excludable to proposals treated as includable and vice versa. Moreover, the SEC has 
usually failed to react in a timely manner. It takes governance failures or newsworthy 
public debate for the SEC to change its position; instead, it should establish a clear test 
to determine which kind of proposals are includable or excludable. For instance, until 
the Enron failure, companies were able to omit shareholder proposals regarding the 
independence of auditors. After the Enron failure, the SEC reversed its position.120 
Another example is Tyson Foods in which the SEC reversed its position. Shareholders 
may have to wait several years for public pressure or a widespread governance crisis 
to change the SEC’s position and to allow such proposals. Even the same dispute can 
result in three different opinions at the same time. The current regulation fails to 
establish a consistent and coherent standard that responds in a timely manner to major 
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changes in the market or to public debate. Instead of maintaining the exclusion, this 
thesis suggests the elimination of this exclusion ground.121 The elimination of this 
exclusion ground would have no substantive impact on the allocation of power 
between shareholders and directors and would not unnecessarily intrude on the board’s 
authority because the rule does nothing more than express the implications of the 
proper subject under state law exclusion ground differently. The SEC stated that the 
underlying purpose of the ordinary business exclusion ground was ‘consistent with the 
policy of most state corporate laws: to confine the resolution of ordinary business 
problems to management and the board of directors, since it is impracticable for 
shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an annual shareholders 
meeting’.122 Since the proper subject exclusion ground still exists, the purported 
purpose of the ordinary business exclusion ground could be achieved under the proper 
subject exclusion ground because section 141(a) of the DGCL clearly provides 
managerial authority to the board.123 This thesis recommends that this process be left 
to shareholders to decide, and in the case of a dispute between the board and 
shareholders, Delaware law could decide whether such proposal is a proper subject 
and within the scope of permissible by-laws. The proposed change would allow 
shareholder activism to play a corrective function before another large-scale 
accounting scandal happens or a public controversy mounts that affects the business 
of companies.  
 The removal of the aforementioned merit-based exclusion grounds may lead 
scholars to argue that the corporate governance created by state law is substantially 
eliminated as a result of the amendments. However, the case is the opposite. These 
merit-based restrictions on shareholder proposals appear to be inconsistent with state 
law. Section 109(b) of the DGCL grants substantial authority to initiate governance 
changes and does not specify a limit on shareholder power other than being consistent 
with law or with the certificate of incorporation. The proposal will be left to the 
shareholder voting process, and if there is any doubt about the legality of the proposal, 
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the dispute will be resolved by the Delaware courts rather than the SEC. Since the 
proposals would initially be voted upon by shareholders, the directors and 
shareholders could compromise rather than take every instance to court. In other 
words, state law would resolve the legality of proposals. With these recommended 
changes, shareholder proposals would no longer be considered as a threat to corporate 
governance; rather, they would be an internal aspect of corporate governance. 
Implementing the proposed changes would help shareholder activism to be partly 
accommodated within US corporate governance. At the same time, the board’s 
authority would be preserved because in the event of overt intrusion into the board’s 
prerogatives, Rule 14a-8(i)(1) would prevent the inclusion of such proposals.   
 The proposed approach not only aims to make proxy regulation consistent with 
state-based shareholder rights but also seeks to preserve the board’s authority. The rest 
of the thirteen exclusion grounds could filter out vexatious, frivolous and unreasonable 
proposals, which cause distractions and waste the time of the board and management. 
However, as critics have rightly argued,124 the $2000 threshold does not reflect the 
realities of company shares. The disadvantage of employing a fixed dollar amount is 
that the specified amount of money becomes irrelevant over time because of inflation. 
The $2000 share ownership could be an infinitesimal percentage of the total share 
value of some companies. Commenting on this issue, Gallagher, the former SEC 
commissioner, stated that ‘$2,000 is absurdly low’.125 For instance, Apple’s market 
capitalisation was around $776.6 billion as of April 2017.126 A $2000 share ownership 
of Apple amounts to 0.00000026% of Apple’s total shares or 14 shares in the 
company. In other words, a shareholder who owns 14 shares of Apple could submit a 
proposal and therefore shareholders who do not have any reasonable material 
ownership of the company could submit proposals. It is quite possible that the 
proposals submitted by these shareholders would focus on issues that are neither 
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financially nor socially material to the company. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
shareholder activism can sometimes be excessive and distracting for the board and 
management. These proposals come at a significant cost to the company because they 
waste corporate resources and consume significant amounts of management time 
through negotiations with proponents, seeking no-action letters, or preparing counter-
proposals. Such proposals may cause mainstream institutional shareholders to lose 
focus on serious matters and delay action on economic and social decisions of real 
importance to the investee company. This analysis suggests the removal of the $2000 
ownership threshold and maintaining the 1% ownership requirement under Rule 14a-
8. In doing so, the value of shares required for the submission of shareholder proposals 
would vary from company to company based on size and share price.   
 In conclusion, an update to Rule 14a-8 is needed to reflect market developments. 
This thesis proposes an approach that seeks to make proxy rules consistent with state 
law. It aims to allow shareholders to exercise their state-based rights more efficiently 
and suggests where there is a doubt on the legality of shareholder proposal, it should be 
left to shareholders, and ultimately state courts. It suggests the elimination of the 
relevance and ordinary business exclusion grounds. It also recommends the use of a 1% 
ownership threshold alone rather than the $2000 threshold. Implementing such changes 
would deliver much-needed improvements and help shareholder activism to be better 
accommodated within US corporate governance while preserving the centrality of the 
board’s authority. 
 The Case for Making Director Elections More Meaningful  
Chapter 5 demonstrated that shareholders have long been impeded exercising 
meaningful voice in the context of director elections. While shareholders still do not 
have default proxy access in the case of director elections, they could adopt proxy 
access through private orderings. The availability of such private ordering is generally 
found sufficient because it can produce proxy access when it is desirable.127 However, 
this thesis argues that in order to accommodate shareholder activism within US 
corporate governance, there is a case to be made for changing default regimes to create 
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a level playing field. This analysis extends beyond default no-access regimes to 
plurality voting rules and universal proxy voting cards.  
6.4.2.1 Adopting the Default Proxy Access Model 
Since the current legal framework provides a no-access regime to shareholders with 
the freedom to adopt a proxy access model, the default regime is considered sufficient. 
It is argued that the legal framework provides shareholders with the flexibility to tailor 
a system of proxy access that depends on the needs of the company.128 It seems 
reasonable that one-size-does-not-fit-all, but it also does not justify why the default 
regime should start from a no-access position. Similarly, a default access regime could 
be structured with an option to opt out of the access regime. Bebchuk and Hirsch argue 
that the ease of reversing default rules should be also taken into account when deciding 
the default regime.129 They argue that the opting out of a no-access regime would be 
far more difficult than opting out of an access regime.130 Opting out of a no-access 
default is difficult when shareholders favour it but the board disfavours it because the 
board would subject the proposal to a vote and have the resources to draft and 
articulate the proposal expertly, as well as place the proposal in the company’s proxy 
material.131 As a result, there is an asymmetry between the opt-outs favoured and 
disfavoured by the board. Moreover, the design of proxy access is complicated 
because a proposal should contain information regarding the minimum ownership 
threshold and duration, the details of the shareholders nominating the director, the 
number or proportion of directors who can be nominated by directors, and the 
eligibility criteria for the directorial candidates. Therefore, there are many ways of 
designing the proxy access proposals. Directors could adopt a proxy access proposal 
which makes the use of the proxy access system very difficult for shareholders in 
practice. As discussed in Chapter 5, these by-law proposals are non-binding in nature 
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and could be amended later on by the board itself under the current legal framework. 
The board may adopt a more restrictive proposal with higher thresholds and 
requirements than the proposal favoured by shareholders. Until recently, many 
shareholder proposals which had received the majority support had been disregarded 
by the board.132 Retaining no-access and adopting a company-by-company approach 
might therefore not provide the desired outcome in terms of proxy access 
arrangements. Finally, the shareholder access proposal could easily exceed the 500-
word limitation imposed by Rule 14a-8 given that the invalidated Rule 14a-11 was 
around 2000 words.133  
 A proxy access opt-out could provide a solution to boards captured by 
management.  Candidates nominated by shareholders are an effective solution to 
captive boards and seek to replace underqualified and ineffective directors. These 
directors help the board to bridge the information asymmetry existing between the 
board and management and enhance the monitoring capacity of the board. Directors 
nominated by shareholders do not seek to paralyse managerial activity, rather they aim 
to deliver new information and perspectives to the board members to enhance the 
monitoring capacity of the board. Better monitoring does not necessarily come at 
expense of the efficient board activities. Therefore, in conformance with the director 
primacy theory model, a proxy access opt-out regime is not automatically disruptive 
to the functioning of the board. These directors could reduce the cohesiveness and 
trust-based relationships in the boardroom. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, a 
friendlier and more cohesive boardroom significantly reduces the monitoring capacity 
of the board and causes significant corporate governance failures because these boards 
usually avoid taking hard disciplinary actions against management.  The result is that 
a proxy access opt-out system creates a meaningful nomination process which would 
substantially increase the disciplinary power of shareholder voting and help corporate 
governance to function better.  
 Proxy access also appears to be the one of the pillars of director primacy under 
state law because the ability of shareholders to replace and elect directors is often used 
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by the courts to justify director primacy in US corporate governance. It broadens the 
pool of candidates. Otherwise, where shareholders do not have an effective right to 
nominate directors, they are left with the list of candidates nominated by the board and 
management and have no option but to elect these directors. As discussed in Chapter 
5, the right to nominate directors exists in state law. Proxy access would allow 
shareholders to meaningfully exercise their state-based right to nominate directors.  
The current legal framework makes it difficult for shareholders to replace directors 
and provides the incumbent board and management with significant advantages over 
shareholders seeking to nominate new directors.  
 The analysis above suggests that there is a strong case for implementing an 
opt-out access regime in place of the current opt in no-access regime. Unlike the 
invalidated Rule 14a-11, this thesis argues that companies should be able to opt out of 
the access regime or to modify, strengthen or restrict shareholders’ access rights. The 
company-specific and industry-specific features, and the company’s shareholder base 
would determine the effectiveness and the optimal level of shareholder activism. The 
optimal eligibility thresholds may therefore vary from company to company. For 
instance, a company with a long-term and dominant CEO might need to employ strong 
nomination rights to ensure the board’s independence, or a company operating in an 
industry that requires prolonged investment may wish to enhance the nomination 
rights of shareholders that are committed to the long-term.134 Companies may need to 
limit excessive shareholder activism. A director election procedure could be valuable 
for some companies but could be value-reducing for others. Moreover, the governance 
requirements of companies may change over time and need to be modified according 
to company-specific factors. In addition, factors surrounding companies such as the 
market, the economy or political developments could change over time necessitating 
a new relationship between the board and shareholders.135 A flexible rule allows 
companies to employ variable criteria such as the ownership threshold or hold periods 
according to specific circumstances. Therefore, rather than mandatory and uniform 
rules that prevent the company from changing them, default rules could provide both 
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proxy access and flexibility that companies could arrange according to their firm-
specific characteristics.  
6.4.2.2 Adopting the Majority Voting Rule 
The analysis has so far focussed on proxy access, but as noted above, the discussion 
extends beyond proxy access to the selection of other default regimes and universal 
proxy cards. As discussed above, the ability of shareholders to replace directors 
enhances their accountability and the decision-making of the board. It would therefore 
be better to reconsider other existing arrangements such as the plurality voting rule 
and proxy card regulations so that shareholders can meaningfully exercise their rights.  
 As discussed in Chapter 5, the plurality voting rule in the US makes director 
elections almost meaningless and in uncontested elections directors could be elected 
even if the majority of shareholders did not support them. In this regard, shareholders 
are left with only the Wall Street Rule rather than voice because their dissatisfaction 
has no consequences for the board and management. Indeed, given the practical 
difficulties in nominating directors independently before the 2009 changes, elections 
were really only a hollow ceremony for institutional shareholders other than activist 
funds because a limited number of shareholders were able to nominate candidates. As 
rightly argued by Hirschman, shareholder activism will likely take place where 
shareholders believe that the activism could be effective.136 The majority voting rule 
could partially address this problem and make director elections more meaningful. 137  
The majority voting rule allows shareholders to vote effectively in favour of or against 
a directorial candidate. If the candidate does not receive more ‘for’ votes than ‘against 
votes’, she or he will fail to be elected. A director is therefore required to provide 
normative account-giving for the board’s actions and decisions because otherwise she 
or he might not secure the directorship for another term. Under the plurality voting 
rule, with shareholders having restricted nomination powers, a director would be 
aware of the fact that she or he would be elected regardless of the outcome of the 
election, so she or he would have less incentive to explain her or his decisions and 
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actions and to establish direct communication with shareholders. What is more, as 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, mainstream investors usually only carry out defensive 
activism. Therefore, they are less likely to nominate directors. Mainstream investors 
should be able to show their dissatisfaction by simply casting votes. The majority 
voting rule better fits with contemporary shareholder activism and the business model 
of mainstream investors. It basically forces the board and management to nominate a 
new director who fits the criteria of shareholders. Therefore, there is a compelling 
rationale to change the plurality voting default for a majority voting default.  
 It is possible to argue that since shareholders are able to change default rules, 
there is no need to change them. Moreover, shareholders are successfully 
implementing changes to majority voting. While this may appear to support the former 
argument, it may also suggest that default rules are no longer found to be efficient or 
desirable by shareholders and the time may have come to reform them. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, shareholders have long had the power to adopt, amend and repeal by-
laws without the approval of directors. Yet, it is not always easy for shareholders to 
amend by-laws for legal and practical reasons. Due to the complicated proxy 
regulations, Delaware law had to make amendments to indicate what kinds of by-law 
are permissible. Otherwise, the proposals could be prevented by the board under Rule 
14a-8. Therefore, the enabling nature of the provisions does not support the argument 
that any changes in the legal rules are unnecessary. Rather, it suggests there is a need 
for legal reform and that a majority voting rule would be a better fit in the era of 
investor capitalism. 
6.4.2.3 Adopting the Universal Proxy Cards 
These proposed changes would make director elections more meaningful and 
encourage shareholders to nominate directors. However, the proxy rules cause an 
intangible difficulty in the election of directors. Under current regulations, 
shareholders in principle receive two separate proxy cards for director elections: 
management’s and dissident’s proxy cards. Each card contains a specific slate of 
candidates. At the meeting, proxy holders appointed by shareholders complete a ballot 
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on behalf of shareholders.138 Although shareholders could theoretically appoint their 
agents to vote on their behalf, in practice all proxies are distributed by parties who 
nominate the candidates for the election.139 Rule 14a-4 creates a peculiar problem. 
Under Rule 14a-4, nominees that only consented to be included on proxy cards and to 
serve as directors can be named in the party’s proxy statement.140 Parties do not include 
other parties’ candidates on their proxy card or allow their candidates to be named on 
the other proxy card. A proxy card, therefore, contains only the party’s nominees. 
Shareholders voting by proxy cannot make a selection based on their preferences. 
However, shareholders who are present at the meeting are able to select among all the 
directorial candidates nominated by any party and vote for any of them.141 A further 
reform that would enhance the election of directors would be universal proxy cards as 
these would provide shareholders with the opportunity to vote for any candidate who 
was properly nominated. The proxy cards would become universal ballots. On 26 
October 2016, the SEC proposed amendments to proxy rules which would require 
companies to include the names of all directorial candidates nominated by the 
management and shareholders on a single proxy card, namely a universal proxy 
card.142 Implementing this amendment would make shareholders voting by proxy to a 
very large extent closer to shareholders who are present at the meeting and voting in 
person.  
 This call for reform has been opposed on the basis that it would increase the 
frequency of contested elections and empower shareholders with special interests.143 
The objections are not well-founded as discussed in Chapter 3. On the contrary, it 
makes the right to nominate directors more meaningful in the shadow of the law. 
Furthermore, shareholders are allowed to vote for a combination of candidates when 
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they attend the meeting in person in the US.144 Why should they be banned from doing 
so just because they vote by proxy? 
Universal proxy cards would lead to dramatic changes in directorial elections 
because they would allow shareholders to vote for their chosen combination of 
candidates. In the context of the current system of contested elections, i.e. unilateral 
proxies, shareholders have to vote for either one of the slates and cannot ‘mix and 
match’ from the two sides.145 This prevents mainstream funds from objecting to a 
complete slate of management or  supporting the activist funds when they do not 
approve of some of the candidates nominated by the management. Shareholders would 
be able to support just a part of the slates rather than all of it. The proposed reforms 
would significantly enhance the role of shareholder activism, and also allow the best 
candidates to be chosen regardless of their nominators.  
 Implementing the proposed amendments will provide significant advantages. 
Shareholders will gain an effective right to nominate directors and any disadvantage 
stemming from being on a separate card will be eliminated. Majority default rule will 
enable shareholders to force a particular director not to be elected. This will increase 
shareholders’ prospects of effectively using their voice. As a matter of law, these 
proposed amendments would be a better fit with the courts’ justification for the 
business judgment rule. Shareholders would be able to replace directors if they were 
not happy with the business strategy adopted by the board and management. Since 
these changes are not mandatory in nature, companies could implement a number of 
alternative procedures, adjusted to the level and type of shareholder activism 
according to the governance needs of companies. These proposed changes will make 
the law flexible enough to accommodate shareholder activism in US corporate 
governance without displacing the incumbent management. These amendments, in 
general, provide a fair opportunity for shareholders to nominate directors while 
preserving the incumbent management’s power to nominate directors. 
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 The Case for Enhancing the Disclosure Regime of Shareholders 
This thesis has shown that institutional shareholders play a key role in correcting 
managerial errors, enhancing decision-making of the board and addressing 
accountability concerns. But in some cases, shareholders in particular activist funds 
engage in controversial transactions to advance their own interests through risk-
decoupling techniques and wolf-packs. The activist funds’ controversial objectives 
provoked a fierce debate about the US disclosure regime.146 The Dodd-Frank Act 
expressly authorised the SEC to shorten the 10-day time period (discussed below) but 
the SEC made no attempt to do so.147 NASDAQ and the NYSE also asked the SEC to 
reconsider the disclosure regime for short-positions of shareholders.148 Recently, the 
Brokaw Act149 proposed to enhance the oversight of activist funds.150 Tightening the 
disclosure regime is aimed at controlling and limiting the activities of activist funds. 
However, there is a possibility that such reform calls could to be too broad to the extent 
that they could completely eliminate shareholder activism because the business model 
of activist funds primarily depends on the disclosure regime. This would be value-
decreasing overall for companies and the market. Regulation of institutional 
shareholders’ governance role must therefore strike a delicate balance. 
 Shareholders of listed companies are subject to numerous disclosure 
requirements under securities law that are primarily designed to release information to 
the public regarding the accumulation of substantial share ownership of a company. 
US securities law requires that when a shareholder or a group of persons accumulate 
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more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s shares, they must disclose their 
ownership within 10 days of the acquisition.151  The 5% and the 10-day time window 
provide an advantageous legal  environment to activist funds, compared to other 
jurisdictions.152 For instance, in the UK, a 3% ownership threshold and 2-day time 
window applies.153 In this regard, while US corporate law makes corporate governance 
restrictive for shareholder activism, the securities regulations make it shareholder-
friendly. Therefore, following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the US disclosure regime 
also attracted attention from lawmakers and academics to limit hedge fund activism.   
 From the perspectives of mainstream investors and directors, the disclosure of 
share ownership and risk-decoupling techniques is also important for the existing 
shareholders of the target company because the accumulation of shares by activist 
investors often means potential changes in the business strategy of the target company. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, mainstream investors show in interest in issues such as 
short-termism, and the objectives and proposals of activist funds. It is therefore 
crucially important for them to have knowledge of the composition and dynamics of 
the shareholder base and whether activist funds have negative interests in exercising 
voting rights. From the perspective of activist funds, disclosure rules play a key role 
in the sustainability of offensive shareholder activism. Activist funds must be able to 
recover the costs of activism. The cost recovery of activist funds usually depends on 
a sizeable share ownership purchased before the disclosure of the ownership because 
a share price increase generally follows the disclosure of the accumulation of shares 
by an activist fund. While the enhanced disclosure may provide better information 
regarding activist funds to companies and mainstream investors, it could make it 
relatively difficult for activist funds to recover their expenses. 
  Regulatory reform calls focus on four elements of the disclosure regime: 
shortening the time window, broadening the scope of beneficial ownership, the 
definition of group and including short-positions in the disclosure requirements. Each 
element aims to address the business model of activist funds. The overall impact of 
                                                 
151 17 CFR 240.13d-1. 
152 Alessio Paccess, ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds Activism in 
Corporate Governance’ (2016) 4 Erasmus Law Review 199, 212.  
153 D.T.R. 5.1.2., FSA Handbook. 
250 
 
these reform suggestions might cause activist funds to shrink and only a few 
companies to be targeted by activist funds because these reforms would substantially 
reduce the returns from activism. This might result in an overall decrease in 
shareholder activism and accountability problems. Therefore, we need to strike a 
balanced approach in regulating the disclosure regime.          
 The first policy question is related to the length of time window. Proponents 
of a shorter reporting window are of the view that the 10-day window allows activist 
funds to secretly accumulate a sizeable stake in the company, to report material 
information in an untimely manner, to trade ahead of the market and to maximise their 
profits at low risk and possibly at the expense of uninformed shareholders.154 Changes 
in technology and the advent of computerised trading enable shareholders to 
accumulate sizeable stake in a matter of seconds. Derivatives also enhance the capacity 
of shareholders to accumulate economic ownership in a short period of time. It is 
argued that there is no legitimate reason for a buyer of a sizeable stake to hide its 
transaction from the management, investment community and other shareholders for 
a 10-day period.155 Therefore, the 10-day period is found to be outdated and needs to 
be shortened to prevent potential abuses by activist funds.   
  The concerns arising from individual investors’ ability to purchase a stake are 
not well-established. The information about an underperforming company depends on 
the research of an activist fund; therefore, the information is a result of its own private 
efforts. Gilson and Gordon rightly ask: ‘why does the selling shareholder have an 
entitlement to share in the value of information created by the analysis of other 
investors?’. 156 The decision to sell belongs to the existing shareholders, and there 
might be different motives behind an exit such as liquidity or dissatisfaction with 
management. Furthermore, Bebchuk and Jackson rightly argue that activist funds do 
not normally obtain control benefits and therefore other shareholders do not lose a 
control premium due to the fact that activist funds do not usually have a controlling 
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stake in the listed companies.157 The calls for reform would facilitate the free-riding 
strategy among investors. A shortened time window would significantly restrict the 
activist funds’ ability to accumulate a sizeable stake, thereby reducing the returns of 
activist funds and the possible occasions of activism. Therefore, while shortening the 
time window appears to protect the interests of mainstream investors, it actually 
deprives them from the strategic monitoring and alternative business strategies 
presented by activist funds. Such restrictive disclosure rules can limit overall activism 
across the market and reduce its impact. 
 The second policy question relates to whether derivatives should be considered 
within the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ or not. The concept of beneficial 
ownership includes ‘voting power’ or ‘investment power’ which refers to ‘the power 
to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security’.158 Other forms of ownership 
are not counted within the concept of beneficial ownership unless they confer a right 
to acquire beneficial ownership. 159 This fails to address positive risk-decoupling 
techniques, i.e. the situation in which shareholders have more economic interest and 
risk than actual voting power. This technique basically allows activist funds to avoid 
disclosure requirements by having economic ownership through cash-settled swaps 
and to influence the vote of the short-party as discussed in Chapter 3.160   
 Developments in financial markets and the importance of hidden ownership 
problems require a broad and consistent solution. The most effective and practical way 
to deal with these problems is to expand the definition of ‘beneficial ownership’ to 
include economic ownership or interests arising out of any swap agreement. Such a 
solution will remove any uncertainty regarding whether the swap holdings of 
shareholders constitute a scheme to avoid disclosure under section 13d. This solution 
would ensure the consistent application of the rule compared to a case-by-case 
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examination.161 Such a solution is proposed by the Brokaw Act. The Brokaw Act 
would expand the concept of beneficial ownership by adding ‘a pecuniary or indirect 
pecuniary interest in such security’ to Section 13d-3(a).162 So any shareholder would 
be required to include financial derivatives that do not provide voting rights within 
their calculation of the beneficial ownership. The increased disclosure requirements 
would enable mainstream investors to assess and to respond adequately to activist 
proposals. Consistent with this view, the Hedge Fund Working Group stated that 
‘companies have a right to know who owns them or who has an ability to easily obtain 
significant voting power’ and endorsed the disclosure of economic-only interests, 
including swaps.163 The proposed change is less likely to have a significant impact on 
activist investors and does not eliminate offensive activism because the ownership 
threshold and the time window would still enable them to recover their expenses. It is 
therefore workable without unduly undermining the business model of activist funds.  
 The third policy question relates to the formation of wolf-packs. It has been 
noted that wolf-packs can be created to implement abusive tactics. The voting power 
of a wolf-pack can easily reach 20% to 30% since it is risk-free for them because, in 
any event, the members of a wolf-pack will receive the immediate increase on the day 
of disclosure.164 The formation of a wolf-pack actually depends on how the group of 
shareholders is interpreted under section 13(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.165 This section mandates that any group formed ‘for the purpose of acquiring, 
holding, voting or disposing of securities of an issuer’ shall be deemed as a ‘person’ 
under section 13(d). Wolf-packs can evade disclosure regimes in three different ways. 
First, all the members of the wolf-pack hold less than 5% of the target company’s 
shares. Second, the leader of the wolf-pack might own more than 5% of the company’s 
shares, but the others stay under the radar. Third, all members of the wolf-pack hold 
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more than 5% of the company’s shares. Depending on the definition of groups, the 
actual size of a wolf-pack could be hidden from other shareholders, the board and 
management. The formation of wolf-packs can transfer power away from the board 
and shareholders to activist funds. Since wolf-packs could pursue controversial 
business strategies without bearing any actual economic risk, their interests might 
diverge from the interests of other shareholders and the board.   
 The courts unfortunately interpret the group narrowly. In Hallwood Realty 
Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P.166 the court rejected the claim that the 
discussion between investors about their purchases constitutes a group under Section 
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. While there was evidence of coordination 
between hedge funds, the court did not consider wolf-packs to be the group. The 
narrow interpretation of ‘group’ has also been affirmed in CSX Corporation v. The 
Children’s Investment Fund Management. 167 The Court of Appeal held that ‘even if 
many of the parties' "activities" were the result of group action, two or more entities 
do not become a group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) unless they "act as a . . 
. group for the purpose of acquiring . . . securities of an issuer’ and further required ‘a 
precise finding, adequately supported by specific evidence, of whether a group existed 
for purposes of acquiring CSX shares’.168 It is difficult for the board and shareholders 
to notice the wolf-pack if some members of the wolf-pack have less than 5% of the 
target company because of the narrow interpretation of a ‘group’. In short, wolf-packs 
cannot be deemed a ‘group’ under securities law unless there is very clear evidence of 
coordination between investors.  
This raises one core question about how to limit the abusive tactics of activist 
funds through wolf-packs without restricting the overall regulatory framework. 
Instead of focusing on shortening the 10-day window or lowering the threshold, this 
thesis recommends an alternative approach. That is, re-defining the group might 
address concerns arising from a wolf-pack and does not constitute an overall limitation 
on shareholder activism. Similarly, the Brokaw Act proposed to add ‘seeking to 
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control or influence the board, management or policies’ and   ‘evading, or assisting 
others in evading, the designation as a ‘person’ under this paragraph’ to section 13d-3 
of the Exchange Act. Implementing these changes would help boards and mainstream 
investors to be aware of any sizeable accumulation of shares. It would not prevent 
individual activist funds from accumulating a toehold stake, but when they 
communicate with each other, their total ownership would be used to determine if they 
cross the ownership threshold.  
 The final policy question is related to the disclosure of short-positions. Unlike 
long-positions, US securities legislation does not require investors to disclose their 
short-positions.169 The Brokaw Act would require shareholders to disclose any short-
interest representing more than 5% of the shares of a company. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, risk-decoupling techniques give rise to significant public concerns in the 
wake of the financial crisis. Section 929X of the Dodd-Frank Act provided the SEC 
authority to promulgate disclosure requirements for short-positions. In academia, there 
are dissenting views regarding whether disclosure could fail to address problems 
associated with the short-positions of shareholders. Therefore, a complete ban on risk-
decoupling strategies is proposed by Thompson and Edelman.170 Such a holistic 
approach does not provide satisfactory solutions where the problem is not black or 
white.171 As discussed in Chapter 3, risk-decoupling techniques also generate benefits 
to corporate governance. Short-selling activities bridge the gap between overvalued 
shares and the real value of shares, reveals new information about underperforming 
companies and instances of misconduct at companies, and enhances liquidity. In the 
context of hedge fund activism, it is usually used in the form of empty voting. This 
thesis therefore does not support a complete ban on risk-decoupling techniques and 
considers enhanced disclosure an adequate solution to the problems of risk-
decoupling. Hedge funds in Australia, the UK and US opposed the enhanced 
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disclosure requirements and argued that the hedge fund industry would be 
significantly diminished if they were required to disclose detailed information 
regarding short-selling positions.172 The risk-decoupling techniques cause governance 
concerns because shareholders, the board and management do not have sufficient 
information to assess adequately whether the motivation behind activist proposals is 
consistent with corporate policies and objectives. Where the board and shareholders 
know that activist funds hold stakes on both sides of a deal, they might develop 
counter-measures such as revising the voting policies.173 Enhanced disclosure would 
likely deter activist funds from engaging in controversial risk-decoupling. Once it is 
known that they follow their private interests through shareholder proposals, they face 
negative reputational consequences. Unsurprisingly, many academics and 
practitioners have advocated enhanced disclosure as a solution to the problems 
discussed in Chapter 3.174 The individualised reporting requirement for short-positions 
would significantly enhance US corporate governance and the functioning of 
contemporary shareholder activism. It would also address the problems arising from 
the negative interests of shareholders while the benefits of short-positions could still 
be still realised without unduly prejudicing activist funds.  
 To conclude, there are calls for the reform of the enhanced disclosure rules to 
constrain unwanted behaviour of activist funds. Activist funds play an important role 
in corporate governance. Implementing the proposed changes, broadening the concept 
of beneficial ownership, narrowing the definition of group, regulating short-positions, 
and maintaining the 10-day time window would limit the controversial behaviour of 
activist funds and enhance the functioning of contemporary shareholder activism 
without unduly undermining the business model of activist funds. 
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6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the director primacy theory model should be softened to 
accommodate the evolving role of shareholders in US corporate governance. 
Shareholder activism could be accommodated within the US corporate governance 
regime while preserving the value of board authority. Shareholder activism serves a 
managerial error-correction role rather than the exercise of authority. It is therefore 
possible to address accountability concerns through shareholder participation while 
preserving sufficient discretionary room for directors. Shareholder activism makes the 
board truly independent of management and enhances the decision-making of 
companies by challenging the board and engaging with it. Therefore, director primacy 
should not survive in its near-absolute form. the proposed softer version of director 
primacy can be embraced by the corporate governance regime in the US and courts 
instead of the near-absolute conception of the theory. This softer version of director 
primacy could more effectively address accountability problems in public companies 
while recognising the role of the board of directors.  Any corporate governance 
reforms should aim to empower shareholders to incorporate their views on the future 
direction of companies rather than seeking to thwart them while still preserving the 
board’s authority. In this regard, UK corporate governance shows that the board’s 
authority is indeed compatible with strong shareholder participatory rights.   
 This thesis recommends the creation of a level playing fields for private 
orderings and making director elections more meaningful. Implementing these 
proposed changes would make US corporate governance flexible enough to 
accommodate shareholder activism. This study also suggests regulating the role of 
shareholders in securities law.  An enhanced disclosure regime has the potential to 
curb the darker side of activist funds without unduly prejudicing them. These changes 
would enable US corporate governance to conform with contemporary shareholder 
activism, while remaining consistent with its traditional approach.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of Theoretical Findings 
This thesis has provided an account of, and the reasons for, shareholder activism. 
Better corporate governance can be secured by considering the evolving role of 
shareholders in the context of the market and policy developments. The central aim of 
this thesis was to answer the question of whether and how the director primacy model 
prevalent in the US corporate governance system should be softened to accommodate 
this evolving role of shareholders.  
 Chapter 2 demonstrated how shareholders are traditionally relegated to the 
sidelines in corporate governance as a consequence of contractarian and director 
primacy theories. Under these theories, the role of shareholders is to provide capital 
with the expectation of receiving a rate of the total return generated by the company. 
Shareholders have neither financial incentives nor sufficient managerial skills to 
participate in the decision-making processes of companies. It is also argued that 
shareholders are not willing to engage in the decision-making processes of companies 
because of a number of legal obstacles and non-legal issues, such as free-rider and 
collective action problems. Director primacy theory highlights the economic 
efficiency and necessity of the board’s centralised decision-making authority and 
argues that this limited role of shareholders is the way it ought to be because 
shareholder activism comes at the expense of board authority. Since there is an 
inherent trade-off between accountability and authority, shareholder activism is found 
value-reducing and economically inefficient. Therefore, under director primacy theory 
company law should promote centralised decision-making through the board as much 
as possible and shareholders should not be entitled to interfere in the decision-making 
processes of public companies.  
 In the absence of shareholder participation, reliance is placed on other 
accountability mechanisms, namely the market for corporate control, remuneration 
contracts, non-executive directors and external auditors to provide sufficient 
accountability in public companies. In addition, it relies on the board’s dynamics to 
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oversee management and directors. However, each accountability mechanism is 
subject to its own inherent limitations and fails to provide sufficient monitoring of 
management. The dynamics of the board are not as strong as director primacy theory 
assumes because the board can be under the influence of management due to the 
informational advantages enjoyed by management and the re-election concerns 
relating to independent directors. This over-reliance on management impedes the 
board from exercising effective control of management. The Barings, Enron, and 
Lehman Brothers failures demonstrated that the modern board of directors often fails 
to carry out the unique combination of managerial and monitoring roles that is 
expected and assumed by director primacy theory. There is therefore a gap in the 
monitoring mechanisms, and the need for a better functioning corporate governance.    
 Chapter 3 showed that shareholder activism could potentially play an 
important role in monitoring directors and managers. It concluded that the evolving 
role of shareholder activism is normatively desirable in corporate governance, despite 
the potential problems that might arise from shareholder participation and found no 
solid support for anti-empowerment rhetoric. The present research examined the main 
advantages of the evolving role of shareholder activism in corporate governance from 
two perspectives: a- shareholder activism as an accountability mechanism to promote 
shareholders’ own private interests, and b- shareholder activism as an accountability 
mechanism to facilitate long-term investments and ensure the sustainability of 
companies and the economy in general. 
 In terms of shareholder activism as an accountability mechanism for 
shareholders’ own private interests, shareholder activism in Hirschman’s framework 
seeks to change corporate policies rather than exit the company.1 Institutional 
shareholders aim to influence the board according to their point of view, so 
shareholder activism can be driven by many different motives. While some 
shareholders aim to protect existing stakes at a particular company, activist funds 
perceive activism as an investment strategy. Alternatively, some funds focus on 
corporate social responsibility issues. In this respect, neither empirical evidence nor 
the short-termism versus long-termism debate casts any light on the desirability of 
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shareholder activism in corporate governance. The underlying issue with regards to 
shareholder activism is the conflicting views between shareholders and the incumbent 
management about the direction of the company’s policies. From this perspective, the 
role of shareholder activism is an early warning mechanism regarding the possible 
underperformance of management, i.e. it is a feedback mechanism to the board. 
Therefore, it functions alongside the board of directors. Shareholder activism, 
therefore, may address accountability concerns and reduce agency problems by 
warning the board about the underperformance of management. This 
underperformance may not only be related to financial issues, but also non-financial 
issues. Shareholder activism has the potential to play a preventive role with regards to 
the underperformance of companies before it is too late to take corrective action. The 
main advantages of shareholder activism are the increased accountability in public 
companies, improved monitoring mechanisms, and better engagement between the 
board and shareholder base. Hirschman’s framework also demonstrated that 
companies benefit from shareholder activism to varying degrees. So, while 
shareholder activism might be beneficial for some companies, it might be excessive 
for others. Shareholder activism is not inherently good or bad. The boards, therefore, 
should be able to adjust the appropriate level of activism with the help of shareholders. 
 In terms of shareholder activism as an accountability mechanism to facilitate 
long-term investments and ensure the sustainability of companies and the economy in 
general, shareholder activism is used as a means of addressing public interest concerns 
such as short-termism in the market. Major institutional shareholders established the 
Stewardship Principles. These principles could be a turning point for US corporate 
governance because they open a door between companies and institutional 
shareholders allowing both sides to develop a constructive dialogue and forms of 
engagement. The promulgation of such principles shows that institutional shareholders 
share responsibility for the sustainability of portfolio companies. This is a new 
paradigm in the US where shareholders and directors have often had a strained or even 
confrontational relationship. Such engagement is more collaborative in nature than is 
assumed by the shareholder primacy and director primacy theories. This kind of 
activism could play a supportive role for the board of directors when they have contact 
with activist funds and decide to invest for the long-term. In this respect, this thesis 
260 
 
considers that such collaborative activism also helps the board to maintain its authority 
and recalibrates the relationship between directors and shareholders.    
 The present thesis also discussed the potential problems relating to shareholder 
activism from different perspectives, namely the short-termism argument, the 
conflicting interests of shareholders, risk-decoupling techniques, and stakeholder 
theory. This thesis argued that the short-termism versus long-termism debate fails to 
shed light on the desirability of shareholder activism because companies operating in 
a competitive market might benefit from immediate feedback from shareholders. 
Shareholder activism, therefore, should be evaluated in the context of the ‘right-
termism’ relevant to the company. The differing interests of shareholders has been 
criticised because it is often argued that they might pursue goals other than shareholder 
wealth maximisation. However, this thesis finds such activism consistent with the 
general approach of company law which allows the board to consider stakeholder 
concerns. Shareholder activism is also criticised on the grounds of stakeholder 
concerns. A different version of the director primacy model that does not provide 
sufficient room for shareholder participation is examined. This thesis concluded that 
shareholder activism could be a means of advancing stakeholders’ concerns. The 
present research also investigated the problems by shareholders who engage in risk 
decoupling. A potential drawback of risk decoupling techniques was identified. With 
the help of these techniques, shareholders can increase their influence over the board 
and management and force them to pursue business strategies which benefit a 
particular shareholder rather than other shareholders and the company. Therefore, 
these techniques raise significant corporate governance concerns. Despite this 
potential problem, this thesis found no solid basis for a complete insulation of the 
board and management from shareholder participation. Therefore, lawmakers should 
not overemphasise the potential problems regarding shareholder participation. 
Overall, the present research concluded that the evolving role of shareholder activism 
is desirable in corporate governance.   
 The success and practicability of shareholder activism as an accountability 
mechanism to promote shareholders’ own interests and ensure the sustainability of 
companies and the economy in general depends on the individual capacity of 
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institutional shareholders to exercise formal and informal means of such activism. In 
other words, institutional shareholders must be able to overcome free-rider and 
collective action problems for shareholder activism to function meaningfully. Chapter 
4 demonstrated that the share ownership of public companies has transformed from 
individual to institutional ownership. Against this background, shareholder activism 
becomes more likely with the re-concentration of shares in the hands of institutional 
shareholders.  
 Chapter 4 also demonstrated that share ownership is not the sole determinant 
of shareholder activism because each institutional shareholder has different business 
models, which play a significant role in shaping their activism. The business models 
of institutional shareholders consist of different factors such as the liability structure, 
the fee structure of the external and internal fund managers, the investment strategy of 
funds, and the political and social purposes of the funds. As a result of the combination 
of these factors, institutional shareholders or their fund managers may hesitate to 
engage in activism, even though such activism would increase the value of portfolio 
companies, i.e. would be beneficial for the ultimate beneficiaries. In this respect, the 
analysis of institutional shareholders has demonstrated that mainstream institutional 
shareholders, namely large pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and 
sovereign wealth funds are long-term investors. These major institutional shareholders 
are not passive in the Berle-Means sense. They have transformed from ‘rational 
passive investors’ to ‘rational reticent investors’. In particular, large mainstream 
institutional shareholders have sufficient resources to establish constructive 
engagement with the boards. They could potentially carry out the stewardship 
responsibilities, but they are more likely to refrain from initiating confrontational 
activism against the board or developing shareholder proposals addressing agency 
gaps in corporate governance because of their business models. 
 Hedge funds fill this important niche in corporate governance. They have a 
unique business model in which the fee structures and the disclosure regime play a 
key role for hedge funds, driving them to exercise offensive activism. They can 
identify underperforming targets, accumulate sizeable stakes, and present an 
alternative business strategy to the board and shareholders. The present research 
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considers hedge funds an important disciplinary means over management by revealing 
the flaws in the incumbent management’s business strategy. Hedge funds provide a 
genuinely alternative approach with regards to the future direction of the target 
company. This study does not unconditionally favour hedge funds because it is not 
uncommon for them to pursue their own private interests through a number of 
controversial tactics such as wolf-packs, golden leashes and risk-decoupling 
techniques, which raise corporate governance concerns. As such, this thesis adopted a 
balanced approach rather than accepting either polar characterisation of hedge funds. 
Overall, the awakening of mainstream shareholders and the emergence of activist 
shareholders are at odds with the assumptions of contractarian theorists with regard to 
the role of shareholders. The present thesis concluded that the evolving role of 
institutional shareholders in corporate governance should be taken into consideration 
in the future direction of company law and should be accommodated in corporate 
governance.  
7.2 The Analysis of US Company Law 
This thesis established a theoretical framework for the importance of shareholder 
activism in corporate governance, and how the role of shareholders envisaged by law 
and economic approaches have been converted into practice in the market. Along with 
shareholders’ economic power, it is crucial to understand how the theory of the role 
of shareholders has been translated into practice within the US legal framework.  
 In this thesis, the aim was to draw a clear picture of US legal and regulatory 
rules which reflect director primacy theory. In this investigation, the aim was to 
evaluate the extent to which shareholder activism is practicable in US corporate 
governance. State law, federal law, and market developments in the post-crisis era 
have been examined and evaluated. Additionally, the judiciary’s understanding of the 
board authority has been critically examined. One of the main findings of this 
examination was that shareholders have long been impeded from participating in the 
governance of companies and even effectively exercising their shareholder rights 
under state law. The courts have developed an understanding of the board that confers 
on it near-absolute authority. Delaware and federal law have overregulated 
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shareholder activism. Modernisation in these areas is much needed to reflect the 
evolving role of shareholders.   
 The findings of Chapter 5 showed that Delaware law and federal law have been 
in flux in terms of shareholder power for a long time, and the anti-shareholder 
empowerment rhetoric of director primacy theory has significantly influenced the 
legal and regulatory reform process. Shareholders were traditionally accorded a 
‘spectator’ or ‘bystander’ role in US corporate governance.2 Even in the post-Enron 
crisis era, shareholder participation has not been a priority for lawmakers, although 
shareholder protection has been a concern for them. Stronger shareholder rights have 
been found to be potentially destructive for corporate governance, and unnecessary 
because of the market for corporate control.  
 Chapter 5 discussed how the courts have also played a role in attributing a 
spectator role to shareholders. US company law mandates that companies are managed 
by or under the direction of a board of directors. The courts have shown strong 
deference to the board’s authority under the business judgement rule, enhanced 
scrutiny, and entire fairness tests. The judiciary developed the business judgment rule 
to protect the exercise of managerial power by the board. In this context, it is very 
difficult for shareholders to rebut the presumption that ‘in making a business decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company’.3 In this 
way, the substance of corporate decisions is protected. The standard of review shifts 
to the enhanced scrutiny test where there are some situations that could potentially 
affect the judgement of even independent and disinterested directors. The standard 
shifts to the entire fairness test where the majority of directors are not sufficiently 
independent and disinterested. The analysis of these three standards of review revealed 
that the board is shown strong deference when it exercises power or fails to act. The 
courts rely on the market for corporate control and director removal, election and re-
election mechanisms to prevent any adverse implications of this strong reliance. 
                                                 
2 Christopher Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World (Cambridge 2013) 38; 
Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge 2011) 63; Jennifer Hill, ‘Visions and 
Revisions of the Shareholder’ (2000) 48(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 39, 47.  
3 Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 811-2 (Del. 1984). 
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However, this rationale was challenged in Chapter 5 because shareholders cannot 
effectively replace directors.  
 The courts apply the enhanced scrutiny test, i.e. the Unocal test where the 
board has adopted defensive mechanisms. These defensive mechanisms were mostly 
employed in the context of takeovers, but recently the board began employing 
defensive mechanisms in the context of shareholder activism. Chapter 5 revealed how 
the application of the Unocal test could be over-restrictive for shareholders to engage 
because a fundamental aspect of shareholder activism is to influence or change 
corporate policy and effectiveness. Furthermore, the courts accepted that the 
possibility that activist funds are acting together could also be a threat to corporate 
policy. In this respect, defensive mechanisms will dilute the voting power of activist 
shareholders and make shareholder activism less likely. Chapter 5 also showed that 
the logic behind upholding defensive mechanisms is that shareholders cannot make 
informed decisions. Chapter 5, therefore, suggested that the Delaware courts should 
re-consider its existing assumption regarding shareholders and recognise the evolving 
nature of institutional shareholders as depicted in Chapters 3 and 4 in order to fully 
realise the benefits of shareholder activism.  
 Chapter 5 also examined how shareholders are slowly moving to the centre of 
corporate governance through private ordering mechanisms. The increasing economic 
power of institutional shareholders has led them to initiate a transformative process 
towards more shareholder friendly corporate governance through by-law amendments 
on a company-by-company basis. Such transformation has accelerated in the wake of 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis with the removal of the impediments against 
shareholders’ proxy access to director elections. In fact, institutional shareholders have 
achieved considerable success in reducing the number of staggered boards, anti-
takeover mechanisms and plurality voting rules, and in adopting proxy access in 
director elections, the separation of chairman and CEO positions, and the right to 
convene shareholder meetings. The impact of these shareholder proposals is not 
limited to these areas; they increase shareholders’ overall disciplinary power. For 
instance, where a company has a staggered board, shareholders could remove directors 
only with cause. The removal of staggered boards has also increased the power of 
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shareholders to remove directors. As a result, by-law amendments through Rule 14a-
8 provided shareholders with greater private ordering autonomy. In addition to 
changes through private orderings, the Dodd-Frank Act expanded shareholders’ rights 
to say on pay. Chapter 5 argued that US corporate governance is becoming more 
shareholder friendly. 
 The present research demonstrated that this transformation has not been perfect 
and has suffered from major deficiencies. Chapter 5 showed that directors also respond 
to this transformation by adopting by-laws to restrict shareholders’ rights or the ability 
to exercise shareholder rights. Both shareholders and directors appear to have equal 
power to adopt, amend and repeal by-laws under section 109 of the DGCL. However, 
Chapter 5 showed that shareholder authority to adopt, amend and repeal by-laws is 
more limited than the board’s authority, even though shareholders possess statutory 
power while directors’ power originates from the charter itself. The courts developed 
divergent treatment for shareholder-and board-adopted by-laws. This thesis argued 
that the power imbalance between shareholders and directors does not arise from 
section 109 of the DGCL, but rather from the strong interpretation of section 141 by 
the courts. Such divergent treatment of shareholder-adopted and board-adopted by-
laws could be used by directors to undermine the value of shareholder activism in US 
corporate governance. Additionally, it is not clear whether directors could repeal or 
amend shareholder-adopted by-laws under section 141(a).   The interpretation of the 
courts and the ambiguity surrounding whether directors could repeal shareholder-
adopted by-laws highlight the need for clarity in the statutory language to allow 
shareholder activism to function better and not be undermined by the courts. 
 This study indicated proxy regulations as one of the most important tools of 
shareholder activism in the US because in public companies dispersed shareholders 
mostly use Rule 14a-8 to submit shareholder proposals. In essence, the primary 
purpose of Rule 14a-8 is to make state-based shareholder rights practicable. The 
findings of the present research demonstrated that Rule 14a-8 has long impeded 
shareholders from submitting shareholder proposals by providing the board and 
management with thirteen grounds for exclusion. One of the exclusion grounds was 
related to director elections. Rule 14a-8 prevented shareholders from submitting 
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shareholder proposals relating to director elections until the Rule was changed in 2010. 
This ban not only covered the nomination of a particular director, but also included 
shareholder proxy access by-laws, i.e. company specific procedures for the 
nomination process. In addition, there are merit-based exclusion grounds, namely 
conflicts with state law, the ordinary business exclusion, and relevance. The board and 
management mostly rely on the ordinary business exclusion ground due to its broad 
and vague definition. These exclusion grounds show that the mere submission of 
shareholder proposals was considered a potential threat to corporate governance. This 
rule had been put in place before shareholder activism became an important aspect of 
US corporate governance. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that the nature of 
shareholder activism has evolved, and shareholder activism does not constitute a threat 
to corporate governance. Moreover, Chapter 5 showed that these proposals are an 
important means of addressing accountability concerns and agency problems and 
making the board responsive to shareholder concerns. It needs to be revised to reflect 
the changing role of shareholders.  
   The present research also examined the process of director elections. Director 
elections are not only a disciplinary mechanism that shareholders have, but also 
underscore the legitimacy of directorial power. The analysis has shown that while 
shareholders have state-based rights to nominate directors, proxy regulation has long 
prevented shareholders from exercising such rights. In the wake of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, the SEC removed the barriers to shareholder nomination by-law 
proposals and adopted proxy access, but the court invalidated the mandatory proxy 
access regulation. Without these reforms, the power of shareholders to nominate and 
replace directors were illusory. Shareholders are now able to adopt shareholder 
nomination by-law proposals, but they still do not have proxy access. Additionally, 
under state law, the default regime for elections is plurality voting. Chapter 5 
demonstrated that the dissatisfaction of shareholders has no practical effect on the 
directors. Overall, such a restrictive framework limits shareholders’ ability to 
nominate directors which could potentially address the short-comings of the 
monitoring board, i.e. the overreliance on management and the information 
asymmetry between the board and management. Chapter 5 therefore challenged the 
rationale for strong deference to the board, which is that shareholders are able to 
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replace directors when they are dissatisfied with them. This analysis implies that the 
legal framework should enable shareholders to nominate directors and to show their 
dissatisfaction.     
 In summary, the results of Chapter 5 indicated that while market developments 
through private ordering and the legal reforms in the wake of the financial crisis have 
made US corporate governance more shareholder friendly, some issues still remain 
problematic. The practicability of shareholder activism remains subject to limitations.  
7.3 Accommodating Shareholder Activism within the US Corporate 
Governance Model 
The aim of Chapter 6 was to understand whether director primacy theory should be 
softened to the extent to that it could accommodate shareholder activism. The chapter 
therefore contributed to existing knowledge regarding the practicability of shareholder 
activism under director primacy theory and provided possible remedies to the main 
impediments to such activism and the potential problems of shareholder activism. 
 The discussion in Chapter 6 argued that the principles of accountability and 
authority could work together and should be read together. It concluded that director 
primacy should be softened to the extent that it can accommodate the evolving role of 
shareholders. Corporate governance should be built around the principles of authority 
and accountability. As such, rather than discussing who should have ultimate control 
in corporate governance, the delicate task of corporate governance should be to 
address accountability problems while preserving sufficient room for directors to 
manoeuvre. 
 Chapter 2 demonstrated that the core attributes of corporate governance in the 
context of the allocation of power between shareholders and directors are the concepts 
of authority and accountability. Since these concepts have been found incompatible 
with each other, it has led to a protracted discussion of shareholder primacy and 
director primacy theories. The discussion in Chapter 6 proposed a toned-down version 
of director primacy which recognises the value of shareholder activism as well as 
centralised management. In this model, the allocation of power is not thought of as a 
zero-sum game in which there is an inherent trade-off between authority and 
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accountability. Rather than discussing who should have the ultimate control in 
corporate governance, the delicate task of corporate governance should be to address 
accountability problems while maintaining sufficient discretionary power to the board 
of directors.  
 The features of contemporary shareholder activism make the milder version of 
director primacy theory possible. The discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that 
current shareholder activism is not only confrontational, but also constructive for the 
incumbent board and management. Chapter 6 showed that the evolving role of 
shareholder activism is to bring moderation to the inherent power imbalance between 
shareholders and directors by challenging the board of directors and establishing 
shareholder engagement with the board. The softer version of director primacy theory 
is consistent with market developments because it forces us to stop thinking of 
shareholders as just providers of capital who are only interested in short-term wealth 
maximisation. This broader understanding encompasses the evolving role of 
shareholders in which shareholders are willing to incorporate their financial and non-
financial concerns into the decision-making of public companies. It addresses 
accountability problems more effectively than the traditional director primacy theory 
and significantly enhances the monitoring and decision-making capacity of the board. 
Moreover, it makes the board more critical of management in exercising judgement 
and decision-making, which is a prerequisite for director primacy theory to function. 
In principle, company law should therefore not block shareholder activism.  
 Contemporary shareholder activism serves two main functions: challenging 
the board and establishing engagement with it. Chapter 6 demonstrated that neither of 
these functions transfer power from directors to shareholders. With regards to the first 
function, activist funds challenge current corporate policies of incumbent 
management. In doing so, they reveal the flaws in the corporate policies or governance 
structure of the investee companies and bring new information to the boardroom and 
shareholders. This enhances the monitoring and decision-making capacity of the board 
of directors by addressing information asymmetry problems between the board and 
managers. In some cases, they directly appoint the directors, who are not afraid of 
speaking out against the management. In essence, activist funds raise legitimate 
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questions in the boardroom. When a corporate decision is contested, the role of the 
board becomes that of arbitrator between activist investors and the incumbent 
management. The board has two basic options: to accept the proposed changes or to 
decline them. In both cases, the board has to explain and justify its decisions. It forces 
the board to be more critical of the management’s actions. Thus, it plays a managerial 
error corrective function rather than a decision-making role by raising legitimate 
questions and forcing the board to obtain more information about the strategy. Overall, 
this aspect of shareholder activism helps to break the overreliance of the board on 
management which was identified as a major short-coming of current boardrooms. In 
this regard, the board becomes truly independent of management.  
 In relation to the second function, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that 
mainstream investors tend to establish constructive activism with the board and 
management. This aspect of activism is a key factor in the board’s success against 
offensive activism. Chapter 6 argued that it enhances the board’s authority because 
where the board provides ex ante explanations with regard to corporate decisions, 
mainstream investors tend to support the board and management against activist funds. 
In this way, it reduces the number of needless confrontational shareholder activism 
actions. Where the voice and concerns of a majority of shareholders are adequately 
taken into consideration, these shareholders are less likely to support activist funds. 
As such, shareholder activism, i.e. accountability, becomes a means of ensuring the 
authority of the directors.    
 Chapter 6 also examined the UK’s corporate governance framework in terms 
of the allocation of power to enhance our understanding of the relationship between 
authority and accountability. Chapter 6 showed that UK company law provides 
shareholders with strong participatory rights as well as directors with authority. The 
board’s authority is well protected under UK company law. The analysis showed that 
strong participatory rights do not equate to ultimate control of public companies, but 
rather only require the board to provide ex ante explanations for their decisions. In 
other words, it still functions within the boundaries of the concept of accountability. 
Therefore, they only bring moderation to the corporate discussion table.  
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 Chapter 6, therefore, showed that it is possible to address accountability 
problems in public companies while leaving sufficient discretionary room for 
directors. It concluded that director primacy theory should not survive in its current 
form but should instead be softened in its approach to authority and accountability. To 
this end, Chapter 6 made a number of recommendations to render US corporate 
governance sufficiently flexible to accommodate the evolving role of shareholder 
activism. These recommendations aim to improve the disciplinary role of shareholders 
and to enhance the decision-making of companies, while recognising sufficient room 
for directors. In creating a better framework for an attenuated version of director 
primacy theory, the following themes should be considered by policy-makers: a- the 
value of board authority b- the emergence of activist funds and the awakening of 
mainstream institutional shareholders, c- the functionality of authority and 
accountability together, d- the possibility of private benefit extraction through risk-
decoupling techniques and wolf-packs, and e- the possibility of excessive shareholder 
activism. The primary aim is therefore to establish a delicate balance between 
shareholder activism and the board’s authority. 
    With this objective in mind, the present research suggested creating a level 
playing field in terms of private orderings, making director elections more meaningful 
and enhancing the disclosure obligations of shareholders. Chapter 5 demonstrated that 
shareholder proposals are the most important tool that shareholders can use to make 
changes to the governance structures of investee companies. However, Chapter 5 
argued that although the boards and shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal 
by-laws originates from section 109, the courts have narrowly interpreted shareholder 
power compared to the board’s power. Chapter 6 argued that this divergent treatment 
arises from the recursive loop between sections 109 and 141, and also the hard 
interpretation of director primacy by the courts. It appears that without any 
clarification in the law, such narrow interpretations will likely remain. In this respect, 
this thesis firstly suggested adding the phrase ‘procedural or substantive’ to section 
109(b) in order to remove the artificial distinctions between procedural or substantive 
bylaws created by the courts, and to add ‘the by-laws may not be used to mandate the 
decision itself’ to the same section to prevent shareholders from directing directors. 
Secondly, it recommended adding the term ‘in its by-laws’ to section 141 to indicate 
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that limitations might come from by-laws as well. Thirdly, in order to remove an 
ambiguity surrounding whether or not directors could amend shareholder-adopted by-
laws, this study suggested adding ‘the board cannot amend a shareholder by-law unless 
otherwise stated in the by-law’ to section 109.  
 By-laws are usually submitted through Rule 14a-8. Chapter 5 demonstrated 
that Rule 14a-8 provides the board with very broad discretionary power to exclude 
shareholder proposals. Chapter 6 showed that Rule 14a-8 fails to reflect the market 
and policy developments. This thesis recommended the removal of the ordinary 
business and relevance exclusion grounds to make proxy regulation consistent with 
state law. Chapter 6 also argued that the $2000 threshold in Rule 14a-8 is outdated and 
instead recommended the application of a 1% ownership criterion to prevent 
shareholders who have immaterial ownership of the company from submitting 
shareholder proposals.  
 Chapter 5 showed that shareholders have long been impeded from participating 
in director elections. Although the SEC removed barriers to shareholder nomination 
by-law proposals, the discussion in Chapter 6 argued that this development is not 
satisfactory and fails to allow shareholders to participate in director elections. The 
analysis in Chapter 6 suggested a shift from a plurality voting to majority voting rule, 
from a no-access to default access regime, and the adoption of universal proxy cards 
to provide shareholders with a genuine opportunity to participate in director elections. 
 Chapter 6 demonstrated that the influence of mainstream institutional 
shareholders is of significant importance if shareholder activism is to play a 
managerial error-correction function and enhance the decision-making of public 
companies. Chapters 3 and 4 examined how activist shareholders could change the 
balance towards themselves without bearing the economic consequences of their 
actions through risk-decoupling techniques and wolf-pack tactics. These controversial 
methods allow activist funds to evade disclosure requirements. Chapter 6 therefore 
suggested  regulating the role of shareholders in securities regulation. The aim was to 
curb the potential darker side of offensive activism without completely eliminating the 
business model of activist funds. In this respect, Chapter 6 examined the proposed 
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Brokaw Act4 seeking to amend the disclosure requirements of activist funds. It 
concluded that shortening the time window of disclosure could significantly 
undermine the business model of activist funds. It also found that broadening the scope 
of beneficial ownership, redefining ‘group’ for the purpose of shareholders acting in 
concert and including short-positions could address the potential concerns arising from 
the activities of activist funds.   
  In summary, this thesis has critically analysed the evolving role of shareholders 
in corporate governance. It has assessed both the advantages and disadvantages of 
shareholder activism and has highlighted why the potential problems with shareholder 
participation should not be overemphasised. It has demonstrated the evolving nature 
of the shareholder base of public companies. The findings showed that the role of 
shareholders as capital providers fails to embrace the emerging role of shareholders. 
Activist shareholders are now willing to criticise existing business strategies, and 
major mainstream institutional shareholders are willing to contribute to the 
development of important corporate policies and to support long-term value creation. 
Alternatively, some institutional shareholders incorporate ESG and CSR issues into 
their investment policies. This is at odds with director primacy theory and US 
corporate governance. This research examined the key elements of shareholder 
activism in US corporate governance to understand how US corporate governance 
could accommodate the evolving role of shareholders. Further recommendations have 
been proposed to address the short-comings identified in US companies by 
considering the developing role of shareholders, the potential darker side of 
shareholder activism and the possibility of excessive shareholder activism.  
 The general finding of this thesis is that there is a need for shareholder activism 
in corporate governance. It is not only a monitoring mechanism, but also a means of 
improving decision-making of public companies. It helps to enhance the independence 
of the board and to function as the ultimate decision-making authority of public 
companies. It could also contribute to the sustainability of companies by incorporating 
ESG issues and supporting the long-term investments of portfolio companies. It 
functions as an early warning mechanism that helps the board and management to 
                                                 
4 The Brokaw Act, S. 2720, 114th Cong. (2016). 
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understand the potential weaknesses in their corporate policies before they become too 
late. Hence, it could play a preventative role in corporate governance.  
7.4 Limitations of the Current Study and Recommendations for 
Future Studies  
This thesis has intended to examine the evolving role of shareholders in US corporate 
governance in light of the prevailing theoretical and practical aspects in the literature. 
However, a number of important limitations of findings advanced in this thesis should 
be considered.   
 Chapter 4 has demonstrated that whether institutional shareholders exercise 
different levels and quality of activism depends on their business models. Chapter 6 
also discussed the importance of the role of mainstream institutional shareholders to 
screen the proposals of activist funds. Their role is also crucial for the success of 
activist funds. Their capacity to exercise informed activism is central to good 
governance.  
 Chapter 3 showed how major mainstream institutional shareholders developed 
a set of Stewardship Principles that require institutional investors and asset managers 
to disclose how they evaluate corporate governance factors in terms of portfolio 
companies. The Principles also encourage asset owners and managers to engage in 
constructive shareholder activism and to work with other institutional investors. The 
present research found this development to be promising overall in terms of guiding 
institutional investors towards an activism culture and letting directors know what 
their investment approach is likely to be and how the shareholder base will react.  
 However, this thesis has not gone further to examine how the monitoring 
capacity of mainstream institutional shareholders could be further enhanced. In this 
respect, the relationship between fee arrangements (between external managers and 
the institutional funds, and internal managers and the institutional funds) and the 
quality of shareholder activism could be  examined in more depth. This is highly 
important because, as Chapter 4 argued, even if the benefit of shareholder activism is 
considerable for the ultimate beneficiaries of institutional shareholders, its reflection 
on the salary of fund managers may be immaterial. It may discourage fund managers 
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to take action. Alternative fee arrangements should therefore be investigated further. 
Another related issue is that of the distribution of the cost of shareholder activism 
between institutional shareholders and external funds. A policy solution within the 
institutional investment industry should be investigated.  
 Chapter 4 also made the point that the way in which mainstream institutional 
shareholders measure the success of fund managers has also had an impact on 
shareholder activism. Further examination is warranted of the possibility of 
stewardship responsibilities as an alternative mechanism to evaluate the success of 
fund managers. The relationship between measuring the success of fund managers 
through absolute or relative performance and the quality of shareholder activism also 
merits closer attention. In this respect, a principle consistent with the dynamics of the 
investment industry should be developed.   
 Chapter 4 showed that institutional shareholders often delegate the fund 
management activity to external fund managers. The monitoring capacity of these fund 
managers could be problematic in terms of shareholder activism. For instance, one 
fund manager declared that it attended more than 15,000 annual general meetings.5 
This illustrates how exercising considered activism could be challenging for asset 
managers in practice if they have not developed an engagement culture and do not 
have a sufficiently large workforce.  
 Another issue that was not examined is the problem of the long and complex 
investment chain involving consultants, funds of funds, and fund managers that places 
asset owners and the ultimate beneficiaries even further away from the portfolio 
companies. This has negative implications for the monitoring activities of investors 
because it causes ‘a tendency to view market effectiveness through the eyes of 
intermediaries rather than companies or end investors’6 and weakens the ‘sense of 
accountability between the ultimate investor and the investee company’.7 David 
                                                 
5 Simon Wong, ‘Is Institutional Investor Stewardship Still Elusive?’ (September 2015) Butterworths 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 508, 510.  
6 John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision-Making (July 2012) 10. 
7 Simon Wong, ‘Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors’ (July/August 2010) 




Swensen, the former Chief Investment Officer of Yale University’s Endowment, 
described ‘funds of funds’ as ‘a cancer on the institutional-investor world’ and argued 
that they cause ignorant capital in the investment chain.8 Future research will need to 
focus on whether the investment chain should be shortened.  
 The final issue that has not been covered in this thesis is the use of loyalty-
promoting instruments such as loyalty shares. Several jurisdictions such as France and 
Italy have started to employ the concept of loyalty shares to encourage long-term share 
ownership.9 The potential impact of loyalty-promoting instruments on activism by 
mainstream institutional shareholders, activist funds and the principle of one-share-
one-vote should be researched in much greater detail.   
 In summary, the present research has indicated that there are many questions 
regarding shareholder activism and the governance structure of institutional 
shareholders.  Within these areas of investigation, it is recommended that the 
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